[Avodah] Does God Change his Mind

[Meir Shinnar]

>> RMB
> There is something I'll call the Sinai Culture. Because nisqatnu
> hadoros, in general members of later eras, products of more
> dislocations since Moshe Rabbeinu a"h, have less of it. It's not a
> matter of book knowledge as much as having the perspective, priorities
> and etire gestalt. It's very much a culture, not a library.
>
> The nearest any of us get to recreating that culture is the talmud
> chakham. This is the concept chareidim call "da'as Torah", but the
> basic idea is that Torah study changes how one perceives the world.
> And the notion stands whether or not one buys into the consequences
> chareidim feel da'as Torah implies.
>
> It is from Torah gefeel, not Torah knowledge, that a poseiq draws his
> authority. A guy with an IQ of 180 and a Bar Ilan CD is still not
> qualified to be the poseiq acharon.

You mix up two completely separate issues.  There is a difference  
between psak, and determining truth - and while psak requires a torah  
gefeel, determining the metziut or history are related to truth - not  
psak.
>
> This notion is befeirush in the gemara (20a), nisqatnu hadoros is a
> statement about declining willingness for mesiras nefesh, not
> knowledge. (And in fact, knowledge increased in the span from Rebbe
> until the protagnonists in the gemara -- Rav Papa and his rebbe,
> Abayei.)
>
> See also
> <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2007/02/midgets-on-the-shoulders-of- 
> giants.shtml>
>
> Thus, it takes a certain amount of caution when inserting oneself into
> the question of the authenticity of Zoharic Qabbalah. Knowing data is
> insufficient if one really doesn't have the same instinctive sense of
> what Torah "feels like".
>

The issue of nitkatnu hadorot is actually quite problematic, because  
the earlier we go into the authenticated mesora, the less we have  
zoharic kabbala - and the question becomes how one who believes in  
nitkatnu hadorot can even think of rejecting of viewing as normative  
the position of Rav Hai Gaon on aggadta - the earliest authority to  
state precisely a position on this - and also one of the biggest  
b'aale hamesora...

It is precisely when we go later that there is greater emphasis on  
Zoharic kabbala.....

It is the acceptance of zoharic kabbala that leads to statements such  
as by rav aharon feldman that now that we have the kabbala we know  
better than the rambam - precisely the opposite of nitkatnu hadorot..

>
> On Fri, February 15, 2008 4:01 am, Michael Makovi wrote:
> : You'll also be hard-pressed to find a scholar who accepts that  
> Daniel
> : was not written in the Hashmonean era. I mean only that this defense
> : cuts both ways. If you try to appeal to disputed authorship of an
> : apocryphal(-like) mystical work, you've exposed yourself.
>
> : In any case, I haven't yet found a scholar who can seriously
> : distinguish between Daniel on the other hand, and the other
> : apocryphal/apocalyptic works on the other, without simply  
> resorting to
> : mesorah....
>
> Who cares what scholars think? It's like taking proof from Apocrypha.
> In both cases one may have access to information, but people who know
> the Sinai weltenschaung deemed it irrelevent.
>
> This is a major blunder C inherited/adopted from the Historical
> School. This confusion of academia, where the goal is to know
> something well through staying apart from it, objective, as opposed to
> talmud Torah where the goal is to internalize the study and bedavka
> learn how to understand it from within.
>

This position, IMHO, demeans torah and hashem - because it implies  
that we can't use our objective methods and the reason given us by  
hashem  to study the history within torah.  The issue of the  
relevance of the history within torah, and the factual evidence, to  
torah and spiritual growth in torah may be debated- but to deny that  
some aspects are subject to independent study is to deny a whole  
tradition of torah - and of kabel ha'emet from anyone.

>
> ...
> : Rambam as is well known, was essentially reconciling the science of
> : his day with Torah, much as many do today. So if Aristotle (who  
> could
> : not be wrong) had proved such-and-such about Hashem or the world,  
> then
> : surely the Torah concurs (for how could the Torah contradict that
> : which has been proven?), and so the only thing left to do is show  
> how
> : everything in the Torah agrees with everything proven by Aristotle.
>
> The Rambam did believe that Aristotle could be wrong, and in fact
> rejected his theory on the eternity of matter (as you yourself write
> in the next sentence).
>
> Thus if the Rambam believed the Torah had a position that contradicted
> Aristotle's conclusions, he would assume Aristotle was wrong. That's
> not being questionable because of Greek Philosophy. It's using
> Philosophy to fill in gaps the Torah doesn't spell out.
>

We have had previous discussions on your understanding of the  
rambam,  The rambam viewed truth as monovalent - and therefore two  
different sources of truth must agree - and if they disagree, there  
is a problem with one of them.  As the truth of chazal and the torah  
was not, according to the rambam, stated explicitly but  
allegorically, one could, in general, easily reinterprete the  
presumed viewpoint to be in agreement with truth - but certain things  
were so fundamental that such reinterpretation could not be done -  
and the rambam believed that there could be no intrinsic opposition.   
He never stated his position on what would happen in such a case -  
not because of lack of emuna, but part of his emuna was that such a  
contradiction was not feasible - as god was responsible for both  
nature and torah...- and such a case would mean a radical  
reunderstanding of the nature of torah.

>
> To better address RMM's next point in light of my comments above:
> :>  REB, was far less immersed in the Torah weltenschaung than the
> :> people he was disputing. This is the whole nisqatnu hadoros. REB
> :> might have  nice theories, but his threshold of proof is quite  
> high.
> :> And his invocation of a Torah theology over that of Chazal or the
> :> rishonim smacks of R's call of a return to prophetic Judaism --  
> with
> :> the huge distinction of the claim being mutar WRT aggadita.
>

I would protest against the casual disrespect of a major talmid  
chacham.  Rather than being less immersed in the torah weltanschaung  
that the people he was disputing - WRT his contemporaries, he came  
from a different torah culture - one that, unfortunately is  
disappearing and is no longer recognized by many.  WRT to the  
medieval authorities he was disputing - he came from the same  
weltanschaung - that, now, unfortunately, has also disappeared - that  
allowed free inquiry within the parameters set by chazal - even if it  
led to radically different conclusions......

WRT to nitkatnu hadorot - his point is that with hashkafa, there is a  
radical change in the medieval sources - and we need to go back to  
the original.  One need not agree with his theology to agree that  
there seems to be a major change in hashkafa in medieval sources -  
which seems to be fairly universally accepted - whether the change is  
one os style and elaboration of ideas implicit in the past or actual  
innovation may be debated - but he is hardly the first to suggest  
that much of medieval philosophy took a turn (think of the Gra on the  
rambam...)



> : Again, I would simply say that he was operating on the same sources
> : but had a different philosophical starting point. Medieval Jewish
> : philosophy had a lot of questions never asked by Chazal and a lot of
> : philosophical baggage never regarded by Chazal.
>
> Yes, philosophy created new questions to answer, in addition to giving
> new words with which to answer them. But rishonim knew better than we
> can judge which seams between philosophy and Torah are smooth, and
> which are more forced and artificial.

This is a point over which rishonim - who you say knew better - would  
have strongly disagreed - as they believed that, at least post  
talmudic,the primary issue is the strength of the argument rather  
than the authority of the arguer....Your position of respect for the  
rishonim actually rejects a core tenet of their hashkafa...


Meir Shinnar