[Avodah] childbirth

[Chana Luntz]

RET writes:

> 1. In fact many commentaries say there is a difference between
> childbirth and other sakkanot in terms of shabbat. For other pikuach 
> nefesh we override shabbat and one can do whatever is necessary without 
> hesitation. However, for childbirth one is required to start with the 
> least problematical work (ha-kal ha-kal techila)
> The reason given is that childbirth is a natural danger

I must say I am not sure I understand what is meant by a "natural danger"?
Is a tsunami (as opposed to a terrorist) a natural danger?  How about
cancer?  Both are not caused by human beings (as opposed to the case of
terrorism, for example).

> 2. In the medical shiurim of R. Zilberstein he has several times dealt
> with the question whether a woman can get pregnant when she has a serious
> disease that the pregnancy will aggravate even to the point of pikuach 
> nefesh. His standard answer is that the woman is not required to but is 
> allowed to get pregnant if she wishes. Her desire for children
> overrides putting herself into danger.

The Tzitz Eliezer poskens similarly.  However, in that case, the woman has
been appraised of the risks, and decides that she has an overwhelming desire
to have children.

But what if her desire is not so clear?  If she is ambivalent about getting
pregnant (or about getting pregnant again)?  And how about the husband?
What gives him the right to assume that the woman has an overriding desire
to have children (without an extensive discussion about it)?

> Though he does not mention it a  similar situation occurs when one's job 
> entails danger that we pasken that can is allowed to take on a dangerous 
> profession, eg Nodah BeYehuda allows one to become a hunter (he has side 
> problems that are not relevant here).

Is there anybody however who holds that after entering a dangerous
profession, one is then locked into that profession and cannot cease to do
it if one decides the risks are not worth it?

But that is not exactly what happens with women, and even if you say that
she chose to enter the "dangerous profession" by getting married, she has no
choice about staying married (gitten not being within her control), and only
limited choice about having relations (moredet etc).  

What about apprising the person of the risks before entering the dangerous
profession, is there any obligation to spell out to somebody considering a
dangerous profession precisely the dangers?  Could one be considered to be
over on dam re'echa if one knew how dangerous a profession was and at least
did not let the person know?  Would this not be true even if one knew that
their desire was strongly for this profession (they had a hunger for the
hunt, let us say)?

And yet counselling for women on the risks of getting pregnant at the pre
chuppah stage (or any other stage) are non existent.  

> 3. Do we assume  Rachel Immenu violated one of the 3 sins that cause
> death in childbirth. More generally there were many righteous women who 
> dies in childbirth throughout the ages. It was in fact one of the major 
> causes of death for women in the middle ages.
> Do we assume they were all violating niddah, challah or candle lighting?

Your question is not on me, it is on the simple language of RMF's teshuva.
I agree with you, which is why I felt it was impossible to reconcile the
simple words of RMF's teshuva with the reality.

However I felt it more clear cut to bring a straightforward Shulchan Aruch
that proofs such as you bring above.  After all, Rachel Imanu, according to
many did die due to some sort of sin (even if it was not, in her case, that
of the three mentioned in the Mishna), so it is not really a good
counterproof to the simple reading of RMF's teshuva.

The wording of RMF's teshuva is extremely difficult to reconcile.

RDE then suggests:

>A possible resolution of the apparent contradiction is the fact that Rav
>Moshe was addresssing the issue of induced labor. He is simply saying that
>induced labor is dangerous relative to natural labor and therefore
>shouldn't be done for the sake of convenience.

The problem with that interpretation is the force of the language contained
in the original teshuva.  I quote again from RDE's fine translation:

> because childbirth in its natural time in the natural way is not 
> considered a danger at all. Since G-d created the world to be fruitful 
> and multiply, there is no question that he created it that it should 
> be for beracha and not for danger. Furthermore He commanded the 
> obligation to have children. It is not logical that there would be a 
> command to place one's self in danger in order to fulfil the mitzva of 
> having children. Especially since women don't even have a mitzva to 
> have children that we would say that the Torah is giving them the 
> option of placing themselves in danger in order to have children.. We 
> must conclude that there is absolutely no danger in childbirth at all. 
> That mean that G-d promised that there would never be danger in 
> childbirth.

That does not at all sound like a description provided merely to explain
that induced labour is dangerous relative to natural labour.  What is
written here explicitly is that it is not logical that there be a command to
place oneself in *any* danger, especially since women don't even have the
mitzvah to have children.  Hence G-d *must* have promised that there would
never be any danger in childbirth.

That seems pretty clear cut and unequivocal.  The logic makes sense.  The
only problem is a) the statistics don't bear him out, as RTK brings (as well
as RET's anecdotal references to righteous women); and b) the halacha states
flatly that this is not the case, and that a woman in childbirth is to be
considered a chola sheyesh bo sakana and shabbas must be violated.  If the
simple straightforward reading of Rav Moshe were right, however, one should
surely be relying on the promise of HKBH that there would never be danger in
childbirth *at all* and not violate shabbas, should one not?

The wording of the teshuva, to my mind, is extremely problematic and
difficult to explain. The second teshuva helps, by seeming to resile from
the clear cut language of the first teshuva, but even that does not seem
that easy to explain.  And I am not sure RDE's attempted reconciliation
fully deals with the problem.

On the other hand, if one disagrees with Rav Moshe, then one does come up
against his questions. How could HKBH have commanded us to place ourselves
in danger?  How could he have instituted an obligation to have children?
How in particular could this be something undertaken by women who have no
mitzvah?  The questions are all piercing fundamental questions, and if the
answers he appears to give appear problematic, then so too do the implicit
answers of anybody who holds differently.

> --
> Eli Turkel

Regards

Chana