[Avodah] Tzeni'us and gender roles

Meir Shinnar chidekel at gmail.com
Thu Jul 30 19:30:19 PDT 2009


> RMB
>
> Rather than state every point in a shaqla vetarya, I want to again try
> to take a step back and spell out my position from square one. I am it
> would be a more clear format. I'm going to go really far back,  
> because I
> think RMS's consternation is evidence of our coming from fundamentally
> different paradigms.
>
Actually, our paradigms are not that different.  I think you  
misunderstand my concerns on this issue.  Let me rephrase the order of  
the arguments.

Let us separate into several different issues:
1) How do we approach change?
There is little in what you say that I would disagree with.  Halacha  
is essentially conservative (small  c), and changing the social  
structure can have major unforeseen consequences about our ability to  
transmit the mesorah.   I would add two points
	a) Sometimes, if changes have occurred, proceeding without change is  
itself a change - because the meaning of the actions change due to the  
changed circumstances - and then, doing the same thing is a radical  
change, and change can actually be a conservative response.  (Whether  
this applies to a given circumstance is to be debated.)
	b) Some of the more "modern" values may actually represent an  
implementation of authentic torah values (as has been argued, for  
example, by hagaon rav eliezer berkovits zt"l.)

2.   The notion of a political psak.  While the the issue of ligdor  
milta is clearly a factor, RYBS, in the one example that is most  
relevant to this discussion, objected to it. That is, WRT to women's  
tefilla groups, it is by now fairly clear that he objected strongly  
(and many of the objections that you raise are related to what were  
his objections).  It is also clear that he was extremely careful and  
medakdek not to use the language of issur v'heter (as has been  
documented by R Mayer Twersky - who argues that his opposition on meta  
halalchic grounds means that functionally, they are assur - but that  
is a different discussion).  He objected to the YU 5s, and RHS's  
position - that tried to put the opposition in classical halachic  
terms.   This discussion started with my point that RHS sometimes  
uses, for political psak, ideas and positions that are difficult to  
defend..(eg, arguing that WTGs violate the magen avraham on women and  
kriat hatora - when it is the mainstream not to follow the magen  
avraham...)

3.   Women's roles.  One of the things that has clearly changed in the  
twentieth century is the public role of women, and the major debate  
has been (within the parameters of the first issue above), about what  
the proper halachic and hashkafic response should be to that - and  
whether that should change what role women play in religious life.
As part of that discussion, there has to be an understanding of what  
the halachic and hashkafic underpinnings of the traditional role of  
women - because only then can we discuss the permissibility and  
desirability of any change.

As part of that discussion, RHS made the following argument(?psak):
There is an inherent conflict between the value of modesty (he used  
tseniut, but that is also used in terms of the pritzut connotation -  
and the part of tzeniut that he was emphasizing is better translated  
by modesty) and public actions.  This is suggested by the rule that  
someone asked to be a shliach tzibbur is supposed initially to  
refuse.  What is mattir (and his argument was essentially a brisker  
argument) us to transgress the value of modesty is that there is a  
hiyuv inherent that someone has to fulfill a role /do the action - but  
absent this mattir, one should not violate modesty.
As women do not have such a hiyuv (for many of the actions  
contemplated), therefore they should not violate their modesty - and  
not assume a public role.

You adopted this argument, and out of this Brisker argument developed  
a far reaching theory of modesty - and one practical implication of  
this is the consequence for women - and positions such as maharat.

My objection is not that the maharat and other similar positions do  
not represent a social change.  There is a legitimate discussion about  
the parameters and needs of change, and of the underlying values that  
we are trying to preserve - including as well the effects on the  
tramsmission of the mesora (as per issue 1).  My objection is that  
this position about tzeniut/modesty is inherently untenable, for for 4  
different reasons (the first three are generally applicable - without  
regard to the discussion about women that was the subtext)

Objections.
	a) This model of modesty is one that in practice is not followed by  
the general Jewish community. (I and many others have pointed out many  
examples)
	b) Not only is it not followed in practice, it is not viewed as an  
ideal that we are unable to fully implement, and there is literature  
against it.
	c) Not only is it not viewed as an ideal, it actually represents an  
ideal that is profoundly immoral, dangerous to the Jewish community,  
and of foreign origin.  ((t is this last point that made the  
discussion so heated - and I confess that I find it difficult to  
understand how someone so morally sophisticated and sensitive adn  
Micha could adopt such a position)
These three objections have nothing to do with the underyling  
discussion about women - but reflect that this position cheapens and  
warns against public service.
lastly
	d) Even if one were to accept this definition of modesty with its  
restrictions as an ideal, it actually doesn't solve the issue of  
women's roles - because the underlying issue of public roles for  
women, such as yoetzet halacha, to'enet, high school tanach teacher,  
or maharat (all revolutions in some form or other), is not satisfying  
the base need for public adulaton of the individual - as viewed by  
some of the critics - but satisfying a communal need that has been  
identified by its leaders.  The question then becomes of what are the  
needs of the community.

Again, the fact that this argument for modesty is rejected does not  
mean that one is compelled to accept all modern changes - it means  
that one has to search deeper for a true understanding of the  
hashkafic and halachic underpinnings of women's roles, because this is  
not it.
It does suggest that whoever initially suggested it may not have such  
an understanding, and therefore his ability to influence further  
discussion.

Let me just summarize my objection c.   The question is what is meant  
by modesty.  You have raised (and I agree) with you, that this is  
related to anivut. However, our prime example of anivut is moshe - who  
is also the prime example of a leader - whose majesty (hod) and public  
role noone denies.  This more than suggests that anivut and modesty  
are not compromised by the fact that one is a public figure or in the  
public eye (although it is true that publicity and power can corrupt -  
they are not intrinsically opposed to modesty)

Indeed, there is no Jewish literature to suggest that modesty/tseniut  
requires abandoning public life and actions.  Rather, tseniut/modesty  
here reflects to how one is public - that one still keeps a private  
personae while being public. To use an example from tanach, when david  
hamelech was dancing in front of the aron, he was tsanua.  I would  
argue that he did violate modesty in his over mourning of avshalom.
Ie, modesty reflects the private sphere.  Yes, there is an oppositon  
to celebrity qua celebrity.  there is also very little in Jewish  
literature that would correspond to St Augustine's Confessions -  
because such public parading of one's inner self is a violation of  
tseniut.  That is exactly how RYBS  defines it in the citation that  
you brought from nefesh harav.  That is quite different from  
opposition to public roles and actions

Moreover, your definition is, as I said, profoundly immoral and  
dangerous.  It imports into yahadut the profound emphasis on the  
individual self perfection rather than communal obligations.  It  
implies that unless there is a clearly identified need - and you are  
the only one - one shoud retreat from the public sphere.  This is  
highly dangerous to the survival of a jewish community - both  
established institutions and many initiatives that have been  
undertaken by individuals, later recognized by the community as  
necessary, where, in the beginning, not so recognized.  I am called to  
serve on the school board - sorry, others can serve, and it will hurt  
my tseniut.  I am thinking of a new initiative for (name communal  
goal) - sorry, not clear it is necessary, nor that I am the right  
person.  Rather than emphasizing the value of public service (vechol  
hasokim betzorche tzibbur be'emunah) - it puts roadblocks in front of  
such service.

I would add that this is one area where I have gotten support from  
people who normally are wholly opposed (eg, RTk (welcome to the  
light :-)), and clearly not opposed to it because of the impact on  
women's issues.

Meir Shinnar





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