[Avodah] Another Chumera ends up Involving a Kula

[Chana Sassoon via Avodah]

RZS writes:

>That's not a kulah, because the issur is davka when it's bechinam,

I don't think that is exactly the correct phrasing to explain the situation.
Rather, there is the general blanket rabbinic issur on playing musical
instruments on yom tov, into which sounding shofar prima facie falls.  This
general issur is pushed aside by the d'orisa positive mitzvah of blowing
shofar (noting that, at least according to the famous Taz, because rabbinic
power doesn't stretch far enough to allow the banning of something which is
a mitzvah d'orisa in every circumstances in which it would occur, as this
would do - but is only in allowed situations where only sometimes the
mitzvah would not end up being performed, such as Rosh Hashana on shabbas).
This rabbinic issur of playing musical instruments on yom tov vis a vis the
shofar is also pushed aside in other rabbinically recognised circumstances -
including (according to the majority rishonim, Shulchan Aruch and Rema,
although there are major rishonic dissenters) nachas ruach d'nashim.  The
case of the katan may well be different, given that the fundamental issue
with katanim is chinuch (which might perhaps be said to cut both ways here).

> and so long as there's a reason it's not chinam. Their wish to hear shofar
>the way this rishon or that one wanted it heard is at least as good a
>reason as our "le`arvev es hasoton", or giving women a "nachas ruach".

Leaving aside nachas ruach, which has (according to those who hold by it at
least rabbinic weight - ie power to push aside at least rabbinic
prohibitions) - what is the justification for le'arev es hasoton?  My
instincts are that, to the extent that le'arvev es hasoton is taken
seriously, the argument there is one of pikuach nefesh, which of course
would push aside the rabbinic issur of playing musical instruments (think
about it, if you can get a few extra years out of confusing the soton, how
could that not be considered pikuach nefesh)?

Don't think that helps with being choshesh for minority shitos.

>However, your chashash brings up an interesting suggestion. if they
>are worried about all possible chashshos, then maybe they should worry
>about yours too, and they can easily solve it: let them go on mivtzo'im
>and find Jews who have not yet heard shofar at all, and blow for them
>according to these opinions. That way, not only will they have heard
>shofar according to all possible opinions, and not only will they have
>the zechus of those Jews having heard shofar according to at least
>one opinion (which is certainly kosher, as you correctly point out),
>but their "extra" tekios will be with a bracha!

But aren't they then denying those Jews who have not yet heard shofar at all
the chance to hear shofar according to the majority opinions by only blowing
for them according to the minority opinions?  Or are you proposing that they
*then* blow for them according to the majority opinions?  Either way you
seem to me to be opening a real can of worms.  The principle on which
somebody who has fulfilled their obligation can then fulfil the obligation
of another is based on kol yisrael areivim zeh b'zeh.  But to what extent is
that applicable in a situation in which that person would never, had the
situation been reversed, have accepted the form of fulfilment they are
offering the other.  Ie since the person who is blowing the shofar refused
to have these alternative ways of blowing as the fundamental method of
fulfilling their own mitzvah, is it really areivus to then foist that form
of fulfilment on others?

>Zev Sero
zev at sero.name

Shabbat Shalom

Chana