[Avodah] Pisuq raglayim

[Chana Luntz]

RMB writes:

> Just to start at the beginning. We discussed pisuq raglayim 
> back in volume 2, v2n157 - n160. Take a look at
> <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol02/v02n155.shtml#01>, where 
> RYGB raises the question of pisuq raglayim and men, and the
conversation that 
> ensued at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=P#PISUK%20
> RAGLAIM>, and the subsequent two entries in the topic index.

I don't think I was involved in that conversation, but I have had a look
at it.

You bring:

> RYZirkind found Rashi in Pesachim 3a "lashon neqi'ah", which 
> speaks of the issur of women taking harchovas haposi'os. A different
problem that is
> somewhat related. But at least shifts the kohein's precedent 
> to a question of women.
> 

I am a bit confused by this reference.

The Gemora at the beginning of Pesachim (actually 3a-3b) is discussing
the attribute to use "nice" language in preference to not such nice
language (the example that is given that starts off the discussion is a
pasuk where the term "anno tahora" [is not pure] is used in preference
to using the term tamei or inpure, even though it would be shorter to
use the term tamei.  From this the Gemora learns that one should use
nice terms, such as tahor, or ano tahor, rather than tamei.

The Gemora then moves on to other examples where we learn that it is
better to use nice terminology rather than not such nice terminology.
And the example is brought where in the case of a man (in the particular
context a zav) the term used is "to ride", while the second half which
refers to a woman (a zava) the term used is "to sit".

Now the Gemora itself does not explain why it is not nice to refer to a
woman as riding, but only as sitting, but a number of commentaries
(including Rashi) that it is not nice to recall riding in a woman
because when one rides, there is "pisuk raglaim".

The Gemora then goes on to question the whole assumption that one does
not use the term ride when referring to a woman, and brings several
psukim to show that in fact one does.  The first is by Rivka and her
handmaidens, but the Gemora explains that this is because we are dealing
with camels.  Again, the Gemora does not explain why camels are
different, but Rashi explains that this is because of how high camels
are, and because of the fear of falling, women do tend to ride so they
can hang on with hands and feet. But at the very least the inference one
must derive from this is that for camels, pisuk reglaim is OK, so at the
very least some circumstances involving pisuk reglaim are OK, even
according to Rashi.

The Gemora then brings a second pasuk that refers to women riding, when
it refers to Moshe and his wife and his sons riding down to Mitzraim,
but rejects that as a proof on the grounds that most of the riding
reference goes on the sons, not on Zipporah.

The Gemora then brings a third pasuk which refers to Avigail riding on
her donkey when she goes off to meet Dovid (soon to be) HaMelech, but
argues that this is an exception as well, for several reasons.

Now there are two ways to try and understand this Gemora.  The first is
that this is no commentary on women riding or not riding, but only on
whether it is nice to talk about it (in the same way as there are tamei
animals out there, it is just whether there is a problem talking about
them). The second is that if there is a problem even talking about women
riding, then even more so there must be a problem with them actually
riding (or, if you accept that the problem is pisuk raglaim, then
possibly there is a problem with any sort of pisuk raglaim).

Now the second understanding would make a lot of sense from what is
written in the Gemora here - especially given the reasons why the Gemora
suggested that the Torah used the term ride when discussing Rivkah and
Avigail, which seemed to suggest that riding (and hence separating the
legs) was an unusual activity, engaged in only by women in extreme
circumstances.  However, there are some problems with this even in the
discussion itself.  If it was such a problem for women to ride, then why
did Avraham Avinu send camels knowing that his future daughter in law
was going to be riding back on them and surely she, as a modest girl,
should have refused to go until more modest transport was provided (and
I am surprised Lavan etc did not use that as an excuse why she should
not go altogether).  However this problem can be surmounted if in fact
camels were the only way of getting there and back (although that rather
seems unlikely - Ya'akov seems to have managed to go there and back
without camels) (The question about Avigail is much easier, as there was
pikuach nefesh issues involved, so you could understand that, in such
circumstances, modesty would need to be pushed aside).

However a more fundamental problem that I have with this second reading
is that it appears to be contradicted by the Gemora in
Baba Meztia 9b - something that, unlike what has been described above,
seems to be brought down in halacha.  The Gemora in Baba Meztia is
describing when one can make a kinyan [acquire] an animal, and
specifically whether riding on an animal is a way that one can make a
kinyan on an animal.  And the Gemora holds that it depends on how people
generally make a kinyan (ie the common custom) and that the custom is
that if one rides in the field, one is koneh the animal, but not if one
rides in the city, because the custom is for men to ride in the field,
but not in the city.  However, if one is an adam chasuv [important
person], or one is a woman, then one is koneh even in the city because
the custom is for them to ride even in the city. Rashi explains that in
the case of a woman, this is because she is not so strong, so it is the
derech [way] of a woman to ride even in the city, because otherwise the
animal might get away from her (BTW although this is there in the Rashi
at the side of our shas, it is even clearer in the girsa of Rashi
brought by the Magid Mishna). This halacha about how one (or
specifically a woman) can make a kinyan on an animal is brought down
l'halacha by both the Rambam in hilchot mechira perek 2, halacha 10 and
Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat siman 197 si'if 5).

So - what this last halacha seems to be suggesting is that it is
customary for women to ride, including among lots and lots of people
(that is why, by the way, that men generally don't ride in the city, it
is too crowded with people) and it would seem slightly odd, to say the
least, if the halacha was that women were customarily acquiring animals
by means of something that was immodest and which they should not be
doing, and that the halacha should give the nod to this without even
commenting on this fact.

So what does that do for this gemora in Pesachim.  One option is that we
do not posken like the gemora in Pesachim (that seems to be true for the
general sugya, in the sense that the gemora concludes that if there is a
contradiction between speaking in learning by the most short and direct
route, and the one that is "nicer" one should go for the short version).
Alternative, we could go back to the idea that the Gemora is not
objecting to riding by women (and if you follow Rashi and the other
commentators that the hava mina was pasuk raglayim, then to pasuk
raglayim) just the use of the terminology when it was not necessary.

> So, what needs justification isn't why women can't wear  pants,

And note that this involves yet another intellectual leap, from riding
to wearing of pants.  Rashi appears to raise the question of pisuk
raglayim vis a vis riding - where it is clear that the legs have to be
pushed quite wide apart to fit on either side of the animal. Even if you
say that the gemora is banning riding except in unusual circumstances,
and you push off the proof from Baba Basra that I just brought, all you
have is, at most, a halacha banning riding - or at most, a halacha
banning an activity that involves pushing the legs quite widely apart so
they are straddling something.  You then have to go further and say that
the ability to see the two legs constituted by the wearing of pants is
the same thing as riding.  I don't see where you see this in Rashi, or
elsewhere for that matter.

So while the statement "Pisuq ragalayim isn't a modern invention. It's
das Moshe, Sinaitic, assur" might indeed be considered true when you
look at the reference to it found in Yechzkel 16:25 - to make this as a
catagorical statement about the wearing of pants based on this Rashi
when there appear to be three hurdles to overcome a) that the gemora is
talking about actually riding not speaking; b) that we posken like the
gemora in Brochas rather than the gemora in Baba Metzia; and c) that
wearing pants is in the same category as riding, seems some what
imprudent.

Hilchot tzniut are, like everything else, a part of halacha.  The same
potential issues regarding bal tosif must surely apply there as well as
elsewhere.  And precisely the same risks that come with being mosif
apply here as elsewhere - one of which of course is that if you claim
the mutar is assur, people will not take you seriously when you try and
claim that the assur is indeed assur (that being precisely the lesson
that the gemora in Sanhedrin learns from Chava and the pri eitz hadaas).


> Tir'u baTov!
> -mi

Regards

Chana