[Avodah] The Main Idea of Judaism

[David Riceman]

RCL:

<<Here we have a situation where something would be a prohibited act, 
and Yael's change of perspective (ie not deriving any pleasure from the 
event) changes it into a virtuous act.>>

It's not a change in perspective.  It's a different physical event.  As 
the Maharsha (and three Tosafoses I have subsequently encountered -- 
I'll cite the one in Sanhedrin below and it'll point you to the others) 
construes the event, Yael did not enjoy the encounter, even though she 
initiated it.  See Tos. Sanhedrin 74b s.v. "V'ha Esther Parhesya havah", 
"hana'ah hashiva k'ma'aseh" (just before the citation of Perek HaMeiniah).

Admittedly Hazal's explanation of why she didn't enjoy it is cryptic: 
"d'ka shadi bah zuhama (Yevamos 103b)", but nonetheless the main thrust 
of the argument in our sugya is clear: The Imahos performed the mitzva 
of having children, but the mitzva was not pure because they enjoyed the 
initial preparation; Yael did not enjoy the initial preparation for 
killing Sisera even though she initiated it.

> <<I am not sure that the Maharsha is right though, since in the 
> Yerushalmi Sotah 4:4 the same Rabbi Yochanan accepted that pleasure 
> derived from being forced is irrelevant: כהדא איתתא אתת לגביה רבי 
> יוחנן אמרה ליה נאנסתי. אמר לה ולא ערב לך בסוף אמרה ליה ואם יטבול אדם 
> אצבעו בדבש ויתננה לתוך פיו ביום הכיפורים שמא אינו רע לו ובסוף אינו ערב 
> לו. וקיבלה. (A woman came to Rav Yochanan and said she has been raped. 
> He said to her, didn't you enjoy it in the end. She said if a man dips 
> his finger in honey and forced it into your mouth on Yom Kippur, is it 
> not bad for you and is it not enjoyable for you in the end, he 
> accepted her). Unless you want to say that, from this Rav Yochanan, 
> that Rav Yochanan denies the possibility that there can never any 
> pleasure in the end, unless someone is functioning on the level of Yael.>>

The gemara in Yevamos I just cited is also construing the opinion of R. 
Yohanan.  I don't understand why there's a contradiction, however.  The 
simple fact is that, according to R Yohanan, Yael seduced Sisera 
(according to R Yohanan).

On a more general level I don't understand your point.  The Maharsha 
construes the gemara as praising "lishmah" in the sense of "having no 
personal benefit from the act". The Yerushalmi is discussing whether the 
raped wife of a cohen needs to get divorced.  One would expect different 
criteria for these very different contexts.


<<Rather the aspect of passivity is not enjoyment or lack of enjoyment, but
solicitation or lack of solicitation.  A woman can be subject to rape even
if she is asleep (or, for that matter, dead), her consciousness is not at
all required.  Similarly with a rape, where she is fully conscious, but
unwilling, the key fact is lack of active consent.>>

See the passage in Tosafos I cited above.  Tosafos constures the criterion to be, not solicitation, but participation, and "hana'ah hashivah k'ma'ashe".

>> Incidentally, the Yalkut Shimoni (#44) disputes R. Yohanan's contention
> that Yael misbehaved.
>
> Does it?  Where do you see that?  (The version I get up on Bar Ilan - #45 -
> I don't see it in #44) doesn't seem to me to dispute it - although it brings
> the averah lishma language in the name of Rabbi Nachman, and it brings other
> aspects as well).
""Amar R. Shimon ben Lakish ... shmi me'id bah shelo naga bah oso 
rasha."  The editor cites VaYikra Rabba 23:10 as a source.  And, indeed, 
Margalios in his notes there (p. 542 note 6) observes that this 
disagrees with R. Yohanan.
> <<Yes but if we go deeper, and that is why the Yael scenario is of 
> particular relevance - why was Yael doing whatever she did? Whether 
> you want to argue lack of pleasure or whatever, Yael's fundamental 
> motivation (ie what replaced any question of pleasure) has to be for 
> the greater good, beyond the specific act - and it is this acting for 
> the greater good that renders the averah aspect of the specific act 
> greater than a mitzvah.>> 

Here is where I think you are either misconstruing or disagreeing with 
the Maharsha.  The gemara accepts that seduction was a means to a good 
end, but doesn't accept that it was "greater than a mitzvah", except for 
the one detail that Yael did not personally benefit from it.

If I understand you correctly, however, you are arguing that Yael's goal 
made that event a "good deed".  But part of the Maharsha's point is that 
the event was not technically prohibited.
> <<I didn't think anybody was suggesting that solving maths problems 
> for pleasure was a kiyum mitzvah. I thought they were arguing that 
> solving maths problems for the sake of servitude to G-d (or perhaps 
> for the sake of knowing G-d, eg as the Rambam appears to understand 
> it) could be a kiyum mitzvah, even if one got pleasure out of that 
> combination.>>

There were two strains of thought.  One that I should have servitude to 
God as my goal.  The other that since, objectively, if I succeed in 
solving the problem it will benefit mankind, my attempts are service to 
God whether or not that is my intention.

Your formulation is acceptable, but neither of the others are.

David Riceman