[Avodah] God of Love, vs. Just God

Micha Berger micha at aishdas.org
Wed Feb 9 12:13:31 PST 2011


On Wed, Feb 02, 2011 at 08:33:45PM -0500, Moshe Y. Gluck wrote:
: I had this discussion with someone recently and I wonder what the Chevra
: think: Is Hashem a Loving God? Or is he a Just God? 

I see this thread going in two directions -- the general question of
theodicy (tzadiq vera lo, rasha vetov lo) and the more specific issue of
"Loving G-d".

RET is correct that many rabbanim today are willing to not only
invoke hashgachah peratis in explaining someone else's suffering, but
to say that it's specifically related to onesh. I am not sure this is
mesoretic. What we find in Chazal is a grasping for a lesson to take from
the tragic. Which is neither the same as asserting cause and effect, nor
to we EVER find them happy with a single answer. Think of the machloqes
about Nadav and Avihu's sins, about churbenos bayis rishon vesheini,
etc... Each produce several suggested answers. It truly is grasping.

To assert a causal connection must exist denies so much: the entirety
of sefer Iyov, or the notion of yisurin shel ahavah, as well as (less
importantly compared to neglecting an entire sefer of Nakh written to
disabuse you of this very point!) those rishonim who say hashgachah
peratis is earned, not guaranteed for all people and at all times.

RYBS says the Jewish question in the face of suffering is not "Why?"
but "How should I respond?" This orientation underlies our entire focus
on halakhah. I can't think of a better [non-]answer.

On the main topic, is G-d a Loving G-d?

Much of the discussion revolves around the notion of negative theology,
the idea that all we can know about HQBH is ruling out what He
isn't. Hashem isn't Omnipotent in the sense of limitless power, but in
the sense that He doesn't even need power for things to happen. Just as
Hashem isn't everywhere as much as location being an irrelevent concept;
He is lemaalah min haZman, not within time, but across an entire infinite
duration. Etc...

More relevent to nidon didan is the two girasos of mah Hu... af atah.
The version you find in our shasen (Shabbos 133b) is:
    "Zeh Keili ve'anvehu" -- Abba Shaul omeir: hevei domeh Lo. Mah Hu
    Rachum veChanun, af atah hayei rachum vechanun...

However, here's the version in the Sifrei (49):
    Vekhi heiach ifshar lo le'adam liqro bishmo shel Maqom?
    Ela, nigra haMaqom "Rachum", af atah heyei rachum. HQBH niqra
    "Chanun", af atah hei chanun... Niqra haMaqom "Tzadiq"... af atah
    heyei tzadiq. Niqra haMaqom "Chasid"... af atah heyei chasid.
    Lekakh ne'emar "Vehayah kol asher yiqra besheim Hashem yemaleit"
    (Yoel 3:5)...

In this version, Chazal aren't saying Hashem is actually Rachum, Chanun
or Qadosh -- he is NIQRA "Chanun". Unsurprisingly, the Rambam favors
this version (Dei'os 1:6):
    Kakh limedu befeirush mitzvah zu: Mah hu niqra Chanun, af atah
    heyei chanun. Mah Hu niqra Rachum, af atah heyei rachum. Mah hu
    niqra Qadosh, af atah heyei Qadosh.

This is not to say that Abba Shaul is necessarily saying something
different than the Sifrei. I would think that the gemara is simply
using standard anthropomorpic shorthand to convey the same intent.

Less problematic (Sotah 14a):
    Ve'amar Rabbi Chama beRabbi Chanin... lehaleikh achar Middosav
    shel HQBH. Mah Hu malbish arumim ... af atah halveish arumum. HQBH
    biqei cholim... af atah...
as here we're talking about actions. Although "mah hu biqeir Cholim"
takes a little thought, since HQBH doesn't actually approach or leave
people. Still, He can make His presence more obvious to a choleh, and
thus be mevaqeir.

I do not fully agree with RHM's chiluq when he wrote:
> I think you're right. Love is an emotion. Emotions are entirely human --
> not Divine. The Midas HaDin -- Justice -- is not an emotion but an ethic
> reflecting the concept of of right versus wrong.

I'm not sure that attributes such as Dayan or saying that HQBH's actions
reflect a pre-existing ethic or even any human-comprehensible one is
significantly simpler than describing Hashem using an emotion. Attributes
come in two or three classes:
1- What Hashem isn't
2- How His actions, or the effects of His Will, look to us

and while the Rambam stops there, R' Saadia Gaon also has
3- Attributes of our relationship with HQBH, rather than HQBH Himself. (I
think the Rambam would include this in #2.)

This is akin to RDR's comment:
> The classification of an event as mercy or justice is not an objective
> one, but a subjective one.

These are descriptions not of Hashem's Will, which is inherently
unknowable, but of how His actions appear to us. And I may add, which
He explicitly models for us to emulate.

Then there is also the Euthyphro Dillemma. Plato has Socrates ask a
young student named Euthyphro, "Is what is righteous righteous because
the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is righteous?" The
Jewish spin would be to ask: Is an act good because HQBH chose to make
it a mitzvah, or did Hashem command us to do it because it is good? What
is the Source of morality? The problem is that if you say that an act
is good solely because Hashem commanded it, then He had no moral reason
to tell us to do one set of things and not another. Can mitzvos be the
product of Divine whim, the decision between "Thou shalt murder" and
"Thou shalt not" entirely without any reason on His part? On the other
hand, if there is an overarching definition of good and evil that Hashem
conformed to, then we placed something "over" Him, something that even
He is subject to.

I would apply the second horn of that dilemma to RHM's "Justice is ... an
ethic reflecting the concept of right vs. wrong."

And besides, we do describe Hashem as expressing ahavah. Okay, to the
Notzerim love plays an entirely different and more central role. But
"ahavah rabba ahavtanu" "ahavas olam", "oheiv amo yisrael", etc... We
don't rule out emotional metaphors for HQBH, or (as per R' Saadia)
at least how He conducts his relationship to us.

RDR continues:
> The classification of an event as mercy or justice is not an objective
> one, but a subjective one. As you correctly note, it can change
> depending on how wide your perspective is. My experience is that wider
> perspective makes events seem more like mercy.

RAM apparently agrees:
> But I prefer to take it as a real question: How can a Loving God do
> such things? And my answer is: We are too short-sighted.

And RMK explains how:
> When you punish your son or send him back to his room after bedtime, are you
> doing it as a loving father or as a just father? Your son, from his limited
> experience, sees this as a dichotomy; we, who have the breadth of
> understanding and experience to know that setting and enforcing clear limits
> is the greatest chesed a parent can perform for a child, do not see the
> conflict.

Although Hashem allowing Nazis to kill an infant is unlikely to seem
like midas haRachamim by any perspective I would consider positive,
constructive, or one HQBH is modeling for us to emulate.

Some meisim are just so great, they will always be munachim lefaneinu,
and we will always be incapable of finding resolution.


So much for responding to what was written. My own opinion:

HQBH is entirely incomprehensible. But He had a "Thought", which in turn
thought a thought, and so on down a chain of logical progression until
you get to this world of chomer. You can phrase that as the Rambam does
(Yesodei haTorah 2:5) as a chain of tzuros beli chomer / sichliim nivdalim
we call "mal'akhim". Or, as the mequbalim do using the terminology of
Or Ein Sof and a progression of olamos. But LAD, they are metaphors and
only somewhat different perspectives on the same basic truth.

One of the earliest in the chain, if not the first, was Tov. "HaTov
shimkhah". IOW, while saying that "Hashem is Good" is only meaningful in
terms of ruling out His being evil and in describing His actions and how
he relates to the beri'ah, it is a closer approximation to the Ultimate
Truth than anything else a human can grasp..

Why does the world exist? R' Saadia Gaon, an Aristotilian rationalist,
and a mequbal like the Ramchal agree: Because it is the "nature"
of Tov to have someone upon whom to bestow that tov. As the Ramchal
points out: He is Shaleim beyond the concept of Sheleimus -- it's not
like beri'ah could possibly be for /His/ benefit. (Derekh Hashem 2:1:1
<http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/mahshevt/mekorot/1b-2.htm>)

A child -- again, direct or indirect, I'm not firm on the point --
of Tov is Chesed. Olam Chesed yibaneh.

And Din and Gevurah are logical consequences of Chesed. Returning to
RMK's perplexed child... Gevurah is the self-restraint of letting my 2
year old fall over her own feet because doing what comes naturally would
never allow her to learn how to walk. Din is the only way a person can be
a free willed, deciding, being. Actions have to have consequences. When I
make a choice, I need to be able to forcast how my actions will change the
odds of various outcomes. Without Din and Gevurah, the ultimate chesed --
being biTzelem Elokim -- is impossible.

If Chesed is the dropping of the barriers between myself and the other (as
R' Shimon Shkop explains it), then ahavah is the emotion that underlies a
relationship of mutual chesed. This is why "oheiv amo Yisrael", because
Yisrael alone has a unique duty back toward HQBH. There is a specter of
mutuality that isn't part of Beris Noach.

So, is G-d a G-d of Love? Yes... with all the above caveats. That the Love
is a consequence of prior concepts, none of which so much as apply to G-d
as rule out their opposites and describe how we experience His Act.

So, then what about the tragedy MYG was asked about, and what about the
Holocaust? We can't explain it. But if there were no Gevurah, no allowing
of evil, then

- we would never have the growth of needing to respond and overcome evil
- people who can't choose evil aren't beTzelem E-lokim when they choose good
- and so on
- and so on...

But these aren't explanations. There is no complete explanation. There
is only response.

I am reminded of the Or Sameiach's comment on haKol Tzafui vehaReshus
Nesunah. (After his commentary on Teshuvah 4:4, our bit is on
pg 28, bottom of amudah 1, par. "Sof davar ein lekha teirutz..."
<http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=19982&st=&pgnum=28>.) There
are answers, but they are each like a blanket that isn't large enough to
cover your whole body. As you pull in one direction to keep your shoulder
warm, your foot is left uncovered. It's not that we don't posess parts
of the answer -- it's that we can't ever capture the full answer. And
the remaining pieces -- is an elephant like a fan, a wall, a tree,
a rope or a hose?

Tir'u baTov
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy'
micha at aishdas.org         'Joy is nothing but Torah.'
http://www.aishdas.org    'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l



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