[Avodah] Tzeni'us and gender roles
Meir Shinnar
chidekel at gmail.com
Thu Jul 30 19:30:19 PDT 2009
> RMB
>
> Rather than state every point in a shaqla vetarya, I want to again try
> to take a step back and spell out my position from square one. I am it
> would be a more clear format. I'm going to go really far back,
> because I
> think RMS's consternation is evidence of our coming from fundamentally
> different paradigms.
>
Actually, our paradigms are not that different. I think you
misunderstand my concerns on this issue. Let me rephrase the order of
the arguments.
Let us separate into several different issues:
1) How do we approach change?
There is little in what you say that I would disagree with. Halacha
is essentially conservative (small c), and changing the social
structure can have major unforeseen consequences about our ability to
transmit the mesorah. I would add two points
a) Sometimes, if changes have occurred, proceeding without change is
itself a change - because the meaning of the actions change due to the
changed circumstances - and then, doing the same thing is a radical
change, and change can actually be a conservative response. (Whether
this applies to a given circumstance is to be debated.)
b) Some of the more "modern" values may actually represent an
implementation of authentic torah values (as has been argued, for
example, by hagaon rav eliezer berkovits zt"l.)
2. The notion of a political psak. While the the issue of ligdor
milta is clearly a factor, RYBS, in the one example that is most
relevant to this discussion, objected to it. That is, WRT to women's
tefilla groups, it is by now fairly clear that he objected strongly
(and many of the objections that you raise are related to what were
his objections). It is also clear that he was extremely careful and
medakdek not to use the language of issur v'heter (as has been
documented by R Mayer Twersky - who argues that his opposition on meta
halalchic grounds means that functionally, they are assur - but that
is a different discussion). He objected to the YU 5s, and RHS's
position - that tried to put the opposition in classical halachic
terms. This discussion started with my point that RHS sometimes
uses, for political psak, ideas and positions that are difficult to
defend..(eg, arguing that WTGs violate the magen avraham on women and
kriat hatora - when it is the mainstream not to follow the magen
avraham...)
3. Women's roles. One of the things that has clearly changed in the
twentieth century is the public role of women, and the major debate
has been (within the parameters of the first issue above), about what
the proper halachic and hashkafic response should be to that - and
whether that should change what role women play in religious life.
As part of that discussion, there has to be an understanding of what
the halachic and hashkafic underpinnings of the traditional role of
women - because only then can we discuss the permissibility and
desirability of any change.
As part of that discussion, RHS made the following argument(?psak):
There is an inherent conflict between the value of modesty (he used
tseniut, but that is also used in terms of the pritzut connotation -
and the part of tzeniut that he was emphasizing is better translated
by modesty) and public actions. This is suggested by the rule that
someone asked to be a shliach tzibbur is supposed initially to
refuse. What is mattir (and his argument was essentially a brisker
argument) us to transgress the value of modesty is that there is a
hiyuv inherent that someone has to fulfill a role /do the action - but
absent this mattir, one should not violate modesty.
As women do not have such a hiyuv (for many of the actions
contemplated), therefore they should not violate their modesty - and
not assume a public role.
You adopted this argument, and out of this Brisker argument developed
a far reaching theory of modesty - and one practical implication of
this is the consequence for women - and positions such as maharat.
My objection is not that the maharat and other similar positions do
not represent a social change. There is a legitimate discussion about
the parameters and needs of change, and of the underlying values that
we are trying to preserve - including as well the effects on the
tramsmission of the mesora (as per issue 1). My objection is that
this position about tzeniut/modesty is inherently untenable, for for 4
different reasons (the first three are generally applicable - without
regard to the discussion about women that was the subtext)
Objections.
a) This model of modesty is one that in practice is not followed by
the general Jewish community. (I and many others have pointed out many
examples)
b) Not only is it not followed in practice, it is not viewed as an
ideal that we are unable to fully implement, and there is literature
against it.
c) Not only is it not viewed as an ideal, it actually represents an
ideal that is profoundly immoral, dangerous to the Jewish community,
and of foreign origin. ((t is this last point that made the
discussion so heated - and I confess that I find it difficult to
understand how someone so morally sophisticated and sensitive adn
Micha could adopt such a position)
These three objections have nothing to do with the underyling
discussion about women - but reflect that this position cheapens and
warns against public service.
lastly
d) Even if one were to accept this definition of modesty with its
restrictions as an ideal, it actually doesn't solve the issue of
women's roles - because the underlying issue of public roles for
women, such as yoetzet halacha, to'enet, high school tanach teacher,
or maharat (all revolutions in some form or other), is not satisfying
the base need for public adulaton of the individual - as viewed by
some of the critics - but satisfying a communal need that has been
identified by its leaders. The question then becomes of what are the
needs of the community.
Again, the fact that this argument for modesty is rejected does not
mean that one is compelled to accept all modern changes - it means
that one has to search deeper for a true understanding of the
hashkafic and halachic underpinnings of women's roles, because this is
not it.
It does suggest that whoever initially suggested it may not have such
an understanding, and therefore his ability to influence further
discussion.
Let me just summarize my objection c. The question is what is meant
by modesty. You have raised (and I agree) with you, that this is
related to anivut. However, our prime example of anivut is moshe - who
is also the prime example of a leader - whose majesty (hod) and public
role noone denies. This more than suggests that anivut and modesty
are not compromised by the fact that one is a public figure or in the
public eye (although it is true that publicity and power can corrupt -
they are not intrinsically opposed to modesty)
Indeed, there is no Jewish literature to suggest that modesty/tseniut
requires abandoning public life and actions. Rather, tseniut/modesty
here reflects to how one is public - that one still keeps a private
personae while being public. To use an example from tanach, when david
hamelech was dancing in front of the aron, he was tsanua. I would
argue that he did violate modesty in his over mourning of avshalom.
Ie, modesty reflects the private sphere. Yes, there is an oppositon
to celebrity qua celebrity. there is also very little in Jewish
literature that would correspond to St Augustine's Confessions -
because such public parading of one's inner self is a violation of
tseniut. That is exactly how RYBS defines it in the citation that
you brought from nefesh harav. That is quite different from
opposition to public roles and actions
Moreover, your definition is, as I said, profoundly immoral and
dangerous. It imports into yahadut the profound emphasis on the
individual self perfection rather than communal obligations. It
implies that unless there is a clearly identified need - and you are
the only one - one shoud retreat from the public sphere. This is
highly dangerous to the survival of a jewish community - both
established institutions and many initiatives that have been
undertaken by individuals, later recognized by the community as
necessary, where, in the beginning, not so recognized. I am called to
serve on the school board - sorry, others can serve, and it will hurt
my tseniut. I am thinking of a new initiative for (name communal
goal) - sorry, not clear it is necessary, nor that I am the right
person. Rather than emphasizing the value of public service (vechol
hasokim betzorche tzibbur be'emunah) - it puts roadblocks in front of
such service.
I would add that this is one area where I have gotten support from
people who normally are wholly opposed (eg, RTk (welcome to the
light :-)), and clearly not opposed to it because of the impact on
women's issues.
Meir Shinnar
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