[Avodah] Fwd: Re: Truth and the Rambam

[David Riceman]

  RMB:
> I'm not sure of the relevence of any of this.
You started by arguing about whether the Rambam views halacha as 
evolving.  I was primarily interested in a side point: you seemed to be 
arguing that, according to the Rambam, halacha is an alternative to 
metaphysics.  I think that's false, with the exception that, according 
to the Rambam, halacha provides an introduction to a few select 
metaphysical doctrines (like God's existence and unity).

RMB:
<<I simply wrote that based on those sections of the Moreh, it appears
> that mitzvos were given as a tool by which one can know more about G-d.
> Not that there is any guarantee they will be used that way, or that the
> person will succeed.
But according to the Rambam there are degrees of knowledge about God (in 
fact, he writes about it as what one would now call an infinite 
progression).  Halacha gets you only so far.
> Me:
>> Really? See Ish HaHalacha (tr. Kaplan pp.37-38): "The ideal of halakhic
>> man is the redemption of the world ... via the adaptation of empirical
>> reality to the ideal patterns of halakha."
> RMB:
> I'm not sure how this indicates original intent.
RYBS's "ideal patterns of halakha" are the "truths to track down" you 
attribute to the Rambam.
> RMB:
> Because isn't that what the haqdamah to the Yad says in #40-41? That
> the originals are for the "me'at bemispar" who have "da'as rechavah,
> nefesh chakhomoh, uzeman arukh", and the Yad is for "sedurah befi hakol"
> -- the masses?
No, the Rambam's introduction is a common motif of advertising: now you 
have dozens of tools in your kitchen but you can replace them all with 
my new slicingdicingcrushingmincing machine; now you have dozens of 
books in your home to help your schoolkid, now you can replace them all 
with my new superduperencyclopedia.  The Rambam says everyone "katan 
v'gadol", can replace their entire Beis Midrash with the MT and a Tanach.

RMB:
> This is still quite a distance from my original topic -- whether the
> Rambam sees halakhah as a legal process, a stream down time of evolving
> interpretations of law, rather than a scientific process of determining
> original intent of the Author of the Torah or the beis din who legislated
> a derabban.
But it is related.  To the extent that he viewed halacha as a purveyor 
of mtaphysical truth he is less likely to view it as changeable.  I 
suspect he was more sensitive to the viability of prospective multiple 
psak than you think.  It's only retrospective multiple traditions that 
really bothered him.
> RMB:
> Only if they have a reason to suspect an error, so they look and find an
> error. Otherwise, the Rambam believes that a pesaq is binding on those
> talmidim to whom it was nispasheit. (Haqdamah #32-22.)
This is not so obvious.  The Rambam knew quite well that the gemara 
leaves multiple options in many places; there is quite a difference 
between an error and a disagreement (it's not binding on the Rambam, but 
I refer you once again to the Ramban's intorduction to Milhamos 
HaShem).  According to you, however, the Rambam holds that if you 
disagree with your rebbe you may not hold like him (ein l'dayan ela mah 
she'einav ro'os), so why should his psak be binding on his students?

Incidentally I don't know what "#32-22" means, so I don't know what in 
the introduction you were pointing to.

David Riceman