[Avodah] Tzeni'us and gender roles

[Chana Luntz]

RMB writes:

> This is a shift of topic. "In accordance with common practice" and
> "in common understanding" are two different things. What I asked for
> was a justification for the claim that common practice indicates there
> is a different shitah in tzenius, and it's that shitah which we are
> following.

I am not quite sure what exactly you are getting at here.  The point has
been reiterated by many posters that nowhere in common practice do we see
any evidence of an understanding of tznius leading us to diminish the
availability of public roles or indeed the creation of new ones - at least
as it applies to men.  We do see some indication of men trying to avoid the
kavod that goes along with such roles, but the roles themselves tend to be
multiplied rather than diminished.

We do see a tendency to diminish public roles for women.  And we do
periodically here explanations of this being based on tznius.  But the usual
definition of tznius used here is not the tzanua laleches one, but the one
that is the opposite of pritzus.  That is, because sight/hearing of a woman
by a man will cause hirhurim and the like, this is a form of pritzus, and
tznius dictates that this not occur.

> Common understanding is blurry and doesn't really make the point.
> Removing common understanding to just talk about nidon didan,
> the following:
> : (A) as the opposite of pritzus.  Pritzus is inappropriate 
> sexuality, and
> : tznius is the opposite of that.
> 
> is not relevent.

Ah but it is highly relevant.  If you asked the halachic man on the
equivalent of the clapham omnibus (ie the halachic everyman) what was the
reason women could not get aliyos, chances are the explanation you would get
back is because it is not tznius for men to see/hear a woman (maybe even kol
isha perhaps).  No, it is not written anywhere authoritative (and ROY, for
example, repeatedly rebuts that kol isha has anything to do with women not
getting aliyos) - (perhaps the closest I have seen is the Matne Ephraim and
similar on why women shouldn't say kaddish) but it certainly crops up in the
common understanding.

There is no question that RHS is playing on this understanding when he comes
in with his thesis.  What he is saying is - yes halachic everyman, it is
about tznius, but you are not fully understanding tznius.  Ie he is trying
to keep the explanation and make it gender neutral by sliding from my A)
definition to B).


> He says noting about anti-peritzus / tzenius type A. Neither in accord
> with the Western mind nor in opposition.
> 
> FWIW, I personally would propose a unifying definition -- peritzus is
> the ultimate in drawing attention to oneself for a non-productive (in
> fact counterproductive) purpose. But that's tangential since only
> one end of the linkage is relevent.

You can only understand RHS like that if you think he is talking in a
vacuum.  I find that completely impossible to believe. Rather I believe that
your unifying definition is precisely his unifying definition.  That is his
starting point.  There is no reason to assume that tzanua laleches has any
connection to aliyos or public roles if you don't go through this pritzus
linkage that is already in the common understanding.  Walking with G-d is
something that does carry with it a sense of privateness - but the exclusion
is of the public altogether - ie the hermit communing with G-d in his cave.
The part of the public yes but out front of public no - which is the radical
bit of the explanation, existed previously linked to the term tznius, but
only in relation to women, with the problematic part of being in front being
labelled pritzus.
 
> I'm arguing that even if that is what I concluded, with no 
> specific issur
> involved there are reasons that have the force of halakhah not to make
> such changes.

Yes, and one of these is - it is not the way women's roles have
traditionally been - it is not tznius, it is pritzus. Women being up front
and in men's faces leads to greater possibilities of hirhurim etc.

A second is that minhag is torah, if we have the minhag that women don't do
things, then that works as as a bar to doing them (think shechita).

A third is to explain kovod hatzibbur in some way - that it is insulting to
the community if women do things that men could do.

I am sure there are others.

You may not like any of these, but these run far deeper in the sources than
what is being proposed.  And while one might not like the consequences of
these, they do not lead to the other negative consequences that would come
about by applying your thesis generally.
 

I then wrote:
> : But synagogue is not supposed to be quiet worship, and 
> quiet worship is only
> : one of a number of idealised forms of worship...
> 
> Isn't the idea of tefillah betzibbur to be part of the 
> corporate entity
> of the tzibur rather than only being an individual (which you could do
> without the tzibbur)?

Yes, but that is not necessarily quiet worship (in many communities it can
involve people chanting things together, and in others people screaming,
what sounds at the top of their voice, their own individual prayer oblivious
to the other).  Chana is a certain kind of an ideal, but it is not the only
ideal. And even tefillah betzibbur is arguably only a substitute for the
ultimate form of avodah, which takes place in the beis hamikdash and was
very ritualised and involved very public roles.
 
> RnCL objected in this later email because:
> : The attitude is a problem.  But you are then going on to confuse the
> : attitude with the object. It is the classic alcoholics  attitude...
> 
> Not really, because the burden of proof rests on the innovator. I'm
> saying that the status quo has advantages, and am not suggesting new
> bans.

But you see you can't do this.  If you propose that the reason why one
cannot change the status quo is because the torah goal is X, in this case a
diminishing of public roles, then the next and logical step is to follow
through and diminish those public roles that currently exist, ie refusing
innovation in one place on a certain ground is likely to set you on a path
towards innovation somewhere else.

But in this case, we don't even need to go so far.  There are already views
(non mainstream, non halachic views) which say that one shouldn't be praying
for the restoration of the beis hamikdash (the Reform movement has
traditionally been big on this).  Now after all, that is a form of prayer to
change the status quo.  Your argument gives strength to that kind of
thinking, because, as I have mentioned, the beis hamikdash is just rife with
the kind of public role that you find such an anathema, and which you argue
is against the Torah goals.  Restart the avodah and the beis hamikdash and
you will have a whole load more of these "tznius" issues that you identify
as a problem.  That is, you have just created a con to a form of davening
where one never previously existed, and something which might cause people
to draw back from a whole hearted prayer that they might otherwise offer.
That is a necessary innovation of your thesis.

The burden on proof as to why we should make a change does indeed rest on
the innovator - but when one proposes a novel theory as to why the status
quo is as it is, then you are in fact the innovator, because it will without
question lead to innovation, in a whole range of subtle and less subtle
ways.
 
> I'm saying his tzni'us would have been greater, and perhaps that means
> that even the anav mikol adam would have been even more of an anav.

Ie Moshe the flawed hero.  And, as I said, there have been objections on
this list to people viewing Pinchas and Avraham and Yitzchak as flawed heros
- especially using non chazal sources to come up with this flaws.  This is a
not dissimilar form of reasoning, it being a consequence of your analysis.
Moshe is less of person that he could have been. 
 
> 
> :-)BBii!
> -Micha


Regards

Chana
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