[Avodah] The Main Idea of Judaism

[Chana Luntz]

I wrote:

<<Here we have a situation where something would be a prohibited act, and
Yael's change of perspective (ie not deriving any pleasure from the
event) changes it into a virtuous act.>>

And RDR:

>It's not a change in perspective.  It's a different physical event. 

This I think is the heart of our disagreement. I do not dispute that a
possible interpretation of what occurred with Yael was absence of pleasure,
but I would dispute that even if that is what the Maharsha, Tosphos et al
are saying, that they considered an absence of pleasure as creating a
different physical event, rather than a change of perspective.

But even before one gets to analysing the words of any of the meforshim,
think the issue through.  If you have a situation where a women (let us say
a married woman) is initially raped (let's say she was asleep and in no way
solicited it) and then woke up and started enjoying it (let's say it was
somebody whom maybe she would have fancied, but would never have done
anything about because she does not believe in committing adultery - I am
trying to make the case a bit believable) - then, according to you the act
would change midway from something where she is blameless to something where
she is blameworthy?

Is that your contention?

That was my point in bringing the gemora in Yerushalmi Sotah.  Ie your
position appears to be (at least somewhat) the hava mina of Rabbi Yochanan -
ie that the woman's enjoyment midway, despite the original force, changed
matters, but the conclusion was to concede that it didn't.  

> As the Maharsha (and three Tosafoses I have subsequently encountered --
I'll cite >the one in Sanhedrin below and it'll point you to the others)
>construes the event, Yael did not enjoy the encounter, even though she
initiated it.  See Tos. Sanhedrin 74b s.v. "V'ha Esther Parhesya havah",
"hana'ah >hashiva k'ma'aseh" (just before the citation of Perek HaMeiniah).

I am not disputing that the Maharasha and Tosphos could be read as
understanding that the reason that Yael was praised was because she did not
enjoy the encounter, but I think you are misreading the various Tosphosim.

The easiest one I think to see the point is the one on Yevamos 103a (d"h
"v'ha") (it's shorter than the one in Sanhedrin a start, and deals solely
with the issue).  What that Tosphos is making clear is that the issue with
Yael is *not* the one raised with Esther, regarding being karka olam (ie
that is *not* the gemora's question) - because it is clear that Yael was not
forced (ie unlike Esther) and indeed solicited the encounter - rather the
gemora's question is, why is she praised above the Imahos?

Similarly in the Tosphos in Sanhedrin that you quoted, they are bringing
Yael to make the point that the text does not question regarding Yael the
way it does regarding Esther, inter alia because it is clear that Yael was
not forced, and Sisera was not in a position to force her, as he was running
away from his pursuers, and rather she enticed him with words to have
relations with her, and hence the focus of the question there is why is Yael
praised so highly (and it can't be that it relates to why Yael did not give
herself over to death, because of the getting of hana'ah, however you want
to translate that, because were that to be the question, it would need to be
asked on Esther too, and it isn't). 

>Admittedly Hazal's explanation of why she didn't enjoy it is cryptic: "d'ka
shadi bah zuhama (Yevamos 103b)",

Well, it is only really cryptic if you insist on understanding hana'ah as
relating to pleasure. That is clearly one way of understanding hana'ah (and
clearly one that jibes better with the modern mind), but it is not the only
one.  An alternative way (although I admit it is a difficult one for the
modern mind, as we do not understand relations this way) is to translate it
as benefit.  Ie there is as a side effect, a (and this is where your
physical reality comes in, although it is not an *act* of the woman)
physical benefit to a woman from relations, they are actually good for her,
even if she does not solicit or want them - but only of course if you don't
get zuhuma in the process.  Once you do, then the side effect benefit goes
out the window and so clearly Yael was more praiseworthy than the Imahos,
who got this side benefit.

>On a more general level I don't understand your point.  The Maharsha
construes the gemara as praising "lishmah" in the sense of "having no
personal >benefit from the act".

Well if you understand it as pleasure, as you originally translated it, then
shelo lishma is doing the act for the sake of the pleasure, and lishma is
doing it, not for the sake of pleasure but for some wider good (there is no
other real alternative, to suggest that she did neither for the sake of the
pleasure, nor for the sake of the wider good to klal Yisrael, but merely lo
ichpat leih is to suggest that she did it because she was totally hefker,
and didn't care  - I really can't see how you can impute that to the
Maharsha).  Similarly if you translate hana'ah as benefit, since she wasn't
doing it for the benefit (since there was none, due to zuhuma) then the
lishma was for the wider good.

You can see that aspect more clearly from the Tosphos on Sanhedrin
discussing the Imahos - shehayu meskavanos l'hivnos m'baalehen - that is why
Yael, who had no such kavana, but rather a kavana purely for the wider good,
was to be so praised.

> The Yerushalmi is discussing whether the raped wife of a cohen needs to
get divorced.  One would expect different criteria for these very different
>contexts.

I brought it both because you argued that the act with enjoyment (or
hana'ah) is not just a different perspective, but an entirely different type
of act, one assur, one as per Yael, mutar - that is your original assertion,
that there cannot be a prohibited act which, with a change in perspective,
becomes a mutar act.  I am bringing you a case where it changes half way,
and while Rav Yochanan has a hava mina that indeed it changes the nature of
the act, and makes it an assur act for the woman, when it was not before, he
accepts in the end that it does not.  

>See the passage in Tosafos I cited above.  Tosafos constures the criterion
to be, not solicitation, but participation, and "hana'ah hashivah
k'ma'ashe".

Now, again I think you are misreading this Tosphos, but to understand this
aspect, you need to go to the gemora in Baba Kama which this is drawn (32a).
The gemora there makes a husband liable for any damage that he does to his
wife during the course of tashmish.  But a query is raised, why is it the
husband's problem and not the wife's, since the husband is permitted to have
tashmish - answer - but it is only the husband who is doing an act - "kavid
ma'aseh", so he is responsible for hurting her, and she bears no liability.

But the problem with that is if you take it too far, as I suggested in my
earlier post, then you ought to get women off scot free from committing
adultery, because they never do any act, it is always the man doing it all.
And yet the pasuk says "v'nichrisu hanefeshos haoseos m'kerev amam" which
implies that only those who do anything will be punished, thus excluding the
women.  And so the gemora answers there in Baba Kama that because both get
hana'ah, then women get punished too, ie for legal purposes it is considered
k'ma'ase, but confirms, for the record, that it is only the man who is
really doing any act - hence he is solely liable for physical injury.

So, tosphos has a problem with the Esther scenario (well not specifically
the Esther scenario, because Achashverosh presumably also gave her zuhuma)
but why isn't this whole question raised on Esther or other women who are
raped the way it is raised on Yael?  After all, if hana'ah is considered
k'ma'aseh then what use is the category of karka olam?  

And their answer is, inter alia, that Yael was *not* raped, she solicited
and orchestrated it, and the opposite, Sisiera was in no position to rape
her, and it is only in those contexts that we raise questions about hana'ah
- however you want to translate it, because there is no karka olam in a
solicitation case.  And that is why you get into the question of motive and
intent.

Note by the way that the Tosphos further up on Nazir 23b (d"h "Tamar") also
supports this understanding, the gemora describes Tamar has having "zinsa"
and Tosphos's comment is "niskavanan l'shem shamayim .." that is why she is
praised - it is her kavana that makes it different from the situation with
Zimri, who also zinsa.


>> Incidentally, the Yalkut Shimoni (#44) disputes R. Yohanan's 
>> contention
> that Yael misbehaved.

...

>""Amar R. Shimon ben Lakish ... shmi me'id bah shelo naga bah oso rasha."
The editor cites VaYikra Rabba 23:10 as a source.  And, indeed, Margalios in
>his notes there (p. 542 note 6) observes that this disagrees with R.
Yohanan.

Oh fine, I thought that you were saying that the Yalkut Shimoni was bringing
R' Yochanan as saying something different.  The Yalkut Shimoni is, of
course, a Yalkut, and it brings loads of completely contrary midrashim and
discussions.  Truth is, however, that it is irrelevant.  The gemora assumes
that there is a concept of an averah lishma - and then brings our Rav
Yochanan to prove that it is actually either greater than a mitzvah shelo
lishma, or at least as good as.

>Here is where I think you are either misconstruing or disagreeing with the
Maharsha.  The gemara accepts that seduction was a means to a good end, but
>doesn't accept that it was "greater than a mitzvah", except for the one
detail that Yael did not personally benefit from it.

>If I understand you correctly, however, you are arguing that Yael's goal
made that event a "good deed".  But part of the Maharsha's point is that the
>event was not technically prohibited.

In a way this gets into the hutra d'chuya discussion.  But consider this
scenario.  Let us say that Yael had relations with Sisera because she found
him overwhelmingly attractive and didn't like her husband much - but the
consequence was that Sisera was weakened and able to be killed.  Now
according to you and your understanding of the Maharsha, is what Yael did
still OK?  If Ok, would she still be praiseworthy?  She would still seem to
have got zuhuma.

A related case, if you want a modern one, might be if somebody wilfully and
deliberately was mechallel shabbas but in doing so saved somebody's life -
best I can come up with - let's say they drove down kikar shabbas on
shabbas, because they hated the religious, and let's say that for whatever
reason they could not be put into the tinuk shenishba category, but because
they were a trained medic, and were there, they were able to do first aid
and save somebody's life who happened to need it, and they did so.  Now in
retrospect the driving on shabbas would seem to be a mutar act, as it
enabled a life to be saved that would not otherwise have been saved, and if
they had intended to drive to save somebody's life, everybody would agree
that it was mutar.  Do you still hold that we can tell, due to retrospect,
that that driving was mutar (feels a bit like shrodinger's cat)?

Note also that your understanding of the Maharsha would seem to suggest that
any woman having relations, even willingly and solicited relations, with
somebody who would give her zuhuma would not be technically prohibited (and
there are billions out there today, so it is quite a heter).  Do you agree
that this would follow from the Maharsha?  Is this indeed your position?
Does it really not matter what is going on somebody's head?

>David Riceman

Regards

Chana