[Avodah] John Locke and Tzedaqa

[Michael Makovi]

> You seem to think that if, in your own eyes, your logic is impeccable --
> then your logic has the full status of a de'oraisa.  But I'm guessing that
> your logic is peccable.
>
> Rn Toby Katz

Let me clarify: I wasn't saying my logic is absolutely
incontrovertible. I was more trying to say that my logic appears to ME
to be reliable, until someone will come along and disprove me. I
wasn't trying to make a "real" d'oraita sevara. I was just trying to
say that even though John Locke isn't a Torah authority, nevertheless,
his views are logical and so can carry weight in a halakhic discussion
until they are (a) disproven logically or (b) disproven according to
an explicit halakhah that contradicts him. I was really just trying to
justify my citation of him in the first place, his very admission into
the discussion.

Similarly, Rabbi Yehiel Weinberg, regarding qol isha, says eit la'asot
la-shem, but then he notes that actually, only Hazal can make an eit
la'asot la-shem, but that anyway, since he had provided other halakhic
justification too, he really didn't need a "real" eit la'asot la-shem
anyway. His citation of that principle was rhetorical, as was my
citation of sevara being d'oraita.

R' Dov Laiser was thus correct that (1) Rn' Katz misunderstood me, but
that (2) my vague citation of sevara being d'oraita opened the door
for her objection. I should have explained myself better.

> On a tangent and by way of well intended advice, I know that you are fond
> of Rabbis Hirschenson, Uziel, Herzog and Berkovits, and that is your right.
> However, by constantly referencing a narrow slice of Jewish thinkers, the
> appeal of your arguments to others who may not share your fondness suffers.
>
> R' Dov Laiser

AFAIK, Rabbis Hirschensohn, Uziel, and Herzog are the only authorities
to have REALLY deeply investigated democracy from the perspective of a
poseq. If there are others, please tell me.

But your advise is well-taken. But I can only cite those people I've
yet learned, however. I'm still learning.

> R, Nachum Eliezer Rabinovitch (RY at Maale Adumim and author of Yad
> Peshuta), in his Darkah Shel Torah, ... IIRC, he
> finds a form of social contract theory in these sources.
>
> R' Dov Laiser

Thank you for this information. I'll have to check this reference. I
have seen fascinating things from Rabbi Rabinovitch cited by Rabbi
Jonathan Sacks.

> Like Moshe
> Feiglin, R. Rabinovitch holds that Torah's conception of democracy (yes, he
> believes it has one) requires direct elections, not proportional
> representation.
>
> R' Dov Laiser

As I understand Feiglin, he was not calling for direct elections. His
emphasis was on the elections being local district elections rather
than national ones. He was not discussion direct versus proportional.

In fact, according to Locke, the form of government is immaterial, as
long as it has the consent of the people. (In fact, Locke doesn't even
require elections; for him, even complying with the government's laws
grants tacit consent.) Henry David Thoreau goes even further, and says
that sometimes, voting can obfuscate democracy, because one votes and
then believes he has done his entire democratic duty; he therefore
sits back and lets the government do what it will. He pretends to
oppose the government's policies with his vote, but he proceeds to
obey the government in deed, thus granting its policies more
legitimacy than his vote ever sought to deny. (Thoreau is discussing
grave injustices, such as slavery. Especially, he is speaking of grave
injustices which the government requires that one be complicit in;
Thoreau is preaching ein shaliah b'davar `averah. He says that with
minor governmental inconveniences (unreasonably high taxes, perhaps?),
we ought to let it go, and not rebel against the government. He
distinguishes between incidental and minor friction in the machine,
which one ought let go unchallenged, versus systemic friction that has
its own part of the machine that produces more friction than useful
work - these, the individuals must protest and disobey the government
over. Voting is not sufficient.)

I don't know Feiglin's views on the matter of direct and
representative democracy, but we must realize that in the quotation of
Feiglin I brought, nothing was said about the form of representative,
only that the elections would be local and not national.

As for my own view of elections: the Torah (in Devarim) says the
PEOPLE choose the king of Israel (it says "you shall set up a
king...", i.e. am yisrael will choose the king), but nothing is said
of elections, and I doubt the technology of the time would permit
national elections. I suspect a non-electoral form of consent was at
play. Since AFAIK the mass gathering around Saul cheered for him, and
since the nation as a whole tacitly acknowledged Saul as their king,
this qualified as a democratic acceptance of him. Even though
elections were not held, an alternative form of consent was procured.
Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, my rosh yeshiva in Yeshivat Hesder Petah Tiqwa,
said that there's a sugya in the Yerushalmi that says that as long as
King David ruled in Hebron over Judah, he was not halakhically a king,
because the whole nation of Israel hadn't accepted him yet. The
Yerushalmi is obviously not talking about whether King David had had
elections or not.

As for my own view of direct democracy: it is impossible in practice
to have direct democracy, and besides, it'd lead to the tyranny of the
majority. It cannot possibly be that the Torah wants us to have direct
democracy. The Torah cannot demand the impossible.

I'll answer R' Micha's more substantive objections tomorrow, bz"h.

Michael Makovi