[Avodah] Geirut

[Chana Luntz]

RAF writes:

> The majority of posqim - e.g., those who require KOM even 
> bedi'avad, would say that, based on how the Talmud explains 'Ameikh
'Ami 
> vE-lohayikh E-lohai, that you cannot meaningfully separate between the
two. To be a Jew 
> is to be a bar 'hiayuva, and you cannot at once meaningfully state
that 
> you want to become(or for a qatan "have become") Jewish and yet refuse

> teh 'ol mitzvot.

The question here seems to be though not quite as you have stated, and I
think this is the heart of the dispute - ie whether refusing the ol
mitzvos mean that the whole statement of wanting to become Jewish is
meaningless, or is it that the statement of refusing ol mitzvos is
meaningless - because it is not possible.  There is also the question of
the terminology at stake. If you take the statement "I want to become
Jewish but not be obligated in the mitzvos" - that last part is an
impossibility, given the first part, so do we ignore the last part, and
keep the first part, or do we knock out the whole statement as not
meaningful because it is contradictory.  And what if the statement is "I
want to become Jewish and not keep the mitzvos" (but nothing about
obligation)?  Is that too an impossibility and meaningless, despite the
fact that the reality of that is lived by secular Jews every day?  What
if the person said explicitly "I want to become Jewish and I want to
have the same olam haba as my non frum Jewish friends" - ie accepting
that there is an obligation, and there may well be din v'cheshbon on
this, but willing to take the same chances as the non Jewish friends. 

The case of the katan though is different, because at no stage does the
katan necessarily even state he wants to become Jewish.  At most he
seems to have the option to reject the whole package - Jewish plus ol
mitzvot.  So if he does nothing, what happens? Even if you hold that you
cannot halachically separate between the two, that does not necessarily
mean that you rule him not Jewish.  The other alternative is that you
rule him Jewish but still a bar hiyuva, whatever he says - in exactly
the same way you do for a born Jew - who can wander around refusing the
ol mitzvot as much as he likes, it don't help any.  In the words of the
gemora (Nedarim 8a) v'halo mushba v'omed m'Har Sinai hu - we are deemed
to be sworn to keep the mitzvos from the time of Har Sinai, and because
of this we *can't* in reality go swearing to keep mitzvos now, even if
we want to, because ain shavuah chal al shavuah.  Similarly, we can't go
resiling from the obligation to keep mitzvos now.  Neither, according to
this view, can the now grown up katan - the only thing he can do is
reject everything, and even that he cannot do once he has done something
that indicates that he is behaving like a Jew - ol mitzvos comes whether
he wants it or not, just like for us.

> But I am not convinced that coming to your bar mitzva service 
> in a car and  having announced a "qidush" in a seafood venue where the

> child will toast to  lobster doesn't sound like a convincing form of
being 
> passive. The actions scream "I don't want 'ol mitzvot."

They may do, as do the actions of those of all of his born Jewish
friends who are doing exactly the same thing.  Those Jews don't want ol
mitzvot either.  They got it whether they like it or not.  Is the fact
that this boy is entitled to protest and walk away from the whole Jewish
thing mean that if he doesn't, that decision is imposed upon him, when
what he really wants is to be like all of his Jewish friends (ie a
sinning Jew)?  The sources really don't seem to read like that.

> Kind regards,
> -- 
> Arie Folger

And then RMB writes:

> The usual case of apitropos is management of a yerushah on 
> behalf of qetanim. (At least I imagine it's the most common.) 
> This includes being a maqneh, even though the qatan's lack of 
> da'as bars him from giving up ba'alus if he were doing it himself.

Yes, and that is why the explanation given by Tosphos to allow this is
hefker beis din hefker.  But the apitropos isn't your (RMB's) argument -
because you were arguing that KOM takes place once the katan reaches
gadlus.  The likening to an apitropos has the apitropos doing the KOM in
place of the katan, thus fulfilling the perceived technical requirement
to have KOM as a condition for gerus, despite it not actually being done
by the katan.  I don't think there is a case of an apitropos being able
to substitute for daas of the katan in this way.  I like you believe
that the usual case of the apitropos is in relation to property, and
hence hefker beis din hefker covers the field, but I am interested to
know if somebody can think of another case more similar to this one,
where hefker beis din hefker does not work, and yet we substitute for
the katan's daas.  The only one I can think of is the marrying off of
the minor girl, and that is not allowed by an apitropos.

>
> KOM is a mandatory part of geirus. 

This is precisely the issue under discussion.  Is it?  There is
definitely one way to read the sources which makes it that (at least for
adults, I think reading it that way for katanim is much more difficult -
you really have to read in something that is not there and insist on a
positive where there is just a negative) - which is what you bring.
That is not the question.  The question is, is there an alternative way
of reading the sources which suggests that KOM is not a mandatory part
of geirus.  If there is, then we have an eilu v'eilu situation.  Now I
am never going to sit on a Beis Din, much less one that accepts
converts, so "where I am going" as RYG puts it, is not exactly relevant.
The question is, is it just as legitimate a reading of the sources to
say that KOM is not a mandatory part of geirus.  Obviously, as RYG
brings, the Rashba is able to read the sources in this way, so it cannot
be so completely out of left field to do so vis a vis the gemora.  But
one rishon does not halacha make - so the real question is do the codes
etc allow for this reading?  If they do, then it is not surprising that
there are those who will hold that this is the correct reading, rather
than  yours.

> The pragmatic issues:
> 
> 1- We can't measure qabbalas ol mitzvos. After all, it's 
> devarim shebaleiv

Well this gets us into what I think is an even more complicated issue.
If KOM exists as a halachic requirement - what *is* it.  Is it, as you
say devarim shebaleiv?  But halachically, as you know, devarim shebaleiv
aino devarim - they just don't really count for anything.  And suddenly
you are saying that devarim shebalev, which are discounted all the way
through halacha as having real halachic impact, suddenly do so in this
case?  That seems a really difficult understanding to have.

Thinking about it last night seems to me that an understanding more
consonant with halacha as we know it, would be to understand KOM as a
form of shavuah.  After all, we have an explicit gemora that tells us
that we are bound by a shavuah made at Har Sinai, and that is why *we*
cannot make a real shavuah to perform the mitzvos, because ain shavuah
chal al shavuah, we can at most make a pseudo shavuah to further
motivate ourselves.  So, given that our original KOM on Har Sinai was a
form of shavuah, mustn't that be what this is? And surely along with a
shavuah, which is treated as a form of action rather than d'varim
shebalev, must surely come kavana (if I sleeptalk, surely I am not
making a valid shavuah, not matter what I say, am I?)

If you do not hold KOM is a requirement, but rather all that is needed
is a desire to join the Jewish people, then presumably what you hold is
that once the person joins the Jewish people, they are bound by that
original shavuah on Har Sinai (whether they want to or not) and hence
are obligated in mitzvos.  That is why you need at the very least to
warn them that is what they are getting themselves into (at the extreme
if they were not at least made aware, then maybe they can argue taus or
some such, - you presumably can't say matir shavuah for the on way back
at Har Sinai).  But while affirming that obligation may be a good thing
to do, for precisely Rav Gidel's reasoning on Nedarim 8a "l'zarize
nafshe", and since of course Beis Din are keen for people to tend toward
zarizus, they ought to make them do this - actually it does not
accomplish anything except chinuch, since ain shavuah chal al shavuah,
ie - so long as they genuinely join the Jewish people, they are bound by
the mitzvos whether they want to be or not - as this comes along with
that.

On the other hand, if you do hold KOM is a requirement, does that mean
that you hold that the ger is *not* bound by the shavuah made on Har
Sinai (which makes a certain degree of sense, because as a goy he was
clearly not), and hence he had to enter into his own shavuah?  But
assuming he made the shavuah before he became a ger, does that mean that
the one made on Har Sinai is not chal?  Or if he makes the shavuah after
he becomes a ger, why does KOM carry any meaning at all, he is bound by
the same obligation all of the rest of us are?  If we cannot make a
shavuah to keep mitzvos, why can he? Because he does it at the same time
that the one from Har Sinai is chal with respect to him? Would there be
halacha l'ma'ase implications for this. If a ger, having made a valid
KOM then violates the mitzvos, is he chayav for a korban for violation
of shavuah as well as whatever the penalty is for whatever violation he
has committed?  If not, why not?

But then even if you require KOM as a requirement, and would reject
anybody who came along and said they were accepting the mitzvos except
for one (based on Bechoros 30b), because that is not a valid form of the
necessary shavuah for KOM (for which you need some form of na'aseh
v'nishma, presumably) - they you still might hold a conversion valid if
they were subsequently found to be lying - in the same way that a
shavuah is chal and the person is liable for a korban if they are
actually lying (that is one of the classic cases of shavuah, is it not -
they said I did not eat, and they did).

Dunno, but this is why I find the whole concept of KOM, that you seem to
swim through so easily, so messy and complicated.  Can somebody give me
another paradigm for KOM that is not a shavuah and not devarim shebelev?

> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha

Regards

Chana