[Avodah] Tzeni'us and gender roles

[Micha Berger]

Rather than state every point in a shaqla vetarya, I want to again try
to take a step back and spell out my position from square one. I am it
would be a more clear format. I'm going to go really far back, because I
think RMS's consternation is evidence of our coming from fundamentally
different paradigms.


One of the facets of our encounter with modernity is how we respond to
modern values. As Jews in the modern world, we have to decide, hopefully
consciously and willfully, which of those values to absorb, and which
we need to take efforts to eschew.

When dealing with new values, my first question would be
whether it can be accomodated within halakhah. Because of the answer is
"no", there is no 2nd question. But that's the uninteresting case. In
non-trivial cases, the telling question would be: Is it in accord or
against the values HQBH is trying to inclucate within us?

It is on this point I expressed my regret for introducing halachic
terminology into the discussion. Because there is no "hutrah" for values,
only dechuyah. Someone who kills beheter still killed, and still is that
much more able to kill in the future. The first shechitah is the hardest;
the first beris is likely to be the one where empathy gets in the mohel's
way. There is no "hutrah" because when a chiyuv conflicts with "ve'asisa
hatov vehayashar", "vehalakhta bidrakhav", "qedoshim tihyu ki Qadosh Ani"
or the like, the negative impact is still there.

This means that we're likely to disagree with other O Jews on two
different levels in this topic: The more minor level is where two
people, or camps of people, make different decisions WRT some value or
another. The more serious disagreement is where one feels that the other
didn't make a conscious decision at all, and is basically an unwitting
victim of assimilation.

When I wrote of thinking in hyperlegalistic terms, I meant that one could
focus so heavily on the first question that they confuse not finding a
specific issur with seeing it as a good idea bichlal. Something RYBS
tried pulling people away from through the use of personal anecdote and
discussion of the "erev Shabbos Jew", the piety of the Chabadnikim
of Chaslovitch and the Chassidim he met in Warsaw. But not so much in
his daily shiur.

Brisker derekh draws one's attention away form this second question.
Rather than talking about values and what we can extrapolate from
halakhah about the Torah's goals for us, it habituates us to think in
terms of chalos -- abstract states defined entirely by their halachic
impact.


Me, I'm not a fan of absorbing values that are not in the Torah. That
doesn't mean I would avoid seriously exploring the entire encounter
with modern values. There are fundamental Torah values that eroded over
time that we only regained through seeing them in the outside world,
once that world matured to the point of catching up to some of what the
Torah told us. We could end up being reminded by our neighbors of things
we lost along the way.

For example, the mishnah in Sanhedrin 4:5 fell by the wayside. Galus
understandably pushed us to see the world in adversarial terms, which
meant that we were motivated to downplay some of the more universalist
aspects of Jewish morality. The civil rights movement in the US was
the best thing that ever happened to "Lefikhakh nivra Adam yechidi
ba'olam... Umipenei shalom haberiyyos, shelo yomar adam lachaveiro,
'Abba gadol mei'avikha'". The mishnah would have been forgotten. (Rather
than frequently twisted? Okay, I'll conceed that to that extent, it was
a mixed bag.)

But this means that I will frequently disagree with MO conclusions about
where to go next.



After asking (1) is it mutar, and (2) do the pros outweigh the cons,
we also must ask if the question is relevent. It's pointless to discuss
avoiding something that takes us further from the Torah's ideal if there
is no way to avoid it.

I think this third question is also a point of contention in this
conversation.


Once dealing with these three questions, the rav has to render pesaq. As
I wrote a while ago on this thread, this can mean what RYBS would call
prohibiting something for "political" reasons. And although I don't like
the word "political" to describe it, as "doing something for political
reasons" sounds less-than-idealistic, I am in full agreement with the
notion that some ideas may be mutar in perat, but assur because of where
they take us. Actually halachically assur, even though we're applying
the law to something non-legalistic.

This "paradox" is really due to the homonymity of the word "mutar".
"Qadeish es atzmekha bema shemutar lakh" sounds similarly paradoxical.
It's saying there is an obligation to avoid something that you're
permitted. Well, if you're obligated to avoid it, how is it permitted?
On scjm, I would post it translated as "sanctify yourself with something
that [would otherwise be] permitted to you". I would say that the
Ramban is giving an instance of something that the hyperlagalistic mind
wouldn't find a problem with. Or in other words, people who explore the
first question (is there a specific issur?) without the second (does it
take us where Hashem tells us to go?) would think it's mutar.


So much for generalizations, now onto discussing nidon didan in
particular.


As for the first question, the specific halakhos: I think it could be
argued that there is nothing about being a Maharat that is inherently
different than being a yoetzet, or just being a knowledgable neighbor
who I call when I am stuck on something. I am not saying my poseiq would
necessarily agree. (My current poseiq is a talmid of R' Aharon and R'
Shneur Kotler, so I bet not -- even though Lakewood was more liberal
then than it is now.) I'm saying it's within eilu va'eilu for hers and
her prospective qehillah's to pasqen that way. So my objection isn't
on the "legalistic" level.


The second question, that of whether the innovation advances AYH, was
raised in our discussion in two ways. The generic issue of change in
general, and then the specific contents of this particular change.


Change is inherently dangerous. We are a society that transmits many
truths culturally, and if we tamper with that culture, we weaken the
vehicle of mesorah. (Can you think of a better reason why Ashkenazim
still don't eat qitniyos on Pesach? <g>)

But let's not overstate things; the danger inherent in change as change
is minor compared to many of the things we can accomplish through
change. New realities, new needs, need to be addressed. If we need a
"wedding dress gemach" to help combat the rising cost of chasunos,
how could the minor change to how we do things -- one more gemach out
of many -- be the greater issue?

Look at the shift to widening girls' education beyond practical halakhah
and Tzena uRe'ena. Compared to the threat of losing many of our girls
to assimilation, how can one worry about the cost of change? Of course,
the halachic weight of the mishnah also had to be addressed, but I'm
only discussing cases where such concerns can be honestly met.

The change proposed by Maharat is of that kind of scale, and therefore
even without the issues raised by the particulars of the change, it can't
be dismissed trivially like the question of "a new idea to start a hesed
organization" (to quote RMS). Something that shifts our self-perception
that much needs significant justification, one has to spell out real
costs to staying the course with the status quo.


The western worldview has an entire constellation of values based
on something I consider a fallacy; the confusion of prominance with
importance.

Recall that since the beginning of this conversation, news outlets in this
part of the world nearly ground to a halt to cover one performer's death,
life, and memorial. Not that the man was known for charity, or even for
being morally upright, found a cure to some form of cancer, etc... We
follow the lives of the rich and famous, and our children confuse a
famous baseball player or actress with the notion of a role model.

The zeitgeist runs counter to R' Shimon Shkop's words (tr. mine), "In
a great engine even the smallest screw is important if it even serves
the smallest role in the engine. For the whole is made of parts, and
no more than the sum of its parts." The engine won't run without that
unnamed screw on the bottom holding part of the casing shut. You'll be
just as immobile as if the defective part were something you know the
name of and discuss more often, like a spark plug.

And it stands in distinction to the Jewish constellation of princples
that underly tzenius (not seeking to live befarhesia), anavah, halakhos,
avoiding kibud (while maintaining a pesonal kavod), etc...

I was arguing that much of feminism's agenda is taken from this basic
orientation. Or to be more accurate: much of feminism's agenda is based
on the notion that woman do and should have this basic orientation.
That since the more valuable expression is the more prominent one,
we have a responsibility to provide women more prominent positions.

It's what makes it hard to truly internalize the concept that being yet
another mother like the many others in her shul is really more significant
of a contribution than being the rav. (It was here that I went off on the
regrettable, because distracting, tangent about the center of Judaism
being in the home, not the synagogue.) Or that there is less avodas
Hashem in being the one to teach her daughter "Modah ani" than in tefillah
betzibur. Or the value of opening one's home to people who have no place
for Shabbos, or being there for other childless couples. If we knew to
value the quiet contribution of being a critical part of the survival
of the Jewish people as one of the masses, "besokh ami anokhi yosheves",
we wouldn't have the entire need to explore other religious expressions
nor the consequent questions of which we could or should accomodate.

WRT gender differences, the assymetry is created by chiyuvim. Men are
mechuyavim in mitzvos asei shehazman gerama and in talmud Torah. These
reflect a different prioritzation of tzeni'us in relation to other values,
and HQBH thereby forces us to act on a different prioritzation.

IOW, there are chazanim and not chazanos not because tzeni'us is less
important for men, but because tefillah betzibbur is more. Kol kevudah
bas melekh penimah is true because Hashem doesn't demand that women
choose to build certain communal structures.

And in weighing pros vs cons of running with innovations in the
direction of egalitarianism, the pros are thus much weaker than had a
chiyuv existed.

To return to my rephrasing when I wrote, "I was arguing that much of
feminism's agenda is taken from this basic orientation. Or to be more
accurate: much of feminism's agenda is based on the notion that woman
do and should have this basic orientation." Should they? And if not,
as I am arguing, then are we properly serving the women who are entering
the Maharat ordination seminary? Are we properly serving the women who
desire such a woman at the helm of their community?

Or, should our attention be focused on correcting the basic conflation, of
returning women to their grandmother's "bas melekh penimah" orientation?

In order to say that these pros outweigh the cons, you have to demonstrate
that these are actually pros, rather than giving up an essential element
of traditional avodas Hashem as a Jewish woman before that battle is
actually lost?

An implicit part of my argument that I didn't realize myself until I
was in the middle typing the next paragraph: Two of the issues I raised
blend into each other. I cited lack of evidence of cheshbon hanefesh, of
weighing pros vs cons. And I also questioned your assumption the change
is a given part of how we live regardless of how we structure religious
roles ends. The decision of whether we are addressing the needs of the
women involed or enabling a poor value system they assimilated depends
largely on whether that value system is part of the question, or a given.

What would happen if the first Orthodox female Supreme Court Justice
defined her Judaism in terms of kol kivudah? Would it not still teach
her the value of keeping the limelight only on the professional aspect
of her life, but yet keeping ones most personal feelings, including her
love and fear/awe for her creator just that -- personal? And isn't that
compartmentalization *exactly* how RYBS is cited as defining tzeni'us when
it comes to those men who do assume positions of religious leadership?

For that matter, how is it Rn Nechama Leibowitz or lbchl"ch Rn Esther
Jungreis was/is able to maintain a position of *religious* prominance
without redefining for themselves the basic role of women in our society?

However, I would argue that even assessing the change of values as poor
was not consciously performed. That this is an assimilation of 20th-21st
cent values that occured so unconsciously, feminism was a priori accepted
as a good. The entire importance=prominence worldview was bought into
and never analyzed.


If one accepted importance=prominence then being a chazan would be the
greater avodas Hashem to being in a minyan, and there would be no reason
to decline the first two invitations to the amud. To be tzanu'ah is to
be disabused of that falacy. It puts Torah and zeitgeist as odds.

Yes, we are products of our world, and so men at most pay lip service to
this idea. More often, those of us who think we have good voices start
walking to the amud before the quesiton is completed the first time. But
how does that reduce the conflict? Is the argument that because we fail
to stand up to the conflict, we lost the battle already and might as well
address the needs of people as they now exist? Or even that there is no
tzeni'us-anavah-avoid kibud value for us to try to relay to whomever is
still ready to accept it or to keep alive through pro-forma to preserve
whatever influence it has?


I made a point of distinguishing between RHS's essay and my variant,
but now that I think about it, I don't think I ever spelled out what
the difference was.

In essence, I don't think RHS is making a "for political reasons"
argument. I think he is saying tzeni'us is a chalos (or perhaps it's
vehalakhtza bidrekhav of the One who does tzimtzum, or... but RHS gives
it the buzzword "tzeni'us"), whose existence he tries to prove and
derive from men not supposed to rushing to the amud. Brisker reasoning.

My own habits are closer to RSShkop's derekh. Looking at the why rather
than constructing a mechanics to explain the what. To me the issue is
about middos, and whether it is assur, mutar or unavoidable to make a
change that replaces the prioritization of middos we derive from the
mesorah (both textual and mimetic) with those of our host society.


To summarize: My biggest complaint is that I do not see anyone exploring
whether the change is forced upon us, and if so questioning if it's
a positive value. I don't see the active conscious confrontation with
modernity, the whole thing RYBS describes in terms of the tension of
the dialectic.

When I personally do the math, it seems to me that the cost of this
particular change is large, as it's a huge cultural rupture, even given
the rupture of women moving into the workplace. The advantage that would
justify accepting the change would have to be equally large.

However, I do not see an advantage beyond those already addressed in
ideas of the last decade, like yoetzet. (Or of WTG over tehillim groups.)
The advantages proposed appear to me to be circular -- given a society
that bought into feminist values, there is an advantage to that society.
But that given lies at the root of the very question it's being invoked
to decide! Maybe we should not accept the needs of the woman who would
be served by having a Maharat, and instead teach her the beauty of being
able to live besokh ami, and thus be served by finding a knowledgable
female teacher/mentor/counselor with no formal title or role and a rav.
Just as it was done miymei qedem.

Last, I think that the resolution of that "maybe we should not accept" is
to my mind, "no, we shouldn't". That anavah, tzeni'us, and that entire
need to be prominent that underlies the feminist ideal (I said "ideal",
not just needing a second income to pay tuitions) is a step away from
what the Torah wants of us. And there are plenty of examples of
professional women who can be tzanu'as in the rest of their lives to
justify assuming we still have that choice.

Have an easy fast, and may RET (and the rest of us) get to celebrate
next Tish'ah beAv as a festival,
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
micha at aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507