[Avodah] Geonim, Rambam and Other Rishonim on Mesorah and, Pesak and RMH's essay

[H Lampel via Avodah]

Somehow, my response to RMB's post was published in the previous day's Avodah (Vol. 34, Number 148 Message #2 (http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol34/v34n148.shtml#02), which I stayed up to the wee hours to compose so that it would appear together with what RMB wrote, so as not to burden the reader with re-quotes. As it appeared, it must have been confusing to the reader, since he did not know to what I was responding. So I'm resubmitting my response again (with a few additions) with the points of RMB I'm addressing only briefly restated.


> RMB: ...We grow up in a culture where Aristotle's Logic is well embedded. The 3
> Classical Laws of Thought appear self-evident. But to show that we should
> neither accept 2 of them uncritically or even assume that Chazal agreed.
>
> After all, I am asserting that the majority position among rishonim,
> and the way of of us do halakhah today is in defiance of at least one of
> these laws. Until I can establish that chazal didn't hold of such things,
> I won't get very far.
>
> More than that, I want to argue that our default position should be that
> both opinions were given at Sinai, that neither side of a machloqes
> is "wrong", despite the fact that they disagree. That machloqes is
> about which correct answer is being made law. And that in fact, the
> burden of proof is on the position RMHalbertal ascribes to the Rambam,
> that machloqes is about which extrapolation from established halakhah
> is correct.
>
> Anyway, the three laws:
>
> 1- The Law of Identity:
>      Whatever is, is.
>      A = A.
>
> 2- Law of Non-Contradition
>     2 or more contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same
>     sense at the same time
>     not (A and not-A)...

> 3- The Law of Excluded Middle
>     Everything must either be or not be
>     A or not-A

>   The Maharal explains machloqes in these terms.
> We have conflicting models of a Truth that can't fit in this world;
> not a real contradiction.

> Pashut peshat in Chazal is that machloqes is understood in these terms
> as well.
>
> "Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim, vehalakhah keBH."

>
>
> Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2 : Had the Torah been given decided, we wouldn't have a leg to stand on."And Hashem spoke to Moshe." ... "Decide according to the majority...." So that the Torah be interpretable 49 ways tamei and 49 ways tahor.
>
> And then there's the problem of explaining the Tanur shel Akhnai story
> ... if it was telling us the One True Pesaq, how could we possibly choose rabbim
> over siyata diShmaya?
>
> The Ran's justification of acharei rabim lehatos is similar. RMH's
> translation:
>      ... Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution
>      every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose
>      truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the
>      sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been
>      delegated to them...
>
> Again, the Divrei Elokim Chaim is described as going beyond the Law of
> Contradiction. Majority opinion isn't advocated as a way of maximizing
> the chance of getting the One Right Answer, but the given methodology
> for picking/a/  right answer. And Moshe was given all the Torah, even
> derabbanans -- or at least divrei soferim (megillah is which?) -- and
> we choose which version is halakhah.
>
> One last note, as part of this laying-the-groundwork email:
>
> I drew a distinction between finding Truth and finding Law. Realized that
> in rabbinic idiom, this could be referred to as Emes vs Din. But it is
> also -- perhaps more often -- phrased as Emes leAmito vs Emes leHoraah.
>
> One needs to see what kind of emes a rishon is describing, and not just
> rely on the use of the word emes.
>
> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha

RMB:

> Pashut peshat in Chazal is that  machloqes is understood in these terms as well.


> "Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim,  vehalakhah keBH."

ZL: You take it as '' pashut peshat''that ''divrei E-lokim chaim''means

''true [despite being contradictory],'' but the rishonim I will cite

below hold that what you consider ''pashut peshat'' is not correct peshat.

MAHARAL

You invoke the Maharal, but the Maharal (be'er HaGolah, be'er rishon)

explains that halacha is like Hashem's creations. He gives the example

of a tree. It is composed of all four elements, but there is an

overriding one that determines that it is a tree. In halacha, too, he

says, although there are properties [in things or situations] that point

to divergent conclusions, ''only one of them is the main, overpowering

one, and that is the determining factor, and that is the halacha.''

(''V'chein, af sheyeish l'davar echad bechinos mischalafos--kulam nitnu

min Hashem, //rak ki echad mei-hem yoseir ikkar, v'hu hamachria, v'hu ///

//

/halacha//.'')

That Maharal is explaining ''kulam mi-ro'eh echad nitnu.'' ''Eilu

v'Eilu,'' he maintains, implies that the determining components are

actually present in equal strength. He says that this is ''sometimes''

the case, and such was the case regarding the disputes of Beis Shammai

and Beis Hillel concerning which the Bas Kol declared that there was no

machria. Even if you consider this to be supportive of your view (I

don't), the Maharal applies this to a limited amount of cases, and does

not make it into the general rule as you do.

CHAZAL

You haven't addressed my point that every Gemora's kushya, or at least

every tiyuvta-tiyuvta, is assuming the Law of Non-Contradiction. If

Aristotle was wise enough to recognize the truth of this logic, that is

to his credit. But it is a logic that everyone from Adam to Moshe

Rabbeynu and on has been expected to use to determine truth.


Chazal taught the Sinaitic rule that if two pesukim are in contradiction, a

third one comes to qualify them, to add conditions to one or both of

them, so that they no longer are said to be true in the same sense at 
the same time.


RABBEYNU CHANANALE

Chagiga 3b tells us that despite the fact that different groups of 
Chazal give contradictory rulings, one should not despair of learning 
Torah, because ''kulan Kel echad amran, Parness echad amran.'' As 
Meharsha states, this is similar to the ''eilu v'eilu'' adage and should 
be understood the same way. Despite what one may think ''pashut peshat'' 
is, Rabbeynuu Chananale tells us it means, ''Acquire a heart to hear 
eilu v'eilu, for all of them clarify themseves to you which of them is 
clear halcha. For although they seem as if they are arguing, they go on 
to vote and decide and agree in the end (/sheh-kulan misbarerin lecha 
b-ayzeh mayhen halacha berurah. She-af-al-pi sheh-nirrin kmo cholkin, 
chozrin v-nimnin v-gomrin umaskimin b-sof/.) Nothing about ''all sides 
being true.''


RASHI

Despite what one may think ''pashut peshat'' of ''kulan Kel echad

amran'' is, Rashi (Chagigah 3b) explains it to mean ''you don't have any

of the disputants bringing a proof from any god's torah, only from the

Torah of our G-d.'' and he explains ''Parness echad amran''to mean: You 
don't have anyone bringing a proof from the words of a prophet who came 
to argue against Moshe

Rabbeynu.'' That's the characterization Rashi gives to the many

divergent opinions among the chachamim. Not that they are ''all true.'' 
All it means, as he goes on to explain, is ''Since their hearts are 
[directed] to heaven [i.e. since they are both making sincere attempts 
to understand the matter]...learn and know the words of all [the 
disputants], and when  you will know to distinguish which one is valid 
(u'k'sheh-taya lehavchin ay zeh yikasher), establish the halacha 
accordingly.''

When Rashi (Kesubos 57a) explains eilu v'eilu by saying //sometimes// this

consideration is appropriate and //sometimes// that one is, because the

considerations change over according to //slight changes in ///

//

/circumstances//, he is working with the logic that ''2 or more

contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the

same time not (A and not-A).'' And that is why he says that if two

Amoraim are arguing over what their mentor held, one of them is saying

''/sheker/,''and we //cannot// apply ''eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim'' to

such a situation.

When TOSEFOS on the same daf says that if two Amoraim are arguing

over what their mentor held, one of them ''/erred/,'' it is because he is

working with the logic that ''2 or more contradictory statements cannot

both be true in the same sense at the same time not (A and not-A).''

When RITVA on the same daf quotes Rashi as the correct peshat, it is

because he too is working with the Law of Non-Contradiction. (Yes, the

same Ritva who elsewhere quotes the kabbalistic teaching about Moshe

being told 49 considerations pointing to opposite conclusions,but who

concludes that ''that is correct by way of drash, but in the derech

ha-emes there is ta'am v'sod ba-davar.'' And pardon me, but I cannot

accept that any one of us can decipher what he means, either in the

beginning or the end.)

RAMBAN on Devarim 17:11 says that one should not be afraid to follow

Beis Din Gadol even if one thinks they erred, and that one must accept

the interpretation of pesukim by the Great Sanhedrin of Yerushalayim

whether they received it from Moshe from Hashem, or they say it

is so according to the mashma-os or intent of the mikreh. He is working

with the assumption that the mikreh has a /specific intent/, and one 
that is

subject to error.

TOS RABBEYNU PERETZ (Eruvin 13b)begins by taking eilu v'eilu as you do,

but cannot accept it because it is illogical. "If something is mutar it

cannnot be assur, and if something is assur it cannot be mutar." He

too is working with the Law of Non-Contradiction. He therefore concludes

that Eilu V'eilu merely means that one must follow the chachmei hador. 
He evidently takes ''divrei Elokim Chaim'' in the sense that both 
shittos of a machlokess are worthy of serious consideration.

SEFER HACHINUCH states that by commanding us to follow the majority

opinion, the Torah teaches us the fact that the majority opinion will

always conform to the truth more than the minority. This puts him 
together with all these other rishonim who hold that ''machloqes is 
about which extrapolation from established halakhah is correct,'' and 
not ''which correct answer is being made law.''

[Regarding the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2 and Sofrim  16:5): R' Yanai 
said: Had the Torah been given decided, we wouldn't  have a leg to stand 
on. ..."Decide according to the majority...." So that the Torah be  
interpretable 49 ways tamei and 49 ways tahor.

Why would we be at a disadvantage if we were explicitly given a pesak 
for each and every situation that may arise? Probably the thought is 
that it would be impossible to carry all those details in our minds. 
Instead, we were given klallim, the correct application through which 
each situation could be halachically solved. This does not contradict 
the fact that there is a correct conclusion to reach for.

>

> And then there's the problem of  explaining the Tanur shel Akhnai

> story if we're seeking the One  True Pesaq. We got the siyata

> diShmaya; if [the Bas Kol] was  telling us the One True Pesaq, how could we

> possibly choose rabbim over  siyata diShmaya?

The objective is to uncover the original intent, but Hashem in His wisdom

imposed upon us the requirement that our endeavor to do so must be

restricted to what we can arrive at through our ownminds' use of the

interpretive tools he gave us, and not through any new revelations.

Heavenly revelations are no longer valid for determining halacha. What

then was the purpose of the there a bas kol by tanur shel Achnai? Among 
the explanations

given are two by Rav Nissim Gaon (Brachos 19b). (1) The Bas Kol

declaring [out of respect for R. Eliezer] that the halacha follows R. 
Eliezer b'kall makom, meant it usually does,

but not necessarily here, or something similar. (2) It was a test for the

Chachamim to withstand the temptation to transgress the principle of /lo ///

//

/bashamayim hee/, similar to when Hashem grants a false prophet the

ability to perform a miracle (or the appearance of one).

To support your take that --

    >Divrei Elokim Chaim is  described as going beyond the Law

    > of Contradiction. Majority  opinion isn't advocated as a way of

    > maximizing the chance of  getting the One Right Answer, but the given

    > methodology for picking /a/  right answer.

--you invoke the RAN, and cite RMH's translation, which ends

Yet [God] also gave him a

> rule whose truth is manifest,  i.e., 'Favor the majority

> opinion'....as the sages of  that generation saw fit, for the decision

> had already been delegated to  them...

I feel frustrated because in my last post I already pointed out that

this is a mistranslation, and the correct translation contradicts the

thesis.

The last sentence reads, in Hebrew,

//aval massar lo klall yivadda bo ha-emmess//.

''/klall yivadda bo ha-emmess/'' does not translate''arule whose truth is

manifest.'' The correct translation is

    But [God] gave him a rule //through which one knows the truth//, 'Favor

    the majority opinion'...

And the context removes all doubt that the Ran explicitly denies that he

is referring only to ''Emes leHoraah vs Emes leAmito. To wit (and this

is again something I already cited last time but will repeat again):

In Drash 5 and 11 the Ran poses a quandary:

    Since the words of those who declare something tamei and those who ?

    declare it tahor are intrinsically contradictory, it is impossible for ?

    both sides of the dispute to be conforming to the Truth. How then
    could ?

    we say that they were both told to Moses by G-d? Does G-d have any ?

    doubts as to what the Truth is?!

And he then suggests the approach that the sages only established ''Emes

leHoraah vs Emes leAmito." But he then goes on to/reject /it for the

overwhelming majority of cases:

Now, this approach will satisfy those who hold that there are no reasons

behind the mitzvos at all and that they all simply follow the

[arbitrary] Will of G-d .... But we do not choose this approach. /We///

/
/

/believe that everything the Torah warns us against is indeed/

//

//

//

/[intrinsically] harmful to us, //and creates a negative imprint on our///

//

//

//

/souls, even though we may not know the mechanics behind that process./

//

//

//

/Therefore, if the consensus of the Sages is that something [that is/

//

//

//

/tamei is] tahor, so what?!// Won't it still harm us and produce its

natural effect, whatever it is? ...It would therefore seem that we

preferably //should// follow the revelation of a prophet or Bas Kol, which

would tell us the true nature of the thing.

The Torah took means to prevent a misfortune that can always arise, and

that is the divergence of opinions and the creation of machlokess,

almost creating a situation of two Torahs. The Torah's remedy for this

ever-present danger was to hand over to each generation's Sages the

right to resolve halachic questions. //For in the majority of cases this///

//

//

//

/will result in both a remedy [of the problem of machlokess] and the/

//

//

//

/correct decision//.... And even though there is the extremely remote and

practically absurd possibility that they may make a mistake, the Torah did

not concern itself with that remote danger. The risk is worth taking for

the benefit accrued.

So the Ran's take is that the halacha represents the /true nature/ of 
things.

He holds that as a rule ''Divrei Elokim Chaim'' does //not//

go beyond the Law of Contradiction. He //does// advocate majority opinion

as a way of  maximizing the chance of getting the One Right Answer, and

does //not// merely advocate it as the given methodology for picking //a//

right answer.

Down to the Yam shel Shlomo, who wrote (Introduction to Bava Kamma)

''Never did two opposite predicates for one subject escape the lips of

Moshe'' (''shelo yatza hadavar mipi Moshe l-olom lihyos shnei hafachim

b-nosei echad''), and the acharonim (who I listed in the original post), 
the various explanations of ''eilu

eilu'' avoid conflict with the Law of Non-Contradiction and assume its 
necessity.

So as far as the consensus of rishonim is concerned, I'm making my case

from Rabbeynu Chananale, Rashi, Tosefos, Tos. Rabbeynu Peretz, Ramban, 
Ritva, the Ran and

Sefer HaChinuch. That's 9 rishonim. Do you have 10 that say otherwise?

Zvi Lampel

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