[Avodah] Does God Change His Mind?

[Michael Makovi]

>  Michael Makovi wrote:
>  :>  However, one could ask in the reverse: if it were about
>  :>  actual mercy, why is it limited to birds and *not* include higher
>  :>  mammals?

>  : Shecht rather than axepole, don't kill the calf and mother on the same
>  : day, feed your animals before you feed yourself...I believe Rambam
>  : discusses this.

>  But you can slaughter a calf right in front of the mother. There is no
>  parallel to shiluach haqen. Thus, it would be hard to say that ShQ is
>  driven by rachamim rather than out to teach rachamim, as you would
>  have to explain why we could be cruel to the cow. OTOH, if it is a
>  lesson in rachamim, we have to explain why birds are used for the
>  lesson, not cows. That's a much easier answer, as we can use RSRH-like
>  symbology.

Good point. Honest question: does anyone talk about whether it is
"bad" or patur or what have you, to slaughter the calf in front of the
mother? For example, if you shecht the mother and find a fully-grown
calf in her womb afterwards, the calf is halachically dead, and you
can kill it however you want. If that calf grows up and gives birth,
then its offspring too are exempt from shechita. One could conceivably
raise an entire farm of shecht-chiyuv-less cattle. But Rabbinically,
sorry, you can't. I'm honestly asking this question of whether
anything parallel is found with slaughtering a calf in front of the
mother.

>  But more to the point, the notion that shiluach haqen isn't expressing
>  rachamim is R' Yosi bar Avin's and R' Yosi bar Zevida's (Berakhos
>  33b). One raises the issue of my poor cow, the other that the point is
>  avodas Hashem. (Quite probably not a machloqes.) Rava and Abayei were
>  so sure of the point, Rava joked about it.

>  : And Rambam rejects that this is the majority view. Or we can go with
>  : the Yerushalmi that it is davka a shaliach tzibur who cannot do this,
>  : because he'll mislead the tzibur, because he cannot explain to them
>  : (during tefillah) what he's doing. But during a shiur? B'vadai one can
>  : express the fact that He has mercy on the birds.

>  Majority view? There are only three people cited in the gemara, and
>  they all agree on this aspect of things.

I didn't say it; Rambam (AFAIK = I haven't seen it inside) said it was
a minority view that it is not rachamim. AFAIK, Rambam says that
adarabba, the majority hold mitzvot have humanly-understandable
ta'amim like rachamim etc.

Anyway, despite the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, AFAIK, holds the issue
isn't rachamim versus not rachamim, but rather shliach tzibur versus
baal habayit.

>  : Rambam as is well known, was essentially reconciling the science of
>  : his day with Torah, much as many do today. So if Aristotle (who could
>  : not be wrong) had proved such-and-such about Hashem or the world, then
>  : surely the Torah concurs (for how could the Torah contradict that
>  : which has been proven?), and so the only thing left to do is show how
>  : everything in the Torah agrees with everything proven by Aristotle.
>
>  The Rambam did believe that Aristotle could be wrong, and in fact
>  rejected his theory on the eternity of matter (as you yourself write
>  in the next sentence).
>
>  Thus if the Rambam believed the Torah had a position that contradicted
>  Aristotle's conclusions, he would assume Aristotle was wrong. That's
>  not being questionable because of Greek Philosophy. It's using
>  Philosophy to fill in gaps the Torah doesn't spell out.
>
>  : Those things not proven by Aristotle (such as eternity of matter,
>  : according to Rambam) we need not be concerned with. But even there,
>  : Rambam offered a way to reconcile Torah with eternity of matter...
>
>  Not at all. The Rambam says that TSBK could be reconciled, if TSBP --
>  "the conclusions of our nevi'im and chakhamim" weren't otherwise. And
>  that the two can't really contradict. So if we have a reliable
>  mesorah, he would have to dig through Aristo to find the flaw.
>
>  It's pouring wine into a bottle, not rounding the corners of a square
>  peg.

I haven't seen Rambam inside, but the understanding I was given (by
Rabbi Epstein Faith of Judaism) that Rambam basically says the
following:

Aristotle says two things: eternity of matter and G-d didn't create
the world. Rabbi Epstein distinguishes these two, because he says,
conceivably one could say that matter was eternal but G-d still shaped
it; I recall Ralbag says something similar to this. So the two issues
are related, but can be distinguished:
1) Is matter eternal or not
2) Did G-d involve Himself in creation, whether creating or simply
shaping that which was eternal. Or was G-d totally uninvolved in any
way ( = Aristotle).

Rambam says the second is absolutely totally 100% unkosher, cannot
reconcile, don't even try. There is no way, whatsoever, to say G-d
wasn't involved in creation. We can argue on the mode of creation, but
G-d was unquestionably involved in it.

Regarding the first, TSBP and the pshat of TSBK says ex-nihilo, and
since Aristotle hasn't proved eternity of matter, why should we bend
anything to reconcile with him? BUT, hypothetically speaking, were
Aristotle to prove beyond a doubt eternity of matter, we'd simply
allegorize TSBK. I don't know what Rambam would do about TSBP, but I'd
wager a guess that he'd deal with it the same way he dealt with many
scientific issues in Gemara: Chazal received their science from study
not Sinai, and so there's no chiyuv to follow them here, whether on
medicine or on creation ex-nihilo.

In other words, Rambam is content to disagree with Aristotle on things
that are totally anti-Torah (G-d didn't create world) and things not
proven (eternity of matter), but on EVERYTHING else, Rambam assumes
agreement with Torah and Aristotle, and he will interpret one to agree
with the other in whatever way is most fitting. And hypothetically, he
offered a way to reconcile even that not proven (eternity of matter),
similar (IMO) to Rav Hirsch's chumash interpreting creation in a way
incompatible with evolution, but in his Collected Writings, he says
that hypothetically, were evolution proven (it was not in his
opinion), we'd simply say...etc.


> R' Micha
>  :>  AND, a G-d who is at times angry is two things when He is angry - a
>  :>  G-d, and His Anger. Divisibility.
>
> : Mikha'el Makovi
>  : Why is His anger a separate thing? Is my happiness or my anger
>  : separate from me? No. I am me, and sometimes I have a state of anger
>  : or happiness. So where's the divisibility? He's one God, and He has
>  : attributes that are a part of Him.
>
> R' Micha
>  A PART OF HIM. Exactly. Something that can disappear without the other
>  PARTS changing. Plurality. A nonessential attribute is a different
>  piece than the essence. If Hashem can exist with or without Divine
>  Wrath then you have to ask how the two came together to begin with,
>  and who created the Creator.

You seem to consider anger almost a tangible substance. I might wonder
if this is parallel to the idea of form and matter, or the idea that
knowledge and information have some concrete existence, etc. I don't
hold like this. So your objection makes no sense to me - anger is not
something independent from G-d that He and it come together; anger is
simply something G-d would be at some point.

>  :>  You are subject to the concept of anger (to return to the same
>  :>  middah). How and when you express that anger is you, but the very
>  :>  concept of anger precedes you. The concept of anger cannot precede
>  :> the Creator of anger.
>
>  : Anger precedes me? The anger is an attribute of me; I am not an
>  : attribute of the anger.
>
>  Anger existed before you were born. The concept doesn't depend on you
>  to exist; you depend on the concept existing in order to be who you
>  are. It precedes you both logically and in time.
>
>  For God to get angry, someone had to invent the concept of anger, and
>  then add it to God, or invent God and add to Him the concept of anger.
>  God can no longer be the end of the chain of "Why?" unless He is so
>  Simple as to have no divisibility even to separate ideas.
>

Again, you seem to be giving anger its own existence. Anger as a
concept existed before me, of course. But what difference does that
make? If I am angry, it isn't because the theoretical concept of anger
arrived at me; I don't follow this whole concept of an idea/knowledge
having its own spiritual existence.

>  To better address RMM's next point in light of my comments above:
>  :>  REB, was far less immersed in the Torah weltenschaung than the
>  :> people he was disputing. This is the whole nisqatnu hadoros. REB
>  :> might have  nice theories, but his threshold of proof is quite high.
>  :> And his invocation of a Torah theology over that of Chazal or the
>  :> rishonim smacks of R's call of a return to prophetic Judaism -- with
>  :> the huge distinction of the claim being mutar WRT aggadita.
>
>  : Again, I would simply say that he was operating on the same sources
>  : but had a different philosophical starting point. Medieval Jewish
>  : philosophy had a lot of questions never asked by Chazal and a lot of
>  : philosophical baggage never regarded by Chazal.
>
>  Yes, philosophy created new questions to answer, in addition to giving
>  new words with which to answer them. But rishonim knew better than we
>  can judge which seams between philosophy and Torah are smooth, and
>  which are more forced and artificial.

Okay, so rishonim get more influential votes. But it doesn't mean that
with enough sevara, we can't overrule. It just takes more to overrule
a rishon than an acharon. Yofi.

>  : Heck, the rishonim say that one can disagree with a Chazalic aggadata!
>
>  And thus the issue isn't "can", but "likelihood of being right". It
>  may be allowed, but you're very unlikely to hit the nail on the head.

Agreed.

>  :>  We must start with the assumption otherwise, or the entire process
>  :> -- including the development of halakhah -- is suspect. It's a
>  :> reducio ad absurdum: if you can believe that baalei mesorah regularly
>  :> erred in aggadic matters, wouldn't the same argument apply to the
>  :> transmission of halakhah?
>
>  : Absolutely yes. Bingo. Chazal are human. Whatever was not received
>  : from Sinai (but instead was extrapolated from Sinaitic data, or
>  : recovered/recalled/rederived from Sinatic data that was forgotten, can
>  : certainly be wrong. Chinuch and Ran both say that we are to follow
>  : Chazal even when they are wrong. The entire nature of machloket means
>  : that Chazal can be wrong...
>
>  Not according to most understandings of eilu va'eilu -- that topic I'm
>  trying to skirt again.

Agreed - I know I'm on the edge. But what can I do? I hold according
to what's apparent to me.

>  : Rambam says that the Torah promises material benefits as a reward, in
>  : the same way that one gives candy to a child. So in this way, this
>  : idea of material benefit strengthens observance. But is this the
>  : proper, "true", way? No. (Now, my analogy is not perfect. According to
>  : Rambam, material reward is 100% true, and simply a lower, non-lishma
>  : understanding. For a proper analogy, I need a *false* idea that will
>  : strengthen observance. But  I think my point is clear.)
>
>  Your parenthetic is wrong. The analogy is perfect -- they are multiple
>  models to fit the same truth to a human life. One might be a better
>  model, aimed at people capable of aiming higher. Or, they might be
>  equal and different models for people who simply have different
>  perspectives.

No no. I was trying to show that an erroneous idea can strengthen
Torah observance. That is why my analogy was not perfect - I was not
trying to show elu v'elu with better and worse / higher and lower /
superior and inferior hashkafot that are all true and all lead to
observance. I was speaking of an objectively 100% incorrect/wrong idea
that STILL nevertheless strengthened observance despite being wrong.

How about this: if Levi honestly believes that if he speaks lashon
hara, he will die. Instantly. Don't you agree Levi will be the best
hilchot lashon hara observer ever? I wager he'll be better than the
Chofetz Chaim! But the fact remains that his idea that he will die
instantly, is wrong. 100% wrong. But it still strengthened his
observance, didn't it?

>  : Obviously he had certain philosophical bases and axioms and whatnot.
>  : But I mean, no foreign philosophy (AFAIK) was explicitly relied on by
>  : him. He said his purpose was to learn Judaism from itself (cf. Rav
>  : Hirsch) without any reliance on anything foreign....
>
>  And yet RSRH was Kantian, and REB a neo-Kantian Existentialist. You
>  can even read deconstruction in REB's hyperlegalistic "terms of the
>  beris" perspective on avodas Hashem. Their philosophies are very
>  easily perceivable as products of their respective zeitgeists.

Kant I am not learned in. But I know that of Rav Hirsch, Rabbi Elias
in his perush takes great pains to show that of many/all of Rav
Hirsch's supposed Kantianisms, a Chazalic parallel serves just as
well. He actually holds that anyone who holds Rav Hirsch was Kantian,
is simply ignorant in Torah, because the Torah sources are so obvious.
Now, I don't know Kant, but Rabbi Elias's examples seemed convincing
enough that I'm convinced that at the very least, Rav Hirsch wasn't as
Kantian as some make him out to be.

Now, b'vadai, Rav Hirsch knew Kant and even praised him - see Dayan
Grunfeld to Horeb.

Rav Berkovits I cannot say anything on, because I don't know Kant and
no one that I've seen has analyzed Rav Berkovits in light of Kant.

>  :>  To ask a final question: If REB's argument is valid WRT Hashem's
>  :>  emotions, why isn't it valid WRT His features? How can one say
>  :> "charon  apo" is an idiom for anger, not a reference to the flairing
>  :> of the Divine Nostril, and yet insist one must stop there because the
>  :> anger couldn't possibly be anthropomorphic idiom?
>  :
>  : By features, you mean physical, bodily features, and by nostril, a
>  : physical nostril? The Torah itself says He doesn't have a body....
>
>  It does not. The corporeality of G-d is actually championed by an
>  (admittedly obscure) rishon. The Raavad is forced to not consider it
>  an ikkar since people he considered great espoused it.

>From what I've seen, this rishon didn't hold that G-d actually is
corporeal, but rather that He can at times inhabit a human body. I'm
not sure whether this rishon holds that while G-d inhabits a human, He
still has an incorporeal parallel existence, or whether His
incorporeality totally ceases so long as He inhabits the body.

Now, personally, I'd say that obviously G-d can possess a human body!
If He can make boulders roll and wind blow, why not make a human body
move his lips tongue and lung move in a certain way to speak? But He
Himself is not physical in this body any more than He is physical in
the wind and rocks moving. He is moving a human body like a puppet,
but He Himself is still incorporeal. That's my personal opinion. But I
digress...

The fact that this rishon, whatever he holds, is so totally minority,
makes me content to say that 99.9999% would hold that the chumash
clearly precludes G-d's corporeality. But I know of no one who claims
the chumash says that G-d has no attributes; this they base on
philosophy and logic, not explicit textual proofs.

>  : Obviously, it could very well be that His emotions are "as-if", and
>  : anger is an anthropomorphic idiom. The Torah doesn't say, so there's
>  : no opportunity for correct or incorrect exegesis at all, let alone one
>  : side making a gross clumsy inept error (like missing the glaring fact
>  : that the Torah says He has no body). Therefore, this is up for debate,
>  : REB versus everyone else.
>
>  But how can you bet on REB with odds like that?

Because his logic convinces me more than everyone else's.

Mikha'el Makovi