[Avodah] anti-meat rhetoric "according to Judaism"

[Micha Berger]

On Tue, Aug 03, 2010 at 04:54:16AM +0000, kennethgmiller at juno.com wrote:
: The really important part is this: You seem to feel that the "tzaar"
: of "tzaar baalei chayim" refers only to the suffering of self-aware
: beings, and not to the pain which other beings might experience. Is this
: correct? If so, what is your source? Why do you feel this way?

Quite the reverse. If I believed that, then there would be no issur of
TBC since I don't believe animals are capable of being aware of their
own suffering. If you think they are incapable of tzaar, then you can't
be prohibited from causing it. (Okay, you can, like ben sorer umoreh,
but you know what I mean -- there couldn't be any lemaaseh issur.)

Rather, I'm saying that tzaar is pain, not self-aware suffering. I am
then explaining why I believe so little utility to man can halachically
justify large amounts of pain to animals. The reason I'm suggesting is
that it's because TBC is "only" about avoiding causing pain.

It is about what it does to the one causing the pain, that doing so makes
the person callous or cruel, rather than what it does to the animal. So as
long as the motive is divorced from wanting to be cruel, it's permitted.

And that last paragraph is the application the Ramban's explanation of
shiluach haqein to this issur in light of the issur of having a chazan
who says "Al qan-tzippor yagiu Rachamekha". It is possible the Ramban
would not have applied the same line of reasoning to TBC, but someone
would have to explain to me why it works in one place and not the other.

: Here's an experiment: In one hand, hold up some kind of food in front
: of a dog. At the same time, offer him a different food from your other
: hand. I have done this many times, and I watch the dog's face and eyes
: move back and forth, from one treat to the other. That is an objective
: observation. My subjective interpretation of it is that the dog is
: trying to decide which treat to grab. I will not pretend to understand
: his thought processes, nor the methods he uses to reach a decision. But
: I doubt anyone will ever convince me that he's not engaged in some sort
: of decision-making process, that he does indeed have the ability to
: choose. No, not the ability to choose between right and wrong. These
: abstract concepts are beyond him, as we presume self-awareness to be
: beyond him.

A chess playing program also takes a long time over each move. And,
a human opponent is likely to anthropomorphize. "It wants to take
my bishop."

Therefore, your argument from appearance doesn't prove anything to me.
I do not believe animals have free will in general, not just WRT good
vs evil. I am not saying the processing they do is the same as a
computer program; just that complex decisionmaking doesn't imply free
will.

(And that's the idea I was going for in the post in v24n141 that RAM
quoted.)

(BTW, as we are seeing on the Bilvavi thread, there are those who teach
that human bechirah is only about how much yir'as Shamayim to have!)

So why don't I accord Roo (who slept by my feet last night) any sort
of free will?

: Let's back up a bit. Torah thought tells us that only humans, with
: Tzelem Elokim, are on a high enough level to be able to choose between
: right and wrong, even if other animals can choose betwen what they
: like and don't like. And scientists, as RMB explains, tell us that
: only humans are on a high enough level to be self-aware, and to say,
: "I am suffering", even if other animals can say, "That hurts."

Not just to say -- to have the experience of their own pain as an input
to their thoughts. We think about thoughts, we think about feelings,
we think about the experience of having sensory inputs -- not just the
inputs themselves.

See the Meshech Chokhmah on "betzalmeinu kidemuseinu". The ability to
be who you choose to be is the core of free will AND what makes humans
uniquely in Hashem's image. Li nir'eh that goes beyond good vs. evil. And,
for that matter, predates Chavah and Adam internalizing good vs. evil.

See also the Kuzari 5:12, which explicitly limits the posession of
chushim penimiyim (Ibn Tibon's term) to man.

So, our first point of departure is that I understand the animals'
lack of bechirah in these terms -- a lack of being a decisionmaker,
not just lacking choices between good and evil. (As per above.)

: But I don't see any relationship between these two ideas. I can easily
: imagine a being who is unable to comprehend the concepts of right and
: wrong, but is clearly self-aware...

However, the reverse is impossible. You can't have control of how you
decide without the decision-making process being itself fed into the
decision-making process.

Thus, self-awareness doesn't necessitate free will, but free will does
require the soul being self-aware. (A second point of departure between
us.)

And that's true in general (as I would take it) but therefore also
in the limited sense of bechirah between tov vara.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The waste of time is the most extravagant
micha at aishdas.org        of all expense.
http://www.aishdas.org                           -Theophrastus
Fax: (270) 514-1507