[Avodah] Lo Ra'inu Eino Raya ==> Blanket Heter

[Chana Luntz]

RRW writes:
 
> > Q: Can anyone explain to me this line of reasoning that lo 
> >ra'inu eino raya implies all is muttar unless explicitly forbidden?
> 

And RYZ replies:

> Since the Halacha of Shas is it is muttor, Lo Roi'nu women 
> Shechting cannot create an Issur.

That is the BY on shechita, but RRW is asking about an extrapolation from
the BY. I cannot explain it to RRW because it does not make sense - it is
rather that lo ra'inu eino raya means that we cannot learn out that
something is mutar or assur from what we see or do not see being done, it
does not mean something is necessarily mutar.  In fact, if you go back to
the original source of lo ra'inu eino raya it is dealing with a case where
the situation in question was rendered assur, not mutar.  Because the
original use of this is in Zevachim 103b, and the case is that of a bechor
who was found to be treif after slaughter, and whether one could give the
hide to the cohanim or whether it needed to be taken out for sreifa.  And R'
Chanina said, in all of my days I never saw a hide taken out for burning -
and R' Akiva derives from this that if one skins a bechor and it is found to
be treif the cohanim can benefit from the hide.  But the Chachamim, whom we
posken like say, lo ra'inu eino raya - the fact that R Chanina never saw it
(even though he would have known about any case that would have occurred in
his days) does not mean that this is the din, but indeed the din is that the
hide of such a bechor needs to be taken out for srefa.

Now, this is a case where the hide is in fact rendered assur, not mutar by
the application of the principle.  Ie what the Chachamim are saying is that
we go back to what one would derive to be the general rule - which is the
skin is assur - ie we cannot use as a proof the fact that we have never seen
it being rendered assur implies it is mutar.

RRW goes on:

> Please follow this logic and try to isolate the precise flaw - if any.
> 
> Given:  anything not prohibitted by Shas
> Is therefore permitted by Shas

Not necessarily, the shechita case is, as RYZ says, something specifically
permited by Shas, not an omission from which we are deriving what Shas might
have said.   There are clearly going to be many things in heaven and earth
that were never considered in Shas, and about which Shas says nothing.  Lo
ra'ainu eino raya is about behaviour of people (women shechting or not
shechting, skins being taken out to be burnt or being given to the cohanim),
not about what is or is not contained in a book.

> Therefore, when one adds a prohibition not found in Shas - 
> one is ipso facto disputing Shas

Again not necessarily, even if you did not accept the above, because Shas
may allow for future prohibitions to be enacted - as gezeros or takanos
despite them being mutar originally.  Or for minhagim to arise that make
previously mutar things assur.  Shas itself is full of these.  The fact that
there is many a sugya which effectively says "there is no maklokus, this was
before the takana and this was after the takana" shows that.  There is
nothing in Shas that would prohibit (here we go again) that process
continuing after the closure of Shas.
 
> Since it if were halachically prohibitted
> Shas itself would have said so.

This assumes that Shas deals with everything.  Lo ra'inu aino raya does not
have any bearing on this.  The flaw is that the person is understanding the
"ra'inu" as "ra'inu b'Shas" but obviously that is a qualification that does
not exist. If anything, the qualification as per the BY is in what people do
- just because we haven't seen any people do something doesn't mean that the
something is not the correct or permitted or right thing to do. 

> And therefore from Shas's silence on any matter - A heter may 
> be legitmatley constructed.

> Corrolary Regarding YD 1:1
> 
> Axiom: 
> BY must be correct 
> Proof:
> since Shas explicitly permits women to do Shechita
> 
> Therefore it must be halachically permitted
> 
> And therefore Agur, Rema, and Shach must be wrong.

The argument of the Shach is that that while we hold lo ra'ainu aino raya
when it comes to halacha (as per Zevachim, ie that the halacha applies that
the skins must be burnt, even if we have never seen anybody do that), we
hold lo ra'ainu raya when it comes to minhagim - so the fact that we have
not seen women shect means that there is a minhag for women not to shect.
Not that it is a Torah or rabbinic issur, but that there is now a minhag and
since minhag Torah hu, then women shouldn't shect.  One of the consequences
though is that if a woman did shect, - the meat would be kosher - because
nobody is saying that women cannot do effective shechita on the level of
halacha, just that a minhag has grown up that has the force of Torah.

What is arguably inovative about this logic is that they are talking about
what one might call a negative minhag, ie a minhag for people not to do
something - which if extrapolated to an extreme, does end up forbidding most
everything that is not done.  That would preclude any form of modern
innovation.  If we have not seen people talking on the telephone (before the
telephone was invented) then talking on the telephone must be assur.  Same
with electric lights, etc etc.  The Shach clearly got a fair bit of flak for
this, and ended up having to define it a lot more narrowly.  And it does
lead to a lot of problems.  But the logic above does not work.

> KT
> RRW

Regards

Chana