[Avodah] Some thoughts on Shemonah Perakim

[Michael Makovi]

The beginning of R' Micha's post is a valuable one. I think the point
of what he is saying is that while halakhah gives us the tools to
effect ourselves, we ourselves must use the tools properly. Thus,
Ramban says we can be moral wretches even with the Torah's permission.
I think derech eretz kadma latorah means that even though the Torah
tells us what is good and proper, we need to already have the desire
to follow G-d's will and have the basic ethical sense in our
conscience. In real life too, a hammer is helpful only if one uses it
properly, and a VCR manual is useful only if one actually learns it
with the intent of doing what the manufacturer says. Disingenuity will
never cease to corrupt.

But two statements of R' Micha I am too ignorant to understand, and I
wish for him to elaborate: (direct quotes)
1) "This goes to the core of my objection with this tendency among some
in "Academic O" (as RYGB calls the subtype of MO) circles to consider
halakhah a law with little or no motivational basis."
2) "This notion that it's primarily to be viewed as contract law is new,
whether in its AO or "Rambamist" forms. Although the Rambam himself
dedicates half of the Moreh cheileq 3 to an opposing viewpoint, it's
clearly the stance of people like R' Chait."

Also, the following of R' Micha, I request clarification, please:

>To my mind, it's not an issue of the value of virtue but whether a given
> halakhah is an expression of a vitue, or a tool for instilling it. In
>boh cases, though, it's not obedience as an end in itself.
>And therefore, I [R' Micha Berger] disagree with [the following which Mikha'el Makovi said]:
>
>>So while Rambam says virtue
>> is greater than obedience, I'd say the opposite, BUT, I'd say that
>> virtue is still a value, and hopefully, in the end, the moral virtue
>> will catch up to one's deed...
>>Mikha'el Makovi
>
>Both the Rambam and your depiction of REB's position are about mitzvos
>as a means to instill virtue more than expression. I see no debate.
>
>And if I did, given what I wrote above about the lack of classical support
> for a notion of halakhah-as-obedience, I would not rest comfortably with
>it. Also, as we saw from the overweight rabbi, pragmatically it raises
>more questions than it answers.
>
> R' Micha Berger

I do not understand your position.

REB is not speaking of mitzvot instilling virtue; he is saying that
halakhah is concerned with the practical temporal effects of our
deeds, because he sees the purpose of halakhah as effecting a
practical temporal sociological tikkun olam, in the same way which I
have attributed to Rav Hirsch.

Rambam, although I do not claim to fully understand the precise
nuances of his position (given the mind-boggling amount of literature
on his philosophy, I think we that anyone who does make this claim, we
may sentence him to a mental institution), he seems to be saying that
halakhah's purpose is to affect our own personal moral and rational
virtues, whether indirectly (hukim) or directly (mishpatim).

Thus, for REB, the halakhah would most certainly be davka expressing a
value, and more, be attempting to give this value practical worldly
effect. (A caveat: sometimes halakhah is itself behind the Torah's own
internal ethos. If so, then halakhah must itself be updated. But in
the end, halakhah still enshrines the ethic and seeks to give it
practical effect.)

Mikha'el Makovi