[Avodah] Kol B'Ishah and Halachic methodology

[Michael Makovi]

>that the halacha of 'tzarich l'hisracheik min hanashim meod meod' is
>based on a totally different societal basis, one where men and women
by >default were entirely separate, and any contact between the sexes
was >dangerous.  Nowadays, when society is in any case so mixed, I
don't >think the halacha expects me (or wants me) to be anti-social
and davka >avoid sitting at a table where a girl is sitting.

Everything below, I already said, but it was very succinct, and I got
a few of my facts wrong besides. Here is a full presentation:

Rabbi Yehuda Henkin comes to this exact conclusion in his Equality
Lost (Urim: 1999), in chapter nine, "Hirhur and Community Norms". He
asks the question, "Is there halachic justification for the relatively
open interaction between men and women in much of today's Orthodoxy,
and if so, what is it?"

Rabbi Henkin first examines Ketuvot 17a and Berachot 20a, in which two
rabbis justify social intercourse with women on the grounds that they
personally on are such levels that this poses no problem of tzniut or
hirhur for themselves.

Sefer haChinuch 188 says no one today may take such liberties with himself.

But Rabbi Hai Gaon in Rabbenu Yonah to Berachot 25a, Sefer Mitzvot
Katan 30, and the Ritva to the end of Kiddushin, all say that if a man
knows that he himself is on this level, he can permit for himself the
same sorts of acts that the rabbis in the Gemara did.

But this only permits openness for exceptional individuals; what of
societal openness? The Maharshal in his Yam Shel Shlomo to Kiddushin,
4:25, says that if an individual knows that he can overcome his
impulses, he may speak to an ervah and such; he also quotes the Ritva
in full. But he adds, "The whole world relies on this in using the
services of, and speaking to, and looking at, women". Rabbi Henkin
notes that this is in contrast to Ritva, he spoke only of exceptional
individuals; Rabbi Henkin notes that Maharshal's chiddush is that
"When an entire community is accustomed to mingling with and speaking
to women, on the other hand, their familiarity may be relied on to
forestall sinful thoughts".

Rabbi Henkin notes that Maharshal's source is Tosafot to Kiddushin
82a. R. Acha bar Ada explained his special liberty saying "hakol
leshem shamayim", but Tosafot there say "On [hakol leshem shamayim] we
rely nowadays [in] that we make use of the services of women". Rabbi
Henkin says, "The Tosafot employ this principle to justify widespread
practicess. This is precisely the equation employed by Maharshal".

Rabbi Henkin says, "It can be said that the "whole world" of modern
Orthodoxy relies implicitly on this Maharshal in using the services of
and speaking to and looking at women".

Rabbi Henkin then notes two additional authorities who follow this approach:
1) The Maharshal's student, Rabbi Mordechai Yafeh, in the Levush
haTechelet vehaChur (Orach Chayim), no. 36. There, as opposed to Sefer
Chassidim 393, he permits saying "shehasimcha beme'ono" at a sheva
berachot even when there is mixed seating.
2) Rabbi Yechiel Michal Epstein in the Aruch haShulchan (Orach Chayim
75:7) permits saying Shema in the presence of a woman with uncovered
hair, for although she is forbidden to do thus, and although she is
technically ervah in this, this has become normal, and men are inured
to it, and he may say Shema in her presence. (Rabbi Henkin notes and
vehementally opposes the common misinterpretation, that the AH is
permitting women to go without a hair covering - rather, the AH is
saying that bedieved, men may say Shema in her presence, but she is
still forbidden to dress thusly.)

Rabbi Henkin adds a caveat: "[T]he above applies only to mingling of
men and women that is  innocent in and of itself. No degree of
frequency and familiarity can legitimize what is intrinsically or
intentionally sexually stimulating. Examples are immodest or
provocative dress, erotic performances and entertainment, and other
pitfalls too numerous to be listed".

A second caveat: "[T]here is no halachic imperative to introduce
mingling of the sexes where it does not already exist. What we have
said here is a justification of community practices, not an agenda. It
is much easier to legitimize existing practices than to justify new
ones. To do the latter, we would have to take into account the
approaches of far more acharonim than just the Yam Shel Shelomoh, the
Levush, and the Aruch haShulchan". Rabbi Henkin had indeed previously
said, "We have seen then, that there exists a trend - not a dominant
trend, but a trend - within halachic thought that in interaction
between the sexes that might ordinarily lead to hirhur, frequency and
familiarity of contact can be a mitigating factor, and that a
community can legitimately rely on this 'in using the services of, and
speaking to, and looking at, women', to use the words of the
Maharshal".

---------------------

I am no authority in any of this, at all. But it occurs to me that when, in
Pirkei Avot 1:5, we are told to not have too much sicha with women,
many of the commentators say that this is speaking of davka inane or
immodest conversation, but not meaningful conversation. At the very
least, they say this of the stricture against too much sicha with
one's own wife, and since this Mishna speaks of one's own wife and a
stam women as equals, and one's fellow's wife as kal vachomer, then
any heterim on one's wife ought to apply to a stam woman, and even to
one's fellow's wife (because of dayyo). Thus, it should seem that
based on this, if one is sure to limit his conversation to meaningful
matters, then social intercourse between the sexes is less
problematic. In particular, Rav Hirsch in his perush to Avot makes a
large point of the fact that sicha is davka inane conversation. And he
never limits this to only one's wife; one can only assume that Rav
Hirsch applies this to the entire Mishna. It is thus interesting that
Rabbi Henkin in a footnote says, "Mixing of the sexes at weddings,
social gatherings, and even Torah lectures was also characteristic of
the strictly Orthodox Germanic-Dutch communities".

As an aside (i.e. without any relevance to the topic at hand, but
similar because Rav Hirsch makes an okimta similar to what he did
above - hey, if the Gemara links two unrelated statements only because
the same rabbi said both, then so can I), Rav Hirsch to Avot 3:4 says
that divrei Torah doesn't
mean davka Torah per se, but rather anything (ANYTHING, even something
totally secular) that contributes to a Torah-type lifestyle of
goodness and modesty and honesty, etc. The parallel to Torah im Derech
Eretz is obvious: just as Rav Hirsch makes a large point of stressing
that secular life and matters and learning are elevated to Torah when
they infused with and directed based on Torah, so too he says that
secular conversations become Torah when they are regarding a life that
is conducted along Torah lines. In other words: secular conversations
regarding a Torah im Derech Eretz lifestyle, these conversations are
themselves divrei Torah.

Mikha'el Makovi