[Avodah] R Tzadok-TSBP

[Michael Makovi]

> This is RSRH's critique of Wissenschaft, that it took theories about
> how Judaism ought to be and redefined Judaism to fit the theory. Alchemy
> style -- fitting the date to the theory rather than the other way around.
>
> R' Micha

Fair enough. I'll note that I do try to get my hashkafah from the
Torah itself and not from alien sources. Whether or not I actually
succeed in this is an entirely separate issue.

One thing that has troubled me: In theory, Rav Hirsch's proposal to
derive hashkafah from halakhah - note his criticism of Rambam, that he
had ta'amei mitzvot that ignored the halakhah - sounds perfectly
logical and reasonable. But we know that certain laws are concessions
to human nature - yafet toar, milhemet reshut, go'el ha'dam, etc.
Also, I remember a rav - I think it was a YU-type rav's article, maybe
Rabbi David Berger or Rabbi Carmi or Rabbi Riskin, but I cannot
remember - noting the following very real question: how do we know
"thou shalt not murder" / "ze sefer toldot adam" (etc.) is the rule
and "kill the Amalekites" is the exception? In other words, the Torah
is not always easy to fit into one seemless whole, so how do we know
which halakhot and hashkafot to reinterpret to fit with the others, or
to put in a box on the side marked "exceptions"? If we derived
hashkafah from halakhah as Rav Hirsch proposes, wouldn't we have to
say that G-d's ideal is for men to take women captive in war?
Obviously, this conclusion is false, but is this not the logical
conclusion of Rav Hirsch's method? Rav Hirsch's method sounds
beautiful on paper, but in practice, you start getting intractible
difficulties.

Another example: I don't remember the exact details, but I think there
are some obscure cases where one is permitted to slaughter the mother
and child on the same die, or eat unshechted meat. I don't remember
the details, so maybe someone else can help out. In any case, all this
would constitute a serious challenge to Rambam's understanding that
these are mercy to the animals, that the mother feels pain watching
the child die, etc. But I'd answer: maybe these exceptions are
formalistic loopholes. I believe there's a story in the Gemara of
people taking their produce through the window to avoid terumah, and
so G-d causes the house to collapse. So not every halakhah can be used
to derive a hashkafa. We might think that produce-through-the-window
teaches a profound message of spirituality and holiness, but actually,
it's just a strange loophole.

Also, I think there's something to be said for Rambam's notion that
G-d had to set certain laws as filler, because *some* law has to
exist. I saw a rabbi - I think Rabbi J. H. Hertz or another British
rav, but I don't remember - say that it is meaningless to search for a
meaning in each individual act of melakhah. As he further explained,
while Shabbat does have a certain definite meaning - he followed Rav
Hirsch's interpretation of Shabbat - it is futile to try to make each
individual act carry that meaning. When I get a certain specific type
of stain on my pants and have to clean it in a very specific way, this
does not help me remember G-d; if I were suddenly permitted to clean
my pants by blotting some water, I wouldn't suddenly forget G-d's
creation. So what this rav said is that while abstaining from labor in
general on Shabbat testifies to G-d, each and every single solitary
act does not. Only when all the acts are put together across a whole
day do they become meaningful. Each individual act, on the other hand,
is just the outcome of a certain formal legalism which has no meaning
in and of itself aside from its legal formalism. I don't think he
mentioned the Rambam in this connection, but it seems to me that all
this logically flows from the Rambam's general statement that if G-d
said 7 sheep, He could have said 6 or 8, but He had to say something
definite. Even if we reject Rambam on the specific example of korbanot
- Rav Hirsch surely would - I think the principle still has
legitimacy, just as concessions to human nature is a valid principle
even if we reject its application to korbanot.

I am not proposing a relativism where we throw out Rav Hirsch's method
and just concoct whatever ta'amei mitzvot occur to us from our
imaginations. I think Rav Hirsch's method is a good one, but it needs
to have one caveat realized: the method is not a science; it also
requires some common sense and the use of certain non-verifiable
principles like concessions to human nature, loopholes, formal
legalistic filler material, etc. So Rav Hirsch's method can be used in
general, but when someone comes across milhemet reshut, he ought to be
able to step back and realize that perhaps the permission to conquer
land is just a concession to primitive people, and not a law which
teaches grand G-dly ideals. In other words: Rav Hirsch's method works
99% of the time, but that 1% of the time that it fails can only be
found with common sense and a feeling for the ethos of Judaism, or
what have you.

> However, using aggadita ... to break the tie is also very common.
> R' Micha

This is EXACTLY what I'm doing. Look, when I'm learning hilkhot
shabbat or kashrut, I don't start bringing hashkafa. 99% of the time,
my halakhah is the same as everyone else's. In hilkhot shabbat and
kashrut, I might raise hashkafah with nicht jude on Shabbat or with
wine, but these are relatively rare. 99% of the time, I practice
halakhah like any Orthodox Jew.

Rav Uziel put it well: he'll rule on hesed and ahavah, but only when a
solid halakhic basis exists. I'll bring Meiri, but only because Rabbi
David Berger already said that Rabbis Hirsch, Kook, Yehiel Weinberg,
Herzog, and Henkin paskened him as halakhah l'ma'aseh. (I myself saw
Rabbi Yom Tov Schwarz does, and Rabbi Haim David Halevy apparently did
as well.) So I'm not inventing a halakhah out of nowhere; I have a
halakhic basis. So when someone asks about cheering for nicht jude
baseball players due to lo techonem, I'll reply with hashkafah. But
this is because I already hold the Meiri is halakhah, so I just have
to show that hashkafically, the Meiri is applicable here.

> To put it broader: MO traces more from Hildesheimer's than RSRH. And is
> doubly true of the Academic Orthodoxy subtype.
>
> RSRH didn't have positive things to say about Wissenschaft even knowing of
> the varient followed by R' Dovid Zvi Hoffman, whose first job was teaching
> at RSRH's Realschule, and eventually becoming rector at Hildesheimer's.
>
> R' Micha

I think that what I do is to take Rav Hirsch's justification for
secular knowledge in general - that understanding the world helps one
understand the Torah -  and apply the same to academic study of
halakhah. (I.e., understanding history and sociology and psychology
would help one understand how the posek operated.) Similarly, though
Rav Hirsch opposed finding Near Eastern literary or cultural
explanations of Torah narratives, I find no problem with this - I
follow Rav Kook here, that the Torah took whatever could be uplifted
from the derekh eretz of that time (prophecy is given in accordance
with the abilities of the recipient - thus the Torah can sound similar
to the Code of Hamurabbi), and that the Torah has concessions to human
nature (the Torah speaks in the language of man - thus the Torah has
yafet toar and milhemet reshut). I don't claim that Rav Hirsch would
agree with everything I do. All I can do is take his words, along with
everyone else's, and take them where they logically lead in my own
opinion, even if Rav Hirsch or someone else disagrees.

Michael Makovi