[Avodah] John Locke and Tzedaqa

[Michael Makovi]

I. One

> If the categories and first principles [i.e. Locke, etc.]
> are alien [to Hazal, etc.], who said the conclusion reached
> from them -- no matter how sound the logic -- are not equally
> alien to Torah? This is something that would require proving,
> rather than assuming that synthesis is possible and
> interpreting Torah to fit.
>
> R' Micha

First, Locke derived his concepts from the Tanakh, and prima facie,
the Tanakh has many democratic ideas (the people choose a king, the
king must carry a Torah with him and abide by impartial rule of law,
etc.), so my first presumption is that the Torah and democracy agree,
until proven otherwise. Rabbi Dr. Joshua Berman has written many
articles and books showing that the Tanakh itself is filled with ideas
which we take for granted, but which are actually extremely
democratic, such as the universal literacy demanded by the Torah, or
the Torah's denying landed property to the kohanim.

Second, Rav Kook said (as quoted at
http://seforim.traditiononline.org/index.cfm/2009/1/28/Marc-B-Shapiro-Thoughts-on-Confrontation--Sundry-Matters-Part-)
that

 כשהמוסר הטבעי מתגבר בעולם, באיזה צורה שתהיה, חייב כל אדם לקבל לתוכו
אותו מממקורו, דהיינו מהתגלותו בעולם, ואת פרטיו יפלס על פי ארחות התורה.
אז יעלה בידו המוסר הטהור אמיץ ומזוקק.

Ke'she-ha-musar ha-tivi mitgaber ba-olam, be-eize tzurah she-tihyeh,
hayav kol adam l'qabel le-tokho oto mi-meqoro, de-haynu me-hitgaluto
ba-olam, ve-et peratav yifales al pi orhot ha-torah. Az ya'aleh b'yado
ha-musar ha-tivi, amitz u-mezuqaq.

In other words: even if the Torah and democracy are opposed, we might
have an obligation, according to Rav Kook, to accept democracy and
Torah-ize it. All the more so this would be true if the Torah and
democracy are actually not opposed in the first place!

Rav Kook also said that

ואם תפול שאלה על איזה משפט שבתורה, שלפי מושגי המוסר יהיה נראה שצריך
להיות מובן באופן אחר, אז אם באמת ע"פ ב"ד הגדול יוחלט שזה המשפט לא נאמר
כ"א באותם התנאים שכבר אינם, ודאי ימצא ע"ז מקור בתורה.

Ve-im tapul she'elah al eize mishpat she-ba-torah, she-lefi musagei
ha-musar yihyeh nireh she-tzarikh lihyot muvan bi-ofen aher, az im
be-emet al pi beit din ha-gadol yuhlat she-ze ha-mishpat lo ne'emar ki
im b'otam ha-t'na'im she-kvar einam, vadai yi'matzei im ze (al ze?)
meqor ba-torah.

As Professor Marc Shapiro comments, "These are incredible words. R.
Kook was also 'confident that if a particular moral intuition
reflecting the divine will achieves widespread popularity, it will no
doubt enable the halakhic authorities to find genuine textual basis
for their new understanding.' (Tamar Ross) R. Kook is not speaking
about apologetics here, but a revealing of Torah truth that was
previously hidden. The truth is latent, and with the development of
moral ideas, which is driven by God, the new insight in the Torah
becomes apparent."

Of Rabbi Norman Lamm, Professor Shapiro says, "He then develops the
notion of a developing halakhic morality in which our evolving
understanding of morality lead us back to the Torah 'to rediscover
what was always there in the inner folds of the Biblical texts and
halakhic traditions'".

So that is why I am interested in democracy, even if the Tanakh and
Gemara would have been dumbfounded and perplexed. After all, wouldn't
they be equally perplexed by our revulsion at slavery, or our
rejection of polygamy?

> I should point out that this is a general problem I have with people who
> describe MO in terms of the adoption of modern ethics.
>
> R' Micha

The introduction by David Hazony to Essential Essays on Judaism,
discussing Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, points out precisely this
criticism against the Conservative movement. Hazony argues that
according to Rabbi Berkovits, only Jewish principles, inherent to the
Torah, can carry any weight. Even if you disagree with Rabbi
Berkovits's halakhic method, I cannot see anyone disagreeing with
Rabbi Berkovits that only Torah values and not non-Jewish values can
influence halakhah.

Alternatively, we could follow Rav Kook, as I have quoted him above.
Perhaps we might adopt non-Jewish values, but we will let the Torah
translate them into terms acceptable to us. Or, we will discover new
Torah values, latent in the Tanakh all along, which we never realized
were always there the whole time.

(The more I learn the thought of Rabbis Kook and Berkovits, the more
similar they appear to me, and the more I believe Rabbi Berkovits
merely took Rabbi Kook further than Rav Kook himself ever went. But
that's another subject.)

II. Two

> It appears to be a system for getting people to be just, and not "ish
> es rei'eihu chaim bal'o".
>
> Notice it's not a social contract between people to keep each other safe.
> It's an obligation imposed by a Third Party to get people to imitate Him
> (veshameru derekh Hashem).
>
> R' Micha

I don't think Locke would disagree. Getting people to keep each other
safe IS a large part of being just.

Additionally, back when Shabbat observance was essential to the
general moral fabric of society, then coercing another to keep Shabbat
would be part of getting people to keep each other safe.

The Torah wants us to ensure that we are all just and G-d-fearing. But
nowadays, coercion just doesn't work, and Rabbi Ya'akov Ettlinger's
omer mutar/tinok she-nishba shita shows exactly why coercion no longer
works. People no longer take religious observance for granted as a
basic part of the fabric of society. Back when Shabbat observance was
taken for granted as the Jewish way, then coercing others to keep
Shabbat was perfectly libertarian. If my next-door neighbor breaks
Shabbat, then we all get hurt by it; kol yisrael `areivim ze le-ze.

Locke's entire source for natural law is that G-d commanded it. G-d
prohibited murder, and so all have a right to live. So if G-d also
commanded one to keep Shabbat, why is Shabbat any less legitimate a
part of natural law than murder? Why can't kashrut be part of natural
law? As long as everyone is a traditionally observant Jew who takes
Sinai for granted, then the whole Torah is natural law for a Jew, and
coercing others is equally legitimate whether for murder or for
Shabbat; the distinction between bein adam l'havero and la-maqom
almost disappears. And I think Locke would agree with this, if he ever
thought about it. (I doubt he did. Orthodox Judaism probably wasn't on
his radar.)

Locke's arguments for religious toleration don't apply to Judaism.
Locke offers three arguments:
1) The government shouldn't concern itself whether you believe in
Jesus correctly,
2) Coercion won't make you believe in Jesus anyway; it'll only make
you lie with your lips and claim you believe,
3) We have to be humble, and realize we don't know which religion is
the true one.
But Judaism would reply:
1) The government may not care what you believe, but it DOES care what you DO
2) Coercion may not be effective in compelling belief, but it is VERY
effective in compelling action
3) We saw G-d on the mountain, for crying out loud! What do you mean,
we don't know which religion is the true one? We saw Him with our own
eyes!

The difference nowadays is that coercing action, while effective, will
only embitter and anger people, and distance them from Judaism even
more. Coercing a person to keep Shabbat works when EVERYONE believes
in G-d and knows that there's only one kosher kind of Judaism, but
since the Reform movement came along, this is no longer obvious to
everyone - Rabbi Ya'akov Ettlinger.

But before the Reform movement came along, Locke's reasons for
religious toleration didn't apply to Judaism, and so coercing Jews to
keep Shabbat was perfectly libertarian. As I said, a Shabbat violator
hurts his neighbors by destroying the social fabric. It also gets G-d
mad, which isn't good for anyone.

G-d doesn't have a desire that we coerce each other, in and of itself.
He wants us to coerce each other because it'll ensure that we do the
right thing. But if nowadays, coercion doesn't work, then why would
G-d want us to practice coercion? He doesn't take pleasure in coercion
per se, only in its success.

One of my rabbis told me that according to the Hazon Ish, "Today,
religious coercion won't work, and even if it did, we wouldn't want to
practice it nowadays." We also all know the famous shita of the Hazon
Ish, that coercion and such was only for a time when miracles were
ever-present.

I have a friend who is both Kahanist and libertarian, and he agreed
with me. In his own words,
> [T]he coercion there [in tzedaqa], as stated by the Rambam, was akin to the coercion of all mitzvot,
> because in those days coercion was an important tool in maintaining a healthy community, where a
> few "bad weeds" wouldn't spoil the otherwise strongly religious population.
> ...
> Compulsion was employed by the shotrim for all mitzvot. Its clear from the beginning of Hilchot
> Sanhedrin in the Rambam that the officers maintained a certain "atmosphere" if you will on all
> issues and in all places and enforced the performance of all mitzvoth.
> ...
> Today, however, when coercion for mitzvot isn't relevant, there would
> be no governmental involvement in enforcing any commandments, including tzedaka.... And a person
> must still give tzedaka, just as he must still keep shabbat, but just as the government wont send agents
> to force him to keep shabbat at home, it wont force him to give tzedaka."

And the amazing thing is, I've gone from using Locke-ian
libertarianism to forbid the kehilla to charge tzedaqa, all the way to
justifying authoritarian religious coercion even according to Locke.
Judaism has become libertarian and Locke has become authoritarian, in
my skilled hands. Aren't I talented? But seriously, what I think
happened is, while everyone else was duking it out between Judaism and
democracy, between laissez-faire libertarianism and
positive-liberty/heteronomous Judaism, between rights-based and
obligations-based ethics, I preferred to follow Rav Kook up to a
higher vantage point, and behold from above the fray that really, all
along, there was never any argument. Even Locke would agree in a
traditionally religious community that religious coercion is proper,
and even Judaism would agree that in a modern secular society,
coercion is not proper. Locke and Judaism don't disagree; they were
just living at different times and talking about different situations.
But once you understand the oqimta, there's no contradiction between
Judaism and democracy.

> Civil law as the Torah
> expects it from any nation and Torah gov't are two different constructs,
> and attempting to extrapolate one from the other can't just be assumed.
>
> the beris Noach is a covenant between
> HQBH and the individual. Therefore, the nature of law isn't to produce a
>mutual service society, but to protect individuals.
>
> R' Micha

The Noahide laws include the obligation to set up courts, which is
very societal and NOT individual. So I think the Noahide laws are just
as societal and non-individual as the Torah is for Jews. G-d's
covenant with Noah included all humans as one giant interconnected
family of brethren all created in His image, who are tasked with peru
u'revu, populating the earth and building societies. Maybe the Noahide
laws encompass 70 nations rather than only one, but it's still
societal and not individual.

So I disagree with your distinction between Noahides and Jews.
According to me, the laws are different - Jews keep Shabbat but
gentiles don't - but the legal principles are the same. Religious
coercion is permitted or forbidden in the same cases. As everyone here
knows about me, I'm loathe to admit any significant difference between
a Jew and a gentile. So a Jewish court can coerce Jews to keep Jewish
law, and a Noahide court can coerce Noahides to keep Noahide law. The
laws in question are different, but G-d's basic expectations are the
same. In computer programming terms, the abstract class is the same
for both, only the implementation for Jews and Noahides differs. Both
of them have the same concerns vis. a vis. libertarianism versus
authoritarianism, rights-based versus obligations-based ethics, etc.
Returning to programming, their functions and methods and parameters
are the same.

> But on a more clearly positive note is parshas Yisro, the 70 zeqeinim, and "kol
> asher yorukha" -- the courts and rabbinate. But this isn't a social
> contract either.
>
> R' Micha

As I said to R' Zev Sero, it doesn't matter to me which court executes
me for murder, because I'm dead anyway. So the social contract is
irrelevant to courts and justice. Locke says that all equally have a
right to punish their neighbors for transgression. After all, if the
people can give the government that power, then they have it
themselves.  In the state of nature, according to Locke, when there is
no government, then vigilantism is the law. In fact, says Locke, an
unjust government is no different than nature without government, and
so, if the unjust government fails to enforce rights, then vigilantes
are perfectly entitled to take justice into their own hands. So social
contract is irrelevant to the execution of justice in courts. So I'm
not troubled by the lack of social contract in the beit din of Moshe.
Social contract is not necessary, because it's already natural law,
and you're bound by that law, whether it's a government or a vigilante
enforcing it.

In the Biblical period, I think the historicity of Sinai was taken for
granted, so Shabbat and kashrut and everything else were as obviously
a part of natural law as murder and theft. Nowadays, this is no longer
so, which brings us back to Rabbi Ya'akov Ettlinger.

My problem with coercion is davka with tzedaqa. As I said, what if I
want my money to go to this poor person, and not that one? Look at Rav
Hirsch and Austritt. He was appalled that his money was paying for the
Reform movement. It's one thing to coerce a person to keep Shabbat,
but how can you coerce him to pay money to a cause that he opposes??!!

> Here there is grounds to obligate tzedaqah, because a
>  person is obligated to better the community, the covenental whole. The
>  kehillah exists to serve its members, and the members exist to serve
>  the community -- all in a common goal, to follow the Torah.
>
> R' Micha

My argument concluded that in a small, self-contained community, where
all the members know each other, and where the community is a very
tangible entity providing concrete benefits to its members, that in
such a community, tzedaqa IS conscionable even from a libertarian
perspective. So your above statement, I agree with, because you speak
of the kehillah, and the community.

I might oppose paying tzedaqa, being coerced to spend my money towards
a cause I oppose, but if the community is small enough, then it could
be seen as my paying dues for the right to live with other Jews, use
the mikvah, etc. Also, if you really get dissatisfied, you can move
somewhere else, and so your staying put in the community could be
classed as tacit consent to the social contract, which Locke accepts
as sufficient. But this falls apart in a larger community, like a
nation, where there aren't any kehillot the same way, and where you
can't "move away" from the nation. I can move from Silver Spring to
Baltimore or Potomac, but if the Chief Rabbinate of Israel charged me
tzedaqa, where would I go? Egypt? Jordan?

> There is a causal connection
> between the US's rights-based approach and the current culture of
> entitlement. "Entitlement" is simply rights run amok.
>
> R' Micha

I disagree. I don't think it is a rights-based approach that is to
blame, but rather, it is WHICH rights are in question. If your only
rights are not to be killed and not to be stolen from, then there is
no risk of entitlement. But if your rights include the right to be
taken care of by everyone else, then you demand welfare.
Libertarianism is very rights-based, but because the rights are
sharply limited, there is no risk of entitlement. Socialism is also
rights-based, but because you have the right to be provided for no
matter how efficiently you do your job, entitlement runs amok and
there's no incentive to contribute to society. EVERYTHING is
rights-based; the only question is what the list of rights includes.

So I think the truth is the exact opposite of what you say: Locke-ian
libertarian has very little danger of leading to entitlement. By
contrast, once you start dealing with positive liberty, and building
public schools and hospitals, and providing welfare, etc., then
entitlement is a very real danger.

Michael Makovi