[Avodah] goy vs chiloni

[Chana Luntz]

RET writes:

> I gave a shiur on shabbat on a halacha of . Zilberstein that to me had a
> surprising chiddush

I confess that I do not understand this chiddush at all - can you help me
here:

> The question was if a chiloni opened the front door by pushing an
> electronic button could one enter the building? (lets assume CI for
> electricity)
> He answer was that yes because one did not have direct benefit from
> the chillul shabbat but what he call "mavriach ari",

This is the first bit I don't understand.  The term mavriach ari I am
familiar with as a concept within Baba Kama and the laws of compensation, ie
if somebody chases a lion away from your property (or similar threatening
occurrence), do you have to pay them or not?, if they get injured in the
process, what is the din?, if an animal gets injured in the process what is
the din? etc etc.

What does this have to do with hilchos shabbas?  Where is it found used it
in hilchos shabbas?

The term I am familiar with in use vis a vis shabbas when one is talking
about more indirect situations is gramma.  Now I can see a distinction that
perhaps Rav Zilberstein is trying to draw here.  Because mostly gramma is
something that is caused indirectly, whereas the chiloni who opened the
front door opened it directly, and what I assume he is trying to say is that
it is only an indirect benefit to you because what the chiloni has done is
remove an obstacle in the way of entering the building (equivalent to a
crouching lion).

But even so, I don't understand.

Let's go back to first principles:  The Shulchan Aruch rules in Orech Chaim
siman 318:1 that one who cooks food on shabbas b'mazid, the person who did
the act is forbidden to eat the food forever, but other people can eat it
right after shabbas. If b'shogeg it is forbidden both to him and others on
shabbas and permitted immediately after shabbas (I know the Gra disagrees
and permits it on shabbas both to him and others if b'shogeg, but let's
stick with the more standard position for the moment). 

The Rema adds (not that I think this is generally taken to be a machlokus,
but an explanation) that this applies to any other melacha.

Now, why is this different from our case?  If a chiloni cooked food b'mazid
(or b'shogeg for that matter) on shabbas, are we not getting only indirect
benefit?  After all, the food before was raw, the chiloni took away the
rawness of the food and made it edible, thus effectively scaring away the
lion that is preventing us from eating the food.  Why, according to this,
cannot one eat it on shabbas?

Now the Chayai Adam does draw a distinction in Hilchos Shabbas klal 9:11
between a situation b'davar shena'aseh ma'asah b'guf hadvar, shenishtanna
mikmos shehaya k'mevashel v'chayotzei bo aval hamotzi mereshus l'reshus
shelo nishtana hadavar mikmos shehaya im beshogeg mutar afilu lo afilu
b'yom.  Now this would cover your lion case (to the extent that scaring away
a lion could be construed to be an issur d'orisa - which as far as I can
think of might be trapping it or carrying it daled amos b'reshus harabbaim)
because the lion is not changed, it is just now away from where you want to
go.  However, *if* you assume the CI on electricity, then what the chiloni
has done here is to destroy the circuit - ie soser and thus is changing the
nature of the item from a built building to a partially unbuilt one (ie
minus a circuit).  And you are then getting benefit from a now partially
unbuilt building, by going into it, when previously you could not.  It seems
to me that this fits within the Chayai Adam's sena'she am'asah b'guf hadvar
precisely.

So, let's think about some other cases.  OK, yes I can see that lighting a
candle or light perhaps could be characterised as more direct than this - in
the sense that you are then getting direct benefit from the light, because
something has been created that wasn't there before.  But surely all of the
destructive melachos would fall into the same category as this one - ie if
somebody turned out the light, then you are only getting benefit from the
absence of light, and if the building case is to be considered like chasing
away a lion, why is this not also.  If anything this case seems more direct
than switching off a light, since you could now characterise the building
you can now enter as a building suitable for entering, and a changed
building, which is was not previously.  So if this case is one which is not
considered direct, it would mean, it seems to me, that the din set out in
siman 318:1 should surely have another qualifier - instead of the Rema (or
some of the other meforshim) saying "or one of the other melachos" he should
be saying, "or one of the other constructive melachos" - because in the case
of the destructive melachos, there would seem to be no case where it could
be applied, because how could you have a situation where you got direct
benefit?  

So where is this said?  And especially given someone like the Chai Adam who
is so careful to distinguish between changes in the body of the item.  So
where is this sourced?  I would have thought so fundamental a distinction
would need to be somewhere - can you find it for me?

 > He then asked asked
> a
> question from a MB who disallows using the contents of a put when a
> Gentile
> opened the cover on shabbat for a Jew. Why should it be different?
> 
> His answer was that the was a decree against amira le-akum and so a knas
> if one did request (or was done for his benefit). There is no such decree
> against a nonobserving Jew.

This too I don't exactly understand.  It is generally agreed that the reason
that here the Shulchan Aruch rules that the food is permitted *immediately
after shabbas* and when discussing a situation where a goy did it, he says
that one has to wait the time bichdei sheyasu - ie the time it would take to
cook the food or whatever is a knas (see eg both the Magen Avraham and the
Taz here, who explain the reason for the knas slightly differently).   But
in these cases they are all talking about having to wait a period of time
after shabbas finishes compared with it being permitted immediately after
shabbas, not about being able to use it on shabbas itself.  Where do we see
that this knas applies to distinguish between after shabbas and on shabbas
itself?  Or rather, if we have knas to make one wait from immediately after
shabbas to bichdei sheyasu, is it not postulating yet a further extension of
the knas to say that one is required to wait from immediately to bichdei
sheyasu?

Of course, if you do hold like the position of the Gra, who holds like Rabbi
Meir that in fact if the act is done b'shogeg then it is mutar both to him
and others on shabbas itself.  Then if you compare that with the situation
vis a vis a goy, you do indeed get this really wide distinction.

BUT if you are going to say that you are holding like the Gra, then to get
to this position do you not need to be saying that the chiloni is to be
considered acting b'shogeg - which presumably is only possible if you want
to say he is a tinok shenishba or some similar consideration? I guess I
would like a lot more evidence that this concept of mevarach ari is out
there and works to alter the basic halacha in siman 318, because so far, I
confess I have not run into it - but of course that could be my ignorance.

> The upshot is the action of a Jew on shabbat can be kulah then that of a
> goy
> (Of course one cannot benefit from a direct chillul shabbat but here it
> is indirect - mavriach ari)
> 
> I thought of a similar case were according to most poskim a chutz learetz
> Jew
> can ask an Israeli Jew to fo melachah on the second day of yomtov but he
> cant ask a goy.
> 
> Nevertheless it seems strange that a goy doing benefit on shabbat is more
> chamur in some cases than a chiloni doing work

Now this bit does not seem so strange to me, because of the halacha that one
can use an item, such a food, immediately after shabbas applies to food
cooked by a Jew on shabbas, but when cooked by a non Jew on shabbas you have
to wait bichdei sheyasu - which in the case of cooking might well be several
hours, so it is pashut to me from the Shulchan Aruch and all of the
meforshim pretty much all the way back that the situation with a goy is more
chamur than that of a Jew.

Nor does the case of the second day yom tov seem really that odd.  Because
what the Israeli Jew is doing is mutar for him.  This is actually more like
the situation where, lets say, the accepted halacha is different for a
Sephardi and an Ashkenazi.  Is it mutar for the one to ask the other to do
something that they cannot do but the other can (eg putting food directly on
the blech, if a Temani, putting cold soup onto the blech etc etc)?  Is it
mutar to benefit - eg if invited for lunch?  Are you obligated to refuse a
lunch invitation because you know the minhag of the family is to do things
that according to their poskim are mutar, and accepted by all to be mutar,
but are assur to you, eg because you are Sephardi/Ashkenazi - especially
knowing that he will do more of it because you are coming for lunch? 

The tricky thing to explain is not really that, but why is it assur when
done by a goy, for whom the act is mutar, and that is why, inter alia, the
Taz and the Magen Avraham both feel the need to explain, that this is a
specific gezera of chazal because of concern that a person is likely to
consider amira l'akum as something rather trivial and be tempted to do it
either next time or in order to get even the slight benefit of having the
item available immediately after shabbas.  All these explanations would not
be necessary were it not that it is on first blush, a slightly surprising
halacha.  But given its primacy in learning hilchos shabbas, I guess I have
long since ceased to be surprised by it.

> --
> Eli Turkel

Regards

Chana