[Avodah] free will

Micha Berger via Avodah avodah at lists.aishdas.org
Thu Jan 21 18:00:01 PST 2016


On Tue, Jan 05, 2016 at 09:15:31PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote:
: Nadav Shnerb has an interesting chapter on hardening Paro's heart. I will
: attempt to shorten his presentation.
: Basic question: A pistol is pointed at someone's head and he is told to
: commit some crime - does he have free will? The average person would
: certainly say he had no choice. How about torture?

Does this relate to the machloqes about what we mean when we say 
mal'akhim have no bechirah chafshis? See RGS's summary of
Sifsei Chaim on the subject at
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol06/v06n015.shtml#02

Not mentioned was a machloqes I had noted, where the Rambam says that
mal'achim has no ability to choose even in principle. They're robots
following programming. And yet the OS (Hilkhos Teshuvah "HaKol Tzafui,
veheReshus Nesunah") says it's that they have no choices to make, since
everything is so obviouse -- which implies they could make choices,
if they had any worth making.

Back to human beings, REED has his famous "nequdas habechirah".
Translation from Michtav meiEliyahu available at
http://www.torah.org/features/spirfocus/FreeChoice-point2.html
Leshitaso, free will only enters in conscious decisions, and it is only
decisions where the two sides are roughly balanced that forces themselves
to consciousness. REED likens it to a battle front. My choice not to
pocket a cup when I see one in the store isn't bechirah chafshi because
the desire to do so never enters my conscious mind. The majority of
a person's actions, he writes, are NOT free will.

(And then the goal in self-development is where the nequdas habechirah
moves with each decision you make.)

In this model, which fits how my own thinking looks like from the inside,
the difference between choosing not to fly and choosing not to get shot
is one of degree, not kind.

...
: Today most scientists no longer accept Freud that each person has some
: subconscious that can't be identified that controls many of man's actions.

You sure about that? They might not agree with Freud -- or R Yisrael
Salanter, who spoke about der dunkl decades before Freud -- about
what it's like. But the idea of thoughts we aren't self-aware of
being a major factor in our decisions has not AFAIK been retired.

: Rambam states that bet din can beat a man to give a get because the person
: really wants to divorce his wife but his desire (yitzro) overcomes him.

: The standard way of understanding this is that every Jew has an inner
: desire/soul to keep mitzvot and only this person doesn't recognize it and
: so beating uncovers the subconscious wish to do the "right" thing. Shnerb
: rejects this on the basis that if so one can make this claim about every
: action of a person that his subconscious really wants the opposite of his
: actions and there is no way of disproving such a statement. Rather the
: interpretation of the Rambam is that every Jew wants to be part of the
: Jewish people (especially in the old days). Therefore the bet din has the
: right to say that belonging to the Jewish people includes divorcing his
: wife and they beat him until he admits to this fact.

I suggested a few times a slightly different understanding. Beqitzur:
a gett me'usa is one which the ba'al has no desire to give. If that
desire exists, but is outweighed by other desires, he would not choose
to give it. However, the gett would still not be me'usah. So all
BD has to do is expose devarim shebaleiv to action.

: A "nafka mina" between the two is what if the Jew says he has no desire to
: be part of the Jewish people and no care for halacha...

Another difference (not lemaaseh) is their ability to explain why
the same compulsion, if not performed by BD or by their request, would
produce a gett me'isah.

....
: However in this case it is no longer clear why G-d hardened Paro's heart.
: Now Paro listened to Moshe but Paro should still be punished because G-d
: knew that Paro in his heart still wanted to punish the Jewish people.

I like Seforno's answer. Par'oh didn't merit being saved by a miracle.
Therefore, Hashem made him emotionally untouched by the miracles. Notice
that the first time it's Hashem doing the chizuq or hikhbid, it is well
after the nissim outstrip the ability for the chartoumim to imitate
them. So Par'oah has no way to fool himself, there was no balance in
his reality keeping free will honest.

>From that perspective, Hashem was preserving Par'oh's free will, not
robbing him of it!


Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Life is a stage and we are the actors,
micha at aishdas.org        but only some of us have the script.
http://www.aishdas.org               - Rav Menachem Nissel
Fax: (270) 514-1507



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