[Avodah] losing 'nishba' status

[Meir Shinnar]

> We've argued here before whether TsN is only about a lack of information,
> or also includes someone who knows the halakhah, but was raised with a
> bias against believing it's real and binding on them. The CI's ruling about
> lo maaleh velo morid indicates the latter, even though he was only talking
> about a specific and chamur context -- that the person isn't a rasha in
> terms of hatzalas nefashos.
>
>
>
> R Dr Meir Shinnar, OTOH, tend to invoke the Radbaz (4:187), who olds
> that someone who is led to believing apiqursus because of clear reasoning
> from faulty assumptions, is not an apiqoreis. E.g. the thread at
> <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah
I think that there are several different issues conflated here.
1) Does TsN status apply only to those without any knowledge, or also
to those who have a bias against the knowledge?
One of the issues that arises is that the classical literature assumes
that public lack of practice (eg mehallel shabbat befarhesya) was
associated with an act of rebellion against the torah and community,
as distinct from just personal weakness (mumar leteavon) - but
therefore, has no good category for modern nonobservance - those who
are not rebelling, just don't think it applies to them or their
circumstances (I think it is the binyan tzion who talks about people
making kiddush and then going to work on shabbat - very different in
character from a classical mehallel shabbat befarhesya...)
The closest classical construct that exists is Tinok shenishba - but
the question is how far to extend it.
BTW, My understanding of the CI is somewhat more expansive, even
though the specific issue answered is as Micha says- because his
reasoning is that he views general culture to be so pervasive that we
are all "nishba" by it.  This used to be the standard understanding...

2) Is the TsN, even though technically not hayav, still has a shem rasha?
Here, I and RYGB had a debate - he cite sources calling them still a
rasha, while I cited Rav Hutner (Pahad Yitzhak on Pesach) that the
tinok shenishba does not have a shem rasha.

3) Is epikorsut defined by belief or by the reason for belief (eg, an
element of rebellion)
Many use the term nebbich epikorus for those who have problematic
beliefs due to general upbringing, but the radbaz I cite (4:187) is
clear that wrong beliefs due to error (rather than rebellion) do not
make one a kofer. (BTW, the same radbaz is also crystal clear that
notions of kfira do not evolve over time - that something that was
acceptable in the past remains acceptable, another major point of
contention) - and the radbaz wold therefore drastically limit who we
would call an epikorus.

Meir Shinnar