[Avodah] Rav Sharki on university students

[Micha Berger via Avodah]

On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 11:06:02AM -0400, David Riceman via Avodah wrote:
:> (of MIT) "proves" that an Omniscient Omnipotent Omnibenevolent (OOO)
...
:> We can't have a contradiction, so one of our givens must be false.
:> (1) is true by definition -- G-d is by definition OOO

: This is wrong. Omnipotence is an incoherent concept. I actually
: once started a thread here called "What can't God do?". Some examples:
: Can God break his own promises? Can God punish people for doing good?
: Can God lie?

The Moreh discusses both points.

1- Omnipotence is really a statement that nothing lies beyond his Potency
than insisting He posesses an infinite amount of power.

2- The Rambam believes that logic is a aspact of Truth, and therefore
part of His Essence. And therefore that He cannot do the illogical.
But this is no more a limitation of Omnipotence, in the Rambam's opinion,
any more than His inability to create bloomfargs or any other meaningless
nonsense clauses.

The Ramchal says that logic is a nivra, and therefore Hashem can indeed 
create round squares and other self-contrdictory things.

...
: I suspect omnibenevolence is equally incoherent.  But Hazal certainly reject it when they say that the world is a shituf of din and hesed.  Omnibenevolence is analogous to pure hesed,

Why? It would be pure Tov, not Chesed.

: Furthermore it is presumptuous to define God.

Thus the idea I labeled #1 above from the Moreh, and his via negativa.

R' Moshe Taqu infamously takes the opposite approach -- it would be
presumptuous to define G-d even to the extent of insisting that we
must limit ourselves to defining what He Isn't. RMT therefore
insists we must accept the descriptions in Tanakh uncritically.

(Which is why it is usual to assume that the Raavad is referring to R
Moshe Taqu when he speaks of someone holier than the Rambam who believes
that HQBH has a body. Though I doubt it, because that's not what RMT
actually says. More that he refuses to take a position on the subject,
one way or the other.)

:> (2) is not really an assumption, but a logical conclusion. (It hides a
:> prior formal proof.) A G-d who would know about any evil, doesn't want evil
:> to exist and can do anything would have eliminated that evil.

: Again, evil is a fuzzy concept. But this is an example of a general
: problem with utility functions. People, and possibly, for all I know,
: God,
: have multidimensional vector valued preferences. Two bundles of goods
: may exist without one being fully better or worse than another.
: So, for example, excising evil would also excise free will. Would God
: really want that?

Well yeah, that's a frequently given piece of theodicy. A world without
Nazis is a world of robots, not people. There would be no moral agents
for good to happen to. And thus no real good in the universe at all.

But it only explains the evil people do. Not congential birth defects
and other such natural evils. This could be one element in a broader
answer.

And that was sort of my point... By ignoring the whole subject of
theodicy, Dr Haslanger misses the main point she would need to refute.

As an aside, a central part of RYBS's hashkafah is that much of free
will is choosing between goods that are in dialecitcal tension. More
often than a pure good vs evil choice.

:-)||ii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 4th day
micha at aishdas.org        in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an
Fax: (270) 514-1507                           imposition on others?


the tragic which 

:-)||ii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 4th day
micha at aishdas.org        in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an
Fax: (270) 514-1507                           imposition on others?