[Avodah] Chok

[Micha Berger]

On Thu, Aug 01, 2024 at 09:23:56PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote:
> R'Micha:
> > how is shaatnez, a lav rather than a ritual, categorized as a choq?

> As I understand RMLeibtag, because the prohibition against a mixture of
> species is an unchanging edict.

Again, every mitzvah has an unchanging core.

And similarly my point about ribbis. Aside from the mishpat aspect, whether
or not reciprocating the favor is allowed and when, when is buying futures
ribbis, etc... are lots of unchanging details.

> As I understand RMLeibtag, understanding whether some activity/agreement
> constitutes *ribbis* involves human judgement, so it would not be
> considered a *choq*.
> 
> Since quoting a salient paragraph from RMFirst's article apparently didn't
> help explain RMLeibtag's approach to at least R'Micha, perhaps an article
> RMLeibtag wrote might help -- please see URL https://outorah.org/p/37639/.

And RML's opening shows the core of my reluctance to accept his thesis.

> What does the phrase CHUKAT HA'TORAH (19:2) mean? Usually, the word TORAH
> is understood as 'the entire Chumash', while CHOK is understood as a
> 'law without reason'; and hence -- the laws of Parah Adumah become the
> example 'par excellance' of a CHOK that doesn't make any sense -- correct?

That's not just common understanding. Yuma defines the cateogy as
    things that the satan meishiv aleihen. And they are: ...
    VeShema tomar they are maasei sohu? Talmud lomar: "Ani Hashem"
    -- I, Hashem, chaqativ, and you have no reshus to be meharheir
    on them.

(I tried to avoid translating buzzwords.)

Rashi on Chuqas cites this gemara. And RML's article quotes Rambam
(Me'ilah 8:8) that (translation his):
    CHUKIM are laws whose reason is not evident ["taamam eino
    geluyah"]... and the laws of Korbanot fall under category of
    CHUKIM...

So the burden rests on explaining how his more literal translation
fits the usage found since Chazal's.

If the root really is "chaquq" / "engraved", I would be looking for a
connection explaining how dinim that are beyond human understanding are
more "engraving" than those we can figure out or at least understand
after the fact.

Or if we follow RSRH (Tehillim 119:5) that it is etymological from
"circle", then we can explain the resulting usage of "choq" as a
mitzah who we can only relate to by its effect of encircling us
with mitzvos.

I am objecting to RML's claim, bracketed in the following quote:
> Actually, let's first explain what a CHOK isn't! In contrast to popular
> opinion, a CHOK (by definition) is not a law that doesn't make sense. [As
> we will see, the fact that a CHOK doesn't always make sense may be a
> characteristic, but certainly not a definition.]

(1) It isn't only popular opinion, it's gemara, rishonim...
(2) He doesn't show that his definition actually does yeild a set of
mitzvos that don't "always make sense" to use more so than the mitzvos
excluded.

Which is why my objections weren't about my not understanding RML's
position, it's that he offers a more literal translation that then
fails to explain actual usage.

To quote:
    The word "chok" describes a fixed law or statute. In fact, Chumash
    even uses the word "chok" to describe statutes that are not mitzvot.

To which I noted that every mitzvah has fixed laws. And the most fixed
are called by a term we both agree is unrelated, "halakhah leMoshe miSinai".

He adds, although for me this is tangential:
    For this reason, the holidays in Parshat Emor are referred to as
    CHUKIM for they celebrated on a REGULAR basis, once a year based
    on the solar (agricultural) calendar. Once again, a "chok" implies
    something constant that doesn't change - a statute.

(RSRH would even say that "chag" is a related word, given the phonetic
closeness of quf and gimel.)

But he went from one kind of "doesn't change" to another, from the
immutability of the law to the regularity of the schedule. Most chuqim
aren't on a schedule. It's more like an unrelated usage of an etymology
about "fixedness".

And:
    Based on this definition, a CHOK can be logical, but it doesn't have
    to be! Certain CHUKIM may be beyond our comprehension, however many
    other CHUKIM can actually make a lot of sense. Therefore we find some
    "chukim" that are quite logical, while others are not - however, an
    'unlogical law' does not define a CHOK!

    In contrast, a MISHPAT, as its name implies, is a JUDGEMENT - based
    on reason. The very concept of a MISHPAT relates to a decision or
    judgement that must be made between two claims. Hence, the Torah
    refers to the entire set of civil laws relating to damages etc. in
    Shemot chapters 21->23 as MISHPATIM (see Shemot 21:1 & 24:3).

But this definition means that some chuqim are mishpatim -- unchanging
laws that can be understood "based on reason".

It doesn't fit the usage in primary sources. Unless all or nearly all
chuqim cannot be understood (or to make the Rambam happy, cannot be
understood by the uninitiated), his explanation doesn't work for me.
Choq and mishpat have to be basically non-overlapping sets, if choq is
going to correlate to the gemara's usage.

Or to put it another way, the gemara didn't say that every mitzvah we
cannot understand is a choq, but that "choq" is a mitzvah we cannot
understand.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 A person lives with himself for seventy years,
http://www.aishdas.org/asp   and after it is all over, he still does not
Author: Widen Your Tent      know himself.
- https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF                          - Rav Yisrael Salanter