[Avodah] anti-meat rhetoric "according to Judaism"

[kennethgmiller at juno.com]

R' Micha Berger wrote:
> I used the word suffering for the level 2 experience just to
> have "pain" and "suffering" as distinct terms.

In my experience, most people use these words interchangeably. But if you want to make this distinction between them, that even if one experiences pain, he does not experience "suffering" unless he is self-aware, that's okay with me.

The really important part is this: You seem to feel that the "tzaar" of "tzaar baalei chayim" refers only to the suffering of self-aware beings, and not to the pain which other beings might experience. Is this correct? If so, what is your source? Why do you feel this way?

> For an animal, there is no "I". We can't really picture what it's
> like to think like an animal does. "That hurts, so I should get
> away from it" is a possible thought, but "I am hurting" is not.
> They are somewhere between a sleeping person and one who is
> conscious. Recall that I am saying that a lack of free will
> implies they feel pain, but they are not conscious of feeling
> pain -- that in fact the entire concept of animal consciousness
> isn't what you or I experience.

The phrase "free will" is ambiguous. It can refer to two different things. In a literal sense, it simply means the ability to choose. But in Torah thought, it is usually used in a much more specific sense, namely the ability to choose between right and wrong.

Here's an experiment: In one hand, hold up some kind of food in front of a dog. At the same time, offer him a different food from your other hand. I have done this many times, and I watch the dog's face and eyes move back and forth, from one treat to the other. That is an objective observation. My subjective interpretation of it is that the dog is trying to decide which treat to grab. I will not pretend to understand his thought processes, nor the methods he uses to reach a decision. But I doubt anyone will ever convince me that he's not engaged in some sort of decision-making process, that he does indeed have the ability to choose. No, not the ability to choose between right and wrong. These abstract concepts are beyond him, as we presume self-awareness to be beyond him.

Let's back up a bit. Torah thought tells us that only humans, with Tzelem Elokim, are on a high enough level to be able to choose between right and wrong, even if other animals can choose betwen what they like and don't like. And scientists, as RMB explains, tell us that only humans are on a high enough level to be self-aware, and to say, "I am suffering", even if other animals can say, "That hurts."

But I don't see any relationship between these two ideas. I can easily imagine a being who is unable to comprehend the concepts of right and wrong, but is clearly self-aware. (Some criminal psychologists might be able to point out some specific examples for you.) It is harder for me to imagine one who does understand right and wrong but is not self-aware, but that might be because I have difficulty imagining an intelligent being who is not self-aware.

In any case, I don't see what either of these concepts have to do with tzaar baalei chayim. You probably explained it in a previo [... We now pause, while Akiva researches RMB's posts on this topic. ... Okay, he's back...]

In the current thread, in Avodah Degest 27:141, RMB referred back to a post from 2003, in Avodah Digest 10:91, where he wrote:

> A computer program designed to yelp in response to anyone clicking
> a given button, and to avoid repeating that situation in which it
> occured may seem to feel pain. But as it has no awareness, can
> it?
> Pain is a form of suffering, but only if there is a "someone" to
> suffer.
> This would have no impact on the meaning of dinim of tza'ar ba'alei
> chaim. For reasons similar to Moshe's need to show hakaras hatov to
> inanimate objects. Being cruel to something that seems to suffer
> leads to becoming a callous person.

I think I have found the point which R"n Toby Katz and I are trying to make: We feel that the pain of a living being is just as real as the suffering of a self-aware being. RMB feels that an animal is no different than a computer program in this regard, and the animal only "seems to suffer" (that's a direct quote), and is not actually suffering.

In contrast, I (and RnTK, I presume) see many differences between a computer program and an animal, and self-awareness is only one of these many differences. And while it *might* be true that animals do not "suffer" the way humans do, the mere lack of self-awareness does not justify de-legitimizing their pain.

Akiva Miller

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