[Avodah] Geirut

[Chana Luntz]

I wrote regarding KOM:

> The thing is, you are not thinking like a halachist.  What you appear to
> be creating here is a new paradigm within halacha, without reference to
> the traditional discussions.  You see, verbal statements, including
> agreements to something or promises to do something is discussed
> extensively throughout shas, under the rubric of nedarim and shavuos (vows
> and oaths

An alternative halachic paradigm that could possibly be applicable is that
of tnai.  The concept of tnai is usually discussed in connection with
kiddushin or gerushin, and it involves eg a man saying to a woman that she
shall be mekadesh to him on condition that "X", where X is something like,
he receives a million dollars, or he is a tzadik or he will fly to the moon
or whatever.  There is a fair amount of discussion regarding the correct
language that needs to be used in such a case, and what if the tnai is not
possible, but that is not really important here.  What is important is that
if the tnai is not fulfilled, the underlying "transaction" (I can't think of
the correct term, but what I mean by this is the kiddushin or the gerushin)
falls apart.  In that sense, the way KOM is usually understood (and as you
have articulated it) appears to resemble a tnai on the giur.  That is, the
convert says, or is deemed to have said (or is required to say), I convert
on condition that I accept that I am obligated that I keep the mitzvoth -
and then if he does not accept the mitzvot, the giur is never chal.  This
fits rather better with what you quote as your father's view that if the
person at some later time did accept the mitzvoth, the giur would be chal at
that time, than what appears to be the more common view in circulation at
the moment that conversions can be completely invalidated by showing that
the person was not immediately after the conversion, shomer mitzvos.  It is
also very difficult to fit with a katan.

I suspect that this may be the way Rav Goren understood it, because he (and
I believe battei din following him) have imposed what appear to be other
forms of tnai on conversions (such as the conversion is invalid if you ever
leave Eretz Yisroel).

The question though, if you do hold that KOM is a form of tnai on the giur,
the question is, who imposed it, is it intrinsic, is it something imposed by
the Chachamim, or is a common practice generally imposed by batei dinim (for
understandable reasons), but which technically, if not imposed, does not
invalidate the giur but in fact arguably would make the giur a more complete
giur.

And as I have indicated, the intrinsic argument is difficult, because then
the codes really ought to say: the requirements for giur are: a) mila; b)
tevila; c) korban and d) KOM (not necessarily in that order).  Even if it
was a rabbinic requirement, learnt out from Bechoros 30b, one would have
expected it to be listed in the codes as one of the necessary elements.
That is, trying to leave aside the politics, the textual difficulty.  People
are so convinced that KOM is an intrinsic requirement, that they keep trying
to read the sources as saying that.  But the language one would expect to
see in such a case is just not there.  And that is what makes this tricky. 


Regards

Chana