[Avodah] Some thoughts on Shemonah Perakim

[Micha Berger]

On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 06:42:08AM -0400, Cantor Wolberg wrote:
: "Rabbis Berkovits and Isidore Epstein say similarly, saying that  
: kashrut trains one in self-control."
: 
: Unfortunately, the facts do not support the above statement...

I think it's more accurate to say it gives one the tools with which to
develop self control. Water is a frequently used metaphor for water.
As the Gra notes, if you water a flower garden you get nice beautiful
flowers. But if you start out with field of weeds, all you get are
bigger weeds.

This goes to the core of my objection with this tendency among some
in "Academic O" (as RYGB calls the subtype of MO) circles to consider
halakhah a law with little or no motivational basis.

RSRH consider halakhah as educational. RYS as tools for transformation.
For that matter, the Litvisher yeshivos did as well, but the other side
of the mussar debate presumed the transformation happened mystically.
To mequbalim, halakhah are rules for coping with metaphysical realities.
AMong them, one's own composition, thus having a different transformative
role. Temimus vs deveiqus.

This notion that it's primarily to be viewed as contract law is new,
whether in its AO or "Rambamist" forms. Although the Rambam himself
dedicates half of the Moreh cheileq 3 to an opposing viewpoint, it's
clearly the stance of people like R' Chait.

Halakhah is a tool, and without trying to live up to the values spelled
out in aggadita, the tool is easily misused.

On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 09:27pm IST, Michael Makovi expressed this
clearly:
: Kaplan disagrees; chapter four already taught us that the non-rational
: commands of the Torah serve as practical instruments to bring us to
: the Mean. Therefore, following G-d's heteronomous command in this case
: is not because we are to develop obedience to His inscrutable will as
: a value in and of itself, but rather, because these commands only
: indirectly affect the moral virtue, whereas the rational commands
: directly relate to moral virtue. Obeying G-d's command for the sake of
: obedience has little if any value for Rambam....

: Thus, Rambam shows that virtue is to be exalted over obedience; the
: ultimate value is rational virtue, followed by moral virtue, and
: obedience has value only insofar as it leads to these.

Because the Rambam followed Aristo's psychology, which stresses mind
influencing emotion. Today's psychologies -- both in mussar and in
the field of Psychology and confirmed pretty easily with a little
introspection -- note a stronger connection in the other direction,
people believing what they are emotionally invested in believing.

Change in middos through change in thought is slow, inefficient and
unreliable.

: I am inclined to follow the philosophy of Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, as
: expounded by David Hazony in "Why Judaism Has Laws", in Azure
: magazine: Judaism, says Rabbi Berkovits, extols the practical
: sociological effect of the deed over the intent of the performer.

: Whether or not one is charitable in his heart is less important than
: whether he actually helps the poor. This is almost the exact opposite
: of Rambam, who extolled virtue over obedience...

To my mind, it's not an issue of the value of virtue but whether a given
halakhah is an expression of a vitue, or a tool for instilling it. In
boh cases, though, it's not obedience as an end in itself.

And therefore, I disagree with:
:                                          So while Rambam says virtue
: is greater than obedience, I'd say the opposite, BUT, I'd say that
: virtue is still a value, and hopefully, in the end, the moral virtue
: will catch up to one's deed...

Both the Rambam and your depiction of REB's position are about mitzvos
as a means to instill virtue more than expression. I see no debate.

And if I did, given what I wrote above about the lack of classical support
for a notion of halakhah-as-obedience, I would not rest comfortably with
it. Also, as we saw from the overweight rabbi, pragmatically it raises
more questions than it answers.

...
: Another comment: we are brought to the vexed question of why G-d
: commanded the rational commands, if they are indeed rational...

No mitzvah is purely rational. As I heard RYBS point out, even "lo
sirtzakh" as elements of choq. Abortion? Euthenasia? Brain death or heart
death? Without G-d's command, the rational mind hits limits at which it
lacks the postulates ("what is 'alive'?") to answer the question.

I think it's clear from Hillel's "el regel achas" that textual morality
flows from natural morality. The need for textual morality is that
sometimes the connection is beyond our ability to derive. In which case,
we're left with a simple trust that somehow parah adumah is an expression
of desani lakh, lechaverkha lo sa'avod. But Hillel says that it really
is connected.

Even those halakhos with no clear connection to morality do have an
unclear connection. Moreso, one can't pasqen in a way that violates
qedoshim tihyu, vehalakhta bidrakhav, veasisa hayashar vehatov... The
development of natural morality is itself subject of numerous chiyuvim.

Mussar excercises are often trivial. Is tzitzis any less effective than an
"A Complaint Free World Bracelet" <http://www.acomplaintfreeworld.org/>,
as seen on Oprah? Character reformation is the work of a lifetime;
it is thus more like whittling. Lots of small incremental actions.

What does it mean to be more in the image of G-d? More free willed (R'
Soloveitchik)? More giving (R' Shim'on Shkop or R' Dessler)? More 
balanced in the image of unity (Rambam Hilkhos Dei'os)? More attached to
him emotionally (Besh"t) or intelletually (Moreh Nevuchim)?

Note that even those opinions who (like I did above) define the goal in
terms of a morality do not say that all of halakhah is an expression of
that morality. Much of it is to create a person capable of being moral.
To impose, not express.

But regardless of what it is following halakhah is supposed to remake
man into, the following apply:
1- It requires many many tiny steps,
2- to the point that it will become total immersion in a culture.
3- Total immersion also requires ameilus baTorah. Study of an easy topic
doesn't force an encounter with the text, and the results are far less
internalized. Once my chavrusah and I get our understanding of the sugya,
we have that pride of ownership; it is *OUR* understanding.
4- The Manufacturer will understand the effects of some of those steps
in ways that we do not know ourselves well enough to comprehend. And in
fact, trusting that this is true is itself a sub-goal.

Gut Voch!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha at aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter