[Avodah] If a woman can say "you do not need to redeem me and I will not give you peros"

Chana Luntz via Avodah avodah at lists.aishdas.org
Mon May 18 06:39:50 PDT 2015


Rav Zylberstein in the Cheshukei Chemed on Daf 78a of Kesubos discusses the
question as to whether a woman today who has lots of peros from her property
can say to her husband - "you do not need to redeem me, and I will not give
you the peros" - on the ground that the need for redemption today is not
common ("lo schiach") - even though the gemora there says that she cannot
avoid this trade as mandated by Chazal (despite her being able to avoid the
trade between mezonos versus ma'aseh yadeha, again a takana of Chazal, as
this last takana was done for her benefit).

Rav Zylberstein brings a discussion based on various rishonim to show that
actually, pidyon was not common even at the time of Chazal, or at the time
of the rishonim, and hence the fact that it is not common today does not
change the situation from that mandated by Chazal.  He also adds in the
position of the Ran, that the takana regarding pidyon is not just made for
her benefit (as the mezonos one is) and hence something that can be waived
by her, but is also for the benefit of the husband, as without her
redemption, the husband doesn't have the benefit of her company and
services, while with mezonos that doesn't apply.

However, it seems to me that Rav Zylberstein is not in fact dealing with
what strikes me as the fundamental question.  That is, it is not a question
of whether or not pidyon is not common today (indeed, I would be tempted
dispute that it is in fact "lo schiach", despite Rav Zylberstein taking this
for granted)  - but rather that the job of pidyon today is one of those that
has been appropriated away from family members such as husbands, and is now
the province of governments.

The decision as to whether an individual may or may not be redeemed from
ISIS, or pirates off Africa, or wherever, is now one which governments take
with regard to their citizens.  Governments which are prepared to do deals,
like France, redeem their citizens (albeit for astronomical sums).
Governments, like the UK and the US, who refuse to do deals on the grounds
that it just encourages terrorists - will not let individuals, including
husbands, redeem, even if the sums could be raised individually, as a matter
of general policy.  Nobody assumed it was the job of Gilad Shalit's family
to effect his release - except to the extent that they was required to lobby
the Israeli government (it might even have been treason to go negotiating
with Hamas directly).  Release or non release negotiations therefore,
including the price to be paid (whether by prisoner release or otherwise) is
today a government price. 

So it seems to me that what in fact we have today is a situation where
husbands are, for the most part, forbidden by law (dina d'malchusa dina)
from redeeming their wives, ie from fulfilling their side of the takana of
Chazal.  In such circumstances - while one might argue that the state of
which the woman is a citizen is entitled to (at least some portion of) the
peros (taxes?) the real question then seems to become: on what basis does
one say that the second half of the takana stands - not just in relation to
a woman who tries to say "you do not need to redeem me", but in relation to
any woman in this circumstance.

Has anybody come across anybody discussing this question, and any thoughts
on any justification for the retention of the husband's benefit if in fact
husbands are not legally allowed to effect redemption?

BTW on the question of the commonness of redemption - part of that would
depend on the scope of the definition of "pidyon".  Clearly redemption from
ISIS or pirates in Africa falls within this category - but how about
rescuing somebody who was trekking in Nepal at the time of the earthquake?
Again this is something that governments are now regarded as having a
responsibility to do (the British Government has been criticised for failing
to do as much as others, such as the Israeli and US governments, have done).
At first  blush I can't see why flying somebody out of an earthquake zone
would not fit within the pidyon definition - despite it being physical
forces, such as landslides, rather than people, who may be trapping the
individuals.  How about a package tour company going bust?  Again, the
person in question would (absent ATOL and similar travel bonding schemes set
up by the relevant governments) be trapped in a foreign country and need to
be returned to their country of origin, as per the language of the
takana/ketuba.  So why would this not be a form of pidyon?  But again, is
not the fundamental responsibility now assumed to devolve onto the
government in respect of its citizens?  So while I am not actually sure that
it is true that pidyon is in fact so extremely not common, it seems to me
that the fundamental question is rather a different one.

Regards

Chana






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