[Avodah] eilu v'eilu

[Micha Berger via Avodah]

On Sun, Feb 19, 2017 at 10:30:46PM -0500, Micha Berger wrote:
: On Sun, Jan 08, 2017 at 01:43:24PM -0500, M Cohen via Avodah wrote:
: : Interesting insights on eilu v'eilu (and other issues)
: : From R Moshe Shapiro zt'l
: : <http://j.mp/2j7eeOa> [On scribd.com -micha]
:
: It is quite relevant to RZL and my slow-speed discussion on the topic.
: Particularly, starting with pg 4, col 2, the par. that begins "This
: brought up the subject of Eilu veAilu".
...
: In contrast, RDE ascribes a multiple Truths view to the Yam Shel
: Shelomo (BQ, haqdamah; fn 22), the Ritva (Eiruvin 13b "EvE", fn 23;
: which we discussed at length) and the French chakhamim in the
: Ritva, R' Yaakov Kamenecki (Emes leYaaqov Devarim 25:1 pg 616,
: quoted in the notes in fn 24).

Also to add to the data collection about pluralistic understandings
of eilu va'eilu  and how the Ritva et all took it, we have R'
Michael Rosenseig's article in Tradition 1992, "Elu ve-Elu Divre Elokim
Hayyim: Halakhic Pluralism and Theories of Controversy"
<http://www.lookstein.org/articles/elu_ve_elu.htm>

Teaser:

    At the same time, if we accept the general scheme developed by Neziv,
    it is conceivable that even the mizvah of talmud Torah would extend
    only to that class of minority viewpoints that retain the status of
    or Torah due to some normative or at least conceptual benefit that
    they may yet provide. This stance is certainly open to debate. In
    the twentieth century, for example, R. Moshe Feinstein in one of
    his responsa eloquently argues on the basis of elu ve-elu divre
    Elokim hayyim that in the realm of talmud Torah and for purposes
    of birkat ha-Torah, minority positions are absolutely equivalent to
    normative halakhot. He goes so far as to suggest that even God and
    his heavenly retinue (metivta de-rekia) spend time discoursing and
    studying these doctrines in the context of talmud Torah [12].

    The possibility of real multiple halakhic truths does not really
    emerge from Neziv's scheme. This approach is, however, implied by
    other sources, Rashi for example, seems to affirm this doctrine [13]:

	When a debate revolves around the attribution of a doctrine to a
	particular individual, there is only room for one truth. However,
	when two Amorairn enter into a halakhic dispute, each arguing
	the halakhic merits of his view, each drawing upon comparisons
	to establish the authenticity of his perspective, there is
	no absolute truth and falsehood. About such issues one can
	declare that both represent the view of the living God. On
	some occasions one perspective will prove more authentic, and
	under other circumstances the other view will appear to be more
	compelling. The effectiveness of particular rationales shift as
	conditions of their application change even if only subtly.

    This more ambitious approach to our topic is explicated by Ritva,
    Maharal and Maharshaleach providing their own nuances and subtleties
    of formulation, each requiring a conceptual underpining to justify
    this difficult concept. Ritva (Eruvin 13b) cites the inherent paradox
    of this theme as raised by the Tosafists [14]:

	The Rabbis of France asked: How is it possible for conflicting
	views to both represent the truth? They responded as follows:

	When Moshe ascended to receive the Torah, it was demonstrated
	to him that every matter was subject to forty-nine lenient and
	forty-nine stringent approaches. When he queried about this,
	God responded that the scholars of each generation were given
	the authority to decide among these perspectives in order to
	establish the normative halakha.

    His response posits that a full range of halakhic optionspossibly
    even of equal statuswas revealed to Moshe and sanctioned as hefza
    shel Torah. License was provided to the scholars of every generation
    to pursue what they deemed to be the most accurate pesak on the
    basis of accepted halakhic methodology [15]. The clear implication
    of this formulation is that for those scholars halakhic conclusions
    are not arbitrary but based on rigorous analysis and, consequently,
    the decisions become normative for that generation [16].


    12 R. Moshe Feinstein, lggerot Moshe (New York, 1982), 4:9, 24.

    13 Rashi, Ketubot 57a, s.v. "[qm"l]"

    14 This view is apparently based on the formulation in Massekhet
    Soferim (16:6). See Talmud Yerushalmi Sanhedrin (4:2) where an
    important aspect of this theme is expressed in a slightly different
    context.

    15 For an interesting discussion of this basic perspective see
    the article by Rabbi Yechiel Michal Katz, "[VeChayei Olam Nata
    Besoicheinu - Zu TSBP]" Sefer Yevul Ha Yovlot (New York, 1986),
    pp. 346-360 and the sources cited therein.

    16 This view combined with the notion of exclusive human
    responsibility for the halakhic process as reflected by the principle
    of lo bashamayim hi (see Baba Meziah 59b) represents the conceptual
    underpinning for the somewhat radical view of halakhic autonomy that
    is manifest in its independence from even Divine interpretation
    and interference. This doctrine is articulated by Derashot haRan,
    (ed. L. Feldman), and in the famous introduction to the Ketzot
    haHoshen on Hoshen Mishpat in his analysis of the concept of halakhic
    hiddush

Note that while I thought the Ritva was speaking of Chakhmei Luneil,
RMR understands him to be referring to Baalei Tosafos.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Worrying is like a rocking chair:
micha at aishdas.org        it gives you something to do for a while,
http://www.aishdas.org   but in the end it gets you nowhere.
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