[Avodah] What if Hashem commanded something I find immoral?

[Micha Berger]

On Tue, May 04, 2010 at 09:11:42AM +0100, R Alan Rubin asked the members
of Areivim whether:
: They do whatever they regard as the ratzon Hashem because they are
: avadim of Hashem and they do what ever Hashem asks without
: consideration of whether it is good or evil.

: or
: Whatever Hashem asks must - by definition be good. Hashem chooses it
: and thereby defines it as good

: or
: There is a prior standard of good and evil but we might not understand
: what that is.

: or some other explanantion...

You're restating Euthyphro's Dilemma (from Plato's Euthyphro). Search
Avodah's archive for the word Euthyphro. Also, look for "Divine Command
Theory" a/k/a DCT.

The title of this subject line "what if..." is somewhat understated,
since many of us actually have to grapple with this question WRT mechias
zeikher Amaleiq.

See also <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2007/05/hashem-and-morality.shtml>
where I conclude:
    So yes, HQBH did choose good vs evil without being subject to
    external constraint, and yet still the choice was not arbitrary.
    Socrates gave Euthyphro a false dichotomy -- there was a third
    choice. Hashem has a reason, but that reason wasn't conforming
    to a preexisting morality.

    G-d created us because He could only bestow good if there is
    someone to receive that good. That is our individual purpose,
    to make ourselves into utensils, receptacles for emanations of
    Divine Good. ... Given that personal purpose, the definition of
    "tov" feeds directly into a "spiritual health" model of reward and
    punishment. Oneshim are the product of not being proper keilim for
    shefa, and therefore one is incapable of receiving the sechar. It's
    not that the sechar is being withheld -- the problem is with the
    reception....

So, Good isn't a "prior standard" nor "whatever Hashem asks" (the
latter being DCT). It's consequential to the question "Why did Hashem
create?"

And in <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2009/08/divine-command-theory.shtml>
I added observations about how maamarim about taamei hamitzvos relate to
our question. After all, within DCT, what does "taam hamitzvah" even
mean?

    The Rambam (Guide III) uses these two quotes to show that while
    mitzvos in the large have reasons, the details are often arbitrary.
    We needed a rite to elevate how we kill animals, that's more
    significant than what the rite is. If Hashem  said that we should
    shecht from the back of the neck we could ask why not the front? Or
    had he told us to take a pepper on Sukkos, we could ask why not an
    esrog?
    ...
    The Ramban argues that it's a decree on us because shiluach haqen
    is about developing our compassion, not an expression of Hashem's.
    This is reading the Bereishis Rabba, which explicitly says the
    difference in how one slaughters for the sake of our middos, back
    into the gemara in Megillah. I would say the Ramban is also
    leshitaso. His whole concept of "qadeish es atzmekha bema shemutar
    lakh" means that there is a definition of sanctity that goes beyond
    that which was specifically commanded. That there is an underlying
    set of values behind halakhah that we are supposed to be developing
    in ourselves.
    ...
    According to the Maharal, mitzvos are decrees, causeless. Hashem
    then created a universe and people such that "derakheha darkhei
    no'am". It's not that Hashem wishes us to be rachanim that He told
    us to send away the mother bird, but rather because He commanded us
    to send her away, Hashem made it so such behavior would have results
    that are ne'imos (pleasant). Without explicitly invoking the Zohar
    ["hitakei beOraisa ubarei alma"], the Maharal presumes it in his
    answer.

Whereas I first suggested that morality was consequential to Divine
Purpose, in the second post I note the Maharal basically saying DCT but
removing it from the realm of arbitrary because we ourselves are made to
fit the moral law. So given people being people and the universe being
the universe, DCT yeilds derakheha darkhei no'am. What is no'am is a
consequence of halakhah, not the other way around. "Hitakeil beOraisa
ubarei alma."

And the following idea fits either version
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2009/05/morality-n-halakhah.shtml>:
    One can accordingly translate Hillel's famous words to the prospective
    ger, "That which you would loathe [if in their shoes] don't do to
    others. Now go and learn" into "All of the Torah is an elaboration of
    natural morality. However, you would never figure out how to reach the
    right conclusions from those principles unless you go study Torah."

    It's like saying that all of biology is inherent in Physics. Even
    that said, you would never be able to derive biology on your own. If
    we were to rely on our ability to build the system ourselves from
    the first principles we would quickly exceed human capacity; errors
    would necessarily be made That's the role of halakhah, to allow us
    to work with notions closer to our question than the basic moral
    principle from which they derive.

In that post I also note that:
    "[B]e holy, for I am Holy" which the Ramban famously tells us is
    an obligation not to be "disgusting with [what would otherwise be]
    the permission of the Torah". By definition, the Ramban assumes
    there is a definition of "disgusting" that isn't defined by halachic
    process. Or "and you shall do hayashar vehatov -- the upright and
    the good". Qedushah, yosher and tov are treated as givens, that a
    person is expected to know what they are before one can even begin
    to explore the halachic mandate.

The Rambam advocates natural morality in the Moreh 1:54, quoting
Friedlander's translation:
    The words "all my goodness" imply that God promised to show [Moshe,
    while in the cleft of the rock, in Ki Sisa -micha] the whole creation,
    concerning which it has been stated, "And God saw everything that
    he had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Gen. i. 31); when I say
    "to show him the whole creation," I mean to imply that God promised to
    make him comprehend the nature of all things, their relation to each
    other, and the way they are governed by God both in reference to the
    universe as a whole and to each creature in particular. This knowledge
    is referred to when we are told of Moses," he is firmly established
    in all mine house" (Num. xii. 7); that is, "his knowledge of all
    the creatures in My universe is correct and firmly established";
    for false opinions are not firmly established. Consequently the
    knowledge of the works of God is the knowledge of His attributes, by
    which He can be known. The fact that God promised Moses to give him a
    knowledge of His works, may be inferred from the circumstance that God
    taught him such attributes as refer exclusively to His works, viz.,
    "merciful and gracious, longsuffering and abundant in goodness," etc.,
    (Exod. xxxiv. 6). It is therefore clear that the ways which Moses
    wished to know, and which God taught him, are the actions emanating
    from God. Our Sages call them middoth (qualities), and speak of the
    thirteen middoth of God (Talm. B. Rosh ha-shanah, p. 17b)...

According to the Rambam, knowing how G-d made things relate to each
other is the basis of understanding His Moral code.

(In all 3 cases, interested parties would make my life easier by checking
the links rather than rely on these excerpts. Otherwise, you're bound
to ask me questions already addressed on-blog.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 35th day, which is
micha at aishdas.org        5 weeks in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Malchus sheb'Hod: What is soul-like about
Fax: (270) 514-1507                  submission, and how is it glorious?