[Avodah] carrying an ID card on shabbat

[Zev Sero]

On 8/03/2013 3:18 PM, Kenneth Miller wrote:
> R' Zev Sero wrote:
>> >Those are batel to the garment.  The permanent attachment
>> >is irrelevant; they'd be just as batel if they weren't
>> >permanently attached.  They have no independent metzius,
>> >they're just part of the garment.

> R' Micha Berger responded:
>> >I don't know why you say a label is batel if its not fully
>> >attached, but whatever you're saying about shaatnez labels
>> >would be true of ID cards, no?

> I suspect that RZS's comment about "permanent" was meant to compare
> (for example) a total sewing and stitching on all four side with a
> safety pin: The degree of attachment is totally irrelevant.

Or even a normal pin, or a slip knot (if not for the fear that it will
come undone).

> The determining factor is the relationship between the garment and the other item.

Exactly.


> A shaatnez label enhances the garment, as evidence of its permissibility
> to be worn.

Or else it has no significance at all, so it's batel, as you explain in
reference to the manufacturer's label.


> How did gloves enter this discussion? A glove is a beged, pure and simple.
> The only reason not to wear gloves is the fear that one might remove it
> and carry it.

They entered the discussion because I made two distinct arguments, which
RMB seems to have conflated into one.  First I made the argument you deal
with, that the ID card can't be batel to the garment (unlike a Jew-patch
which is, because it's just a bit of fabric).  Second, I wrote that even
if one turns it into a wearable beged of its own, e.g. by making it an
integral part of a belt, there's still the problem of "shema yishlof".
RMB cited the case of gloves as one where me'ikar hadin we pasken that
there's no gezera of "shema yishlof", and it's only a chumra to attach
them to the coat.  He wants to say that the same applies to the ID card.

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
zev at sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan