[Avodah] Rambam's naturalism

[Michael Makovi]

> It doesn't necessarily mean natural law in distinction to other Divine Action.
> R' Micha

According to Rambam, in "hakol bidei shamayim hutz miyirat shamayim",
the "hakol" (which is in G-d's hands) is natural law, and "yirat
shamayim" (which is not in G-d's hands) is all the actions of man,
which are either mutar or assur.

We've got an omission between the reisha and the seifa. The reisha is
natural law (in G-d's hands), and the seifa is man's actions (in man's
hands); pray tell, where is the mention of miracles and ad-hoc Divine
interventions? This ma'amar Hazal seems to be lacking something. One
could either emphasize the hakol, and say that truly, nothing at all
is in G-d's hands save natural law, or one can emphasize the hutz mi,
and say that the only thing G-d lacks control over is our deeds, but
that He does perform ad-hoc interventions.

Now, Rambam repeatedly speaks of how the ACTIONS of man are within
man's control, and how G-d controls man's ACTIONS insofar as He
instituted natural law. If Rambam is only speaking of man's ability to
do the deed, then perhaps indeed, Rambam is saying that while G-d
controls man's deeds insofar as He controls natural law, this doesn't
rule out G-d's controlling events in other ways. My stealing or giving
tzedaka is wholly within my hands and in His only insofar as natural
law is in His, but lightning, floods, and plagues of frogs are in a
totally different category, and perhaps He controls these NOT merely
by way of His initial institution of natural law, but rather, by some
more direct volitional manner.

But Rambam further says,
It is also necessary to take all the precautionary
measures laid down in the Law, such as,
"Thou shalt make a battlement for thy roof; that thou bring
not blood upon thy house", "lest he die in the battle",
"wherein shall he sleep?", and "no man shall take to pledge
the nether or the upper millstone", and many other
passages in regard to precautions found in the Law and
the Prophets.

Rambam is clearly extending even the RESULTS to our hands.

Moreover, Rambam says,
Thus, for instance, when a stone is thrown
into the air and falls to the ground, it is correct to say that
the stone fell in accordance with the will of God, for it is true
that God decreed that the earth and all that goes to make it
up, should be the centre of attraction, so that when any part
of it is thrown into the air, it is attracted back to the centre.

What was the action which the man did? Clearly, his action was
throwing the stone into the air; if Rambam wanted only to emphasize
that man's actions are within his power, Rambam could have emphasized
that man can freely throw the stone up, and stop there. Rambam had no
need to mention the stone's falling back down, if all he is concerned
with is that the initial deed is in man's control. Obviously, Rambam
is extending even the RESULT of the deed to man's control.

However, you may object: even if I am correct, that Rambam is
extending our free will even to the results of our deeds, and not
merely to the deeds themselves, perhaps, nevertheless, the same
results are also occasionally done by G-d Himself. For example,
someone may fall off a roof because ploni forgot to build a parapet,
but all the same, someone may fall off the roof become G-d stam caused
him too. That is, even if our failure to build a parapet causes
someone to fall off a roof, not every instance of falling off a roof
is due to failure to build a parapet.

But if so, what do we make of the following passage?
The Rabbis expatiate very much upon this subject in the Midrash
Koheleth and in other writings, one of their statements in
reference to this matter being, "Everything follows its natural
course". In everything that they said, you will always find that
the Rabbis (peace be unto them!) avoided referring to the Divine
Will as determining a particular event at a particular time.

Moreover, Rambam went to great lengths to be naturalistic, even going
so far as to say that all miracles were pre-instituted at creation,
and are not ad-hoc volitional acts of G-d. Rambam repeats this on Avot
5:5. If "EVERYTHING follows its natural course", and if the Rabbis
avoided referring events to ad-hoc Divine Will, and even miracles are
not ad-hoc interventions, clearly this excludes the notion that in
addition to our free will (which G-d does not interfere with), that
G-d ALSO performs ad-hoc actions of His own.

End of that subject, onto another one.

I said that according to Manekin, Novel Will has nothing to do with
intellect, whereas Divine Providence is based davka on intellect. R'
Micha objected:
> That's a very hard position to support. Will is something Intellect has.
> Basic Aristotilian physics: Intellect has Will
> ...
> ...
> And chap 18 [of the Moreh] includes: "For it is the intensity of the Divine
> intellectual influence that has inspired the prophets, guided the good
> in their actions, and perfected the wisdom of the pious."
>
> R' Micha

Sorry. Let me clarify my intent. My point was that Manekin's Novel
Will has nothing to do with the RECIPIENTS' intellect. Obviously,
everything G-d does is in accordance with His will and His intellect
(which are actually one and the same thing, but...). My point,
however, was that while Rambam's Divine Providence is only for those
RECIPIENTS with perfected intellect, Novel Will would be different.
The people of Sodom could have all been raving idiots, and they still
would have been destroyed by G-d's Novel Will, due to their sins.

Now, one could say that if the Sodomites were idiots (and in a
Maimonidean sense, they were, since only an ignoramus who doesn't
appreciate G-d would ever sin), then they were destroyed, not because
G-d destroyed them, but because they lacked Divine Providence (which
may be Ralbag's Divinely proffered smart tips to proper living, or
whatever), and they destroyed themselves.

I myself made this same point with regard to the Letter to Marseilles,
at http://michaelmakovi.blogspot.com/2009/02/maimonidean-rationalism-part-3-letter.html:
Rambam says we lost the commonwealth because we didn't learn the art
of war, but rather learned astrology. The reliance on astrology and
segulot stultified our minds and turned us from practical efficacious
endeavors. Had we followed the Torah's prohibition of astrology, we'd
have instead learned practical warfare, and we'd have defeated the
Romans in battle. Thus, the prohibition of astrology, contained its
own intrinsic naturalistic punishment. G-d punished us, insofar as He
didn't help us.

It is worth noting that Rabbi Henkin, in Equality Lost, for a reason
having nothing to do with Rambam, also suggests that the Second Temple
fell, not due to G-d's punishing us actively (sinat hinam, he says, it
not a severe enough averah to merit this), but only due to His
passively not protecting us, withdrawing His active protection; sinat
hinam is only bad enough to merit His withdrawing His protection.

Rav Hirsch says likewise, but with regard to the First Temple as well:
the historians mock the Tanach and say the Temple fell due to
naturalistic reasons, and Rav Hirsch replies, "Precisely!". According
to Rav Hirsch, the miracle was not that the Temple fell, but rather,
that the Temple stood as long as it did; naturally, the Temple should
have (given Near Eastern politics and warfare) fallen hundreds of
years before it did. All G-d in 586 BCE did was withdraw His
Providence.

Indeed, R' Micha says,
> [S]ince Sedom was evil, then the Rambam's reasoning leads one to
> conclude it was cast off to hashgachah kelalis because of a lack of
> intellectual perfection. Therefore its destruction had to be part of a
> general rule.

This may very well be the case. However, if Manekin is correct, then
alternatively, even if the Sodomites WERE idiots, and Divine
Providence dictated that G-d sit back and watch whatever will just
happen to happen to them, nevertheless, Novel Will would permit G-d to
take direct action against them.

Michael Makovi