[Avodah] Rambam's naturalism

[Micha Berger]

On Mon, Mar 09, 2009 at 02:21:12PM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
: According to Rambam, in "hakol bidei shamayim hutz miyirat shamayim",
: the "hakol" (which is in G-d's hands) is natural law, and "yirat
: shamayim" (which is not in G-d's hands) is all the actions of man,
: which are either mutar or assur.

Arguably, the Rambam could say that since HP is in response to da'as, a
person has some control over it. But I don't see the Rambam actually
saying that the actual responding is outside "yedei Shamayim". But at
that point, it becomes an argument as to what "yad" means.

: But if so, what do we make of the following passage?
: The Rabbis expatiate very much upon this subject in the Midrash
: Koheleth and in other writings, one of their statements in
: reference to this matter being, "Everything follows its natural
: course". In everything that they said, you will always find that
: the Rabbis (peace be unto them!) avoided referring to the Divine
: Will as determining a particular event at a particular time.

Ah, but continuing the paragraph, it is clear the Rambam is speaking of
the difference between Hashem creating human nature and determinism of
human action:
    When, therefore, they said that man rises and sits down in accordance
    with the will of God, their meaning was that, when man was first
    created, his nature was so determined that rising up and sitting down
    were to be optional to him; but they as little meant that God wills
    at any special moment that man should or should not get up, as He
    determines at any given time that a certain stone should or should
    not fall to the ground. [3] The sum and substance of the matter
    is, then, that thou shouldst believe that just as God willed that
    man should be upright in stature, broad chested, and have fingers,
    likewise did He will that man should move or rest of his own accord,
    and that his actions should be such as his own free will dictates
    to him, without any outside influence or restraint, which fact God
    clearly states in the truthful Law, which elucidates this problem,
    when it says "Behold, the man is become as one of us to know good
    and evil."[1] The Targum, in paraphrasing this passage, explains
    the meaning of the words mimmenu lada`at tob wara`. Man has become
    the only being in the world who possesses a characteristic which no
    other being has in common with him. What is this characteristic? It
    is that by and of himself man can distinguish between good and evil,
    and do that which he pleases, with absolutely no restraint. Since,
    then, this is so, it would have even been possible for him to have
    stretched out his hand, and, taking of the tree of life to have
    eaten of its fruit, and thus live forever. [2]

Gorfinkel's footnotes:
    [3] Cf M's Commentary on Abot IV 23 (Rawicz Commentar pp 89 90): H.
    Teshubah V 4, and Moreh III 17 Fifth Theory. See Rosin. Ethik p 69 n 6
    [1] Gen III 22
    [2] Cf. H Teshuvah V 1

I do not see in this discussion where he attacks hashgachah in general.
After all, the 8th pereq is about bechirah; and his only mention of
hashgachah is in contrast to bechirah. The question of HP (including
sechar va'onesh) vs hashgachah kelalis (including the Divine Wisdom
expressed in nature) is outside the discussion.

: Moreover, Rambam went to great lengths to be naturalistic, even going
: so far as to say that all miracles were pre-instituted at creation,
: and are not ad-hoc volitional acts of G-d. Rambam repeats this on Avot
: 5:5. If "EVERYTHING follows its natural course", and if the Rabbis
: avoided referring events to ad-hoc Divine Will, and even miracles are
: not ad-hoc interventions, clearly this excludes the notion that in
: addition to our free will (which G-d does not interfere with), that
: G-d ALSO performs ad-hoc actions of His own.

Peirush haMishnayos 5:5 is saying that neis isn't a suspension of
teva as much as teva was created with the possibility of neis. E.g.,
"On the fourth day, when the sun was created, there was placed with
in it the potential to at some time stand still when Joshua spoke to
it." Not a constant following of natural course as much as a version of
nature which doesn't require believing that G-d changed His mind when
He performed a miracle.

: End of that subject, onto another one.

I remain with my belief that the Rambam doesn't suggest in either of
these quotes anything like the Ralbag's notion that hashgachah is only
expressed as ruach haqodesh or nevu'ah.

And thus, no contradiction to Moreh III:18 to need resolution.

: I said that according to Manekin, Novel Will has nothing to do with
: intellect, whereas Divine Providence is based davka on intellect. R'
: Micha objected:
: > That's a very hard position to support. Will is something Intellect has.
: > Basic Aristotilian physics: Intellect has Will
: > ...
: > ...
: > And chap 18 [of the Moreh] includes: "For it is the intensity of the Divine
: > intellectual influence that has inspired the prophets, guided the good
: > in their actions, and perfected the wisdom of the pious."

: Sorry. Let me clarify my intent. My point was that Manekin's Novel
: Will has nothing to do with the RECIPIENTS' intellect. Obviously,
: everything G-d does is in accordance with His will and His intellect
: (which are actually one and the same thing, but...). My point,
: however, was that while Rambam's Divine Providence is only for those
: RECIPIENTS with perfected intellect, Novel Will would be different.
: The people of Sodom could have all been raving idiots, and they still
: would have been destroyed by G-d's Novel Will, due to their sins.

You're language needs honing. The Rambam's notion of hashgachah applies
to everything. It's only HP that depends on the recipient. Hashgachah
kelalis includes nature, it's an expression of Divine Will and Wisdom,
in contrast to Epicurus's belief in randomness.

: Now, one could say that if the Sodomites were idiots (and in a
: Maimonidean sense, they were, since only an ignoramus who doesn't
: appreciate G-d would ever sin), then they were destroyed, not because
: G-d destroyed them, but because they lacked Divine Providence (which
: may be Ralbag's Divinely proffered smart tips to proper living, or
: whatever), and they destroyed themselves.

(WADR the the Rambam, he and Aristotle were wrong. Sin isn't due to a
failure of intelligence, but a failure of midos. This isn't the topic
under discussion, but see
<http://www.yutorah.org/_shiurim/Dr%2E%20Mark%20Steiner%20%2D%20Rabbi%20Israel%20Salanter%20as%20a%20Jewish%20Philosopher%20%281%2D1%2D2000%29%2Epdf>
or <http://www.kitzur.com/52t2r>. RMSteiner discusses the topic,
including the work of non-Jewish philosophers that disprove Aristotle's
model, and argues in favor of R' Yisrael Salanter's. But regardless of
that last point, philosophy moved past Aristo.

...
: It is worth noting that Rabbi Henkin, in Equality Lost, for a reason
: having nothing to do with Rambam, also suggests that the Second Temple
: fell, not due to G-d's punishing us actively (sinat hinam, he says, it
: not a severe enough averah to merit this), but only due to His
: passively not protecting us, withdrawing His active protection; sinat
: hinam is only bad enough to merit His withdrawing His protection.

That's the Rambam's notion that HP requires yedi'as Hashem, or REED's
(very distinct) notion that the only way to avoid needing hishtadlus is
by having bitachon.

: Indeed, R' Micha says,
: > [S]ince Sedom was evil, then the Rambam's reasoning leads one to
: > conclude it was cast off to hashgachah kelalis because of a lack of
: > intellectual perfection. Therefore its destruction had to be part of a
: > general rule.

: This may very well be the case. However, if Manekin is correct, then
: alternatively, even if the Sodomites WERE idiots, and Divine
: Providence dictated that G-d sit back and watch whatever will just
: happen to happen to them, nevertheless, Novel Will would permit G-d to
: take direct action against them.

How? Novel Will is hashgachah peratis. The perat is what makes the event
"novel"!

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A life of reaction is a life of slavery,
micha at aishdas.org        intellectually and spiritually. One must
http://www.aishdas.org   fight for a life of action, not reaction.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            -Rita Mae Brown