[Avodah] Tiqun Olam

[Michael Makovi]

> ...
> But even so, that's not what Tiqun olam
> actually is. In post-Ari qabbalah, it has to do with broken keilim and
> metaphysical forces.
>
> R' Micha

I'm not concerned with what the Ari says. First, Aleinu uses the
phrase differently than the Ari, and I think the Aleinu has more
authority than the Ari. Rambam to Avot 1:2 says (commenting on al
shelosha devarim ha-olem omed - al ha-torah, v'al ha-avodah, v'al
gemilut hasadim), "Yomar, she'b'hokhmah, v'hi ha-torah; u'b'ma'alot
ha-midot, v'hen gemilut hasadim; u'b'qium tzivei ha-torah, v'hen
ha-qorbanot - hatmadat tiqun ha-olam v'sidur mitziuto al ha-ofen
ha-shalem biyoter."

Now, what is most interesting, I think, is that Rambam equates Avot's
"ha-avodah" with "qorbanot", which he in turn equates with "qium
tzivei ha-torah". This of course fits with Rambam's general view of
the qorbanot in general, trying to deemphasize their importance, and
all the more so delegitimize them as the sine qua non of Judaism
(Kuzari).

But besides that, Rambam defined Avot's language "ha-olam omed" as
"sidur mitziuto al ha-ofen ha-shalem biyot", and he then equated this
with "hatmada tiqun ha-olam".

I could rest my case, but I will bring one random quote which I first
saw yesterday. The quote is taken from Professor Marc Shapiro's review
(www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/3_2_Shapiro.pdf)  of Rabbi
Jonathan Sack's The Dignity of Difference. Professor Shapiro actually
quotes Rabbi J. H. Hertz as preempting Rabbi Sack's general thesis;
Professor Shapiro quotes a different passage of Rabbi Hertz's than I
did, but he comes out to basically the same effect, that Judaism is
concerned with gentiles' morality, not their theology. Professor
Shapiro makes many other fascinating references, including an
endorsement of Professor Moshe Halbertal's interpretation of Meiri.
But I say all this as an aside; the quote I will bring now is
Professor Shapiro's citation of Rabbi Isaac Palache: "R. Isaac Palache
too regards the Noahide Laws as no longer binding on Gentiles by
virtue of divine law, although he argues that one is still permitted
(!) to instruct them in these laws because they have a strong
utilitarian purpose, in that they make for a civilized society (tiqqun
ha-olam)." My purpose here is not to argue whether the gentiles are
obligated to keep the Noahide laws - see Shapiro there for this
argument - but rather, I just want to call attention to how Rabbi
Palache used tiqqun olam, as making for civilized society.

> What is qedushah? To be set aside for the purpose of imitating Hashem by
> being good to His creatures.
>
> R' Micha

EXACTLY. Qedusha (for us, not for G-d) is to imitate G-d. As Hazal
say, "How can one walk after G-d, a consuming fire? Rather, be
merciful just as He is merciful, etc." Notice how Hazal never say,
"Put on tefillin just as He puts on tefillin." And since there is a
midrash that G-d wears tefillin, Hazal could very well have defined
imitateo dei as wearing tefillin. Instead, however, Hazal defined it
as being merciful and kind like G-d. As Isaiah says, as cited by Rabbi
Hertz, the Holy G-d is sanctified by righteousness, not by qorbanot
and tefillah (Kuzari).

> According to the Meshech Chokhmah, all qedushah derives from human
> activity. There is no such thing as an inherently holy place or object.
>
> R' Micha

But while this works fantastically for Rambam, it is anathemous to
Kuzari and Kabbalists. According to the Kuzari, tumah is something
tangible that a sensitive individual can feel after he walks through a
graveyard. According to Rambam, on the other hand, tumah and taharah
are entirely conventional, in that they don't reflect any ontological
reality, but rather, they teach some sort of lesson or train in some
behavior. (See Professor Menachem Kellner's recent book Maimonides'
Confrontation with Mysticism; his thesis is that Moreh Nevukhim is a
veiled polemic against the Kuzari.) This approach is in breathtaking
parallel with Rabbi Hirsch's, of course, which is why Rabbi Shelomo
Danziger refers to Rabbi Hirsch's ta'amei mitzvot as pure Maimonidean
thinking.

> This [viz. R' Hirsch's view] might be "holiness", it certainly is Rudolph Otto's definition, but
> if so it has nothing to do with qedushah. ... Otto is speaking from a Xian perspective,
> where salvation is viewed as a gift. We work from the position where
> man partners with G-d to redeem himself.
>
> R' Micha

I'm sorry, but you lost me. What has Rabbi Hirsch's view to do with
Christian vicarious salvation? Rabbi Hirsch's view is essentially that
man's task in life is to imitate G-d by completing His world - asher
bara elokim la'asot, and p'ru u'r'vu u'm'lu et ha-aretz u-kavshah -
and behaving with kindness towards his fellow man created b'tzelem
eloqim, using his G-d-given moral freedom to freely choose to follow
G-d's laws, whereas nature inexorably does the same. What has any of
this to do with Christianity? If anything, Christianity most logically
devolves into a denial of free will, whereas Rabbi Hirsch saw free
will as an intrinsic part of man's nature, ontologically equal to
natural law. (See his commentary to Mishlei chapter 8 (about the Torah
preceding the world) and his commentary on the Garden of Eden.)

> [Regarding my quoting sources that gentiles are not liable for
> idolatry, but only for immorality]
> Why then is AZ listed among the 7, and why is it dinei nefashos for
> nachriim as well? Why is it assur for them to make a pesel even one
> that represents a monotheistic Creator, or for others to worship? Why
> an issur against sheim Hashem lashav?
>
> R' Micha

I'm not learned in the laws of AZ vis a vis gentiles. But see Shapiro
whom I cite above
(www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/3_2_Shapiro.pdf) - he brings
Shemot Rabbah, Akedat Yitzhak, and Abarbanel (the latter two relying
on Deut 4:9) as saying that gentiles are not prohibited from AZ -
totally exempt l'gamre! Additionally, he notes that Rashbam and R'
Hertz both interpret Deut. 4:9 in this same way. So how do we fit this
with the halakhot of AZ? Tzarikh iyun.

> RAS's position is that a non-Jew can be a "tinoq shenishba" WRT emunah,
> but not WRT ethics.
> R' Micha

I've said the same myself, so thank you for interpreting RAS in this
way - I can now put his name behind my assertion.

> It's not that monotheism is optional, or only has value
> as a derivative of the resulting ethics. It's that the person raised in
> a pagan culture can't be judged accountable for his polytheism.
>
> So yes, lemaaseh, it may mean suspending judgment (by non-dayanim). But
> not for the reasons given at all. You're quoting apologetics designed
> to emphasize Judaism's Humanism and taking it as definitive of the
> value system.
>
> R' Micha

Oh, don't misunderstand me! I'm not saying that belief in G-d is
unimportant, G-d forbid! I'm only saying that a gentile is not
OBLIGATED to believe in G-d, as far as reward and punishment goes.
Similarly, there is a difference between what is true and what is
dogma; not everything that is true is a dogma whose denial causes a
loss of olam ha-ba. But this doesn't mean that the truths are
unimportant, and that we can discard anything not written in the 13
Principles as being unimportant to Judaism. Similarly, then, a lack of
a command to believe in G-d doesn't mean this belief in G-d is
anything to be belittled! But just as Rambam didn't hold the Kuzari to
be a heretic for believing in the ontological reality of tumah - even
though Rambam held Kuzari was absolutely false - so too, we won't hold
gentiles liable for lack of belief in G-d. But this doesn't mean that
such belief isn't a vital desideratum in our world; halevai that every
gentile believed in G-d, and more importantly, that he behaved like it
too!

The Yerushalmi, based on either Eicha or Yeremiyahu, says something to
the effect that, "Though they didn't believe in me, if only they had
nevertheless kept my Torah!" Now, if one doesn't believe in G-d, of
what use is keeping the Torah - tefillin, kashrut, etc.? Therefore, it
seems clear to me that by "Torah", the Yerushalmi means the mitzvot
sikhliot. If I remember correctly, Rabbi Benjamin Blech, in the
introduction to his Understanding Judaism, interprets this Yerushalmi
similarly, something to the effect that G-d would rather we keep His
mitzvot but not believe in Him rather than the reverse, but I'm not
sure.

Michael Makovi