[Avodah] Free Will vs. Physics

[Micha Berger]

On Fri, Sep 26, 2008 at 12:35:10PM +0000, kennethgmiller at juno.com wrote:
: R' Micha Berger asked:
:> The first problem is just defining Free Will. What is
:> something that is neither deterministic, reducing people
:> to robots, and not random like a set of dice? We're
:> claiming some middle ground. RMKoppel proves that there
:> are things that are neither describable in algorithms
: > nor random, but what kind of such "middle ground" do we
: > mean in this case? Can we narrow it down enough to know
: > what it is we're trying to prove?

: I think your problem (like in so many other physics questions) lies
: in your choice of the frame of reference. You're only looking at the
: physical world.

Then I really wasn't clear, or perhaps you were misled by the inherited
subject line.

There is nothing in my post about physics, or about whether free will is
possible. My intended topic was just to define the term.

: My approach to this problem is to consider the metaphysical world -- in
: which the neshama resides -- as part of this equation. The neshama makes
: a decision, and interfaces with the physical world via the brain...

I would say the neshamah is the beam of light, and the brain is where
the beam hits the "screen" of olam hazeh and matter.

: one looks only at the physical world, the brain activity *appears*
: to be random. (Random activity on a quantum level does not go against
: deterministic physics.) But in the larger picture, its not really random,
: because it was the causal result of a decision made in another part of
: the system.

Random activity on a quantum level DOES go against a deterministic
physics. Maybe one can say that it's statistically deterministic -- the
odds have to be met, but no one outcomes does.

To explain (hopefully): The law of large numbers means that if you
flip a coin enough times, you're much much more likely to get closer
to 50:50 heads vs tails than a more lopsided distribution. Therefore,
in the large scale, predictability is rarely violated. But it could be.

In fact, because the brain's neural network is basically a system for
magnifying small effects (the eye can see as few as 5 or 6 photons!),
that averaging may not apply. So, which of the coins end up heads can
have macroscopic consequences. IOW, quantum randomnes could change things
on the scale of human behavior.

But you would have to fit the soul-matter relationship into something
in which "half of the coins or so end up heads". It may only be random
to physics, but the probabilities aren't being defied. (Otherwise it
wouldn't look like that kind of random, and we would be defying physics.)

: My problem is not with the determinism of brain neurons, but with the
: determinism of the neshama's decision-making process.

: Consider this: A one-minute-old infant was not crying, and now
: starts to cry. This is not the result of any decision he made, but is
: a reflexive/instinctive reaction to certain influences. Now consider a
: 30-year-old, deciding to get out of bed. This is a very conscious choice,
: based on many varied factors. Somewhere between these two events lies
: the very first time he exercised his free will.

Not a problem according to REED. The nequdas habechirah is a battlefront
that emerges when two desires/goals are in conflict. It is not engaged
in every decision.

The infant could weel have bechirah chafshi in potentia, but since no
decision raises to the level of a conflict that draws conscious attention,
it isn't used in practice. It is only as notions of higher goals and
delayed gratification are taught to the infant that such decisions
come up.

Nothing changes in the structure of the baby's brain or soul aside from
learning, developing a nascent yeitzer hatov. That said, I wish to reask
the question in a different way. (In another 41 lines or so.)



On Fri, Sep 26, 2008 at 05:57:07PM -0400, Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
:> The first problem is just defining Free Will. What is something that is
:> neither deterministic, reducing people to robots, and not random like
:> a set of dice? We're claiming some middle ground. RMKoppel proves that
:> there are things that are neither describable in algorithms nor random,
...
: I think that you are conflating the concepts of 'algorithmic' and
: 'deterministic'.  Something can be noncomputable but perfectly
: deterministic, as Turing showed...

(Actually Turing didn't. What he showed was that there are problems that
aren't computable. He didn't prove there was a machine that could solve
them. Such a machine would be beyond algorithmic, but still deterministic
-- once we say it exists. But my problem is with determinism and
randomness, not really algorithm.)

You are right that I conflated two ideas, but keeping them separate
makes my problem worse. I am bothered by the wider claim, determinism,
not that the brain must be an algorithm. It may mean that RMK's notion
doesn't help me either.

Here's the basic dilemma, in hopefully clearer language.

Say a person is now deciding whether or not to steal a diamond.

If the person's decision is based entirely on a sum of the history of
things he experienced and the nature of his personality (both static and
in its propensities to evolve in various ways), then the soul is
deterministic. If so, his decision is entirely a product of things
beyond the person's control, and why should he be blamable for anything?

If the other element is that it's not fully caused by the outside, then
is free will simply randmoness? That still means a person can't be the
subject of blame or guilt.

Let's posit some internal cause as a third possibility. The person can
be blamed for straling the diamond because his decision was caused by
some factor, a taavah for wealth (or women, or...) not just external,
or initial causes, nor random causelessness. But then we must ask where
that taavah comes from. Wouldn't its origins be subject to the very
same question as the decision itself?

I think this is the question RAM is asking, in a very different form.
Not a question about the decision itself, but about where the shift
occurs
from: a conflict of desires/goals the baby was either
    (1) wired for or
    (2) forced into by experience plus wiring
to: a conflict including a desire the person can be held accountable
for having?

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When memories exceed dreams,
micha at aishdas.org        The end is near.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - Rav Moshe Sherer
Fax: (270) 514-1507