<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">AN INSTANCE OF THE 7th
KIND OF CONTRADICTION IN THE MOREH NEVUCHIM<br>
<br>
The Rambam’s seventh kind of contradiction# is often flouted as a
declaration that in the Guide he will purposely profess opinions
one place that stealthily contradict opinions he professes
elsewhere. (And some, the Strausian school, even assert that he
does this for sinister reasons, involving surreptitious detraction
from orthodox views.)<br>
<br>
Two observations regarding this.<br>
<br>
1. The Rambam ascribes this kind of contradiction to the Midrashim
and Aggados (but not the halachic Talmud) as well. Would the
Strausian school claim he thought the Aggados and Midrashim were
“likewise” secretly promulgating heretical ideas?<br>
<br>
2 . The Rambam is explicitly speaking of contradicting /premises/
used to give evidence /for /a point, not contradicting /points/.
Meaning, among the premises which the Rambam builds upon in order
to illustrate or bring evidence for a point, may at times be a
premise he himself disagrees with, as long as the audience
considers it acceptable. In talmudic terminology, this is called
speaking le-shitas-cha. When such a method is exercised in the
Talmud, it is usually openly disclosed. And the Rambam himself
openly discloses in the Moreh that he used such a technique in the
Mishneh Torah when he proved G-d’s existence accepting the premise
that the world existed eternally, a premise he vociferously
denies. But in the Aggados and Midrashim, contradictory premises
fly about without indication. Nevertheless, the concluding points
being made are all true, and do not contradict (if not in cases
where one of the other reasons for contradictions apply).<br>
<br>
I assume that the Rambam’s insistence that one must not let on, to
the unsophisticated, the contradictory nature of the premises, is
similar to one of the reasons he gives for why the Aggados convey
lofty concepts in a literary form that if taken literally is
absurd. If the unsophisticated are let on to the contradictions,
they would mock or at least not value highly enough the lessons
meant to be taught.<br>
<br>
Finding instances of this kind of contradiction in the Moreh
Nevuchim is not easy. But I believe I have found one.<br>
<br>
In II:6, the Rambam is making the point that while no doubt angels
are real spiritual entities, the term ''malach'' is also used for
the instinct in animals that causes them to move one way or
another, when that movement is desired by G-d. The Rambam
illustrates this with the account of Bilaam’s donkey, who, because
it was blocked by a malach, refused to obey Bilaam’s instructions
to travel further.*<br>
<br>
Before I go on, some introductory matter:<br>
<br>
Ramban, like the Rambam, holds that since angels are none-physical
entities, they cannot ordinarily be perceived by a person’s
physical senses. Ordinarily,## ''seeing'' an angel is a spiritual
enterprise capable by a human, but not by an animal. So, Ramban,
explains, when the Torah says that Bilaam’s donkey ''saw'' the
angel blocking its way, it cannot mean it in its literal sense. It
means that the donkey was controlled by an instinct of fear that
prevented it from moving, without having any awareness of the
angel that caused it.<br>
<br>
So now, back to the Rambam. Later in the Moreh Nevuchim, II:46:<br>
<br>
The Rambam did not subscribe to the Ramban’s assertion that angels
can be turned into physical beings. Therefore, the entire episode
of Bilaam’s donkey, which involved the donkey and Bilaam seeing an
angel and speaking with it, could only have been an experience
that happened to Bilaam on a spiritual plane, not a physical one.
It was a vision.<br>
<br>
*So: there was no movement by the donkey caused by its instinct,
called an angel or not.*<br>
<br>
In chapter 6, in the account of Bilaam, the Rambam was using the
Ramban’s premise or one similar to it--that the account of Bilaam
was something that happened in the material world--as one
illustration of his point that Scripture uses the term “angel” to
describe G-d instilling a force into an animal that causes it to
move or refuse to move.<br>
<br>
But the Rambam himself does not actually hold that this happened
in the material world. *The premises in the two cases are
contradictory. All the same, his points remain uncontradictory*:
(a) Any scriptural passage describing a physical being having a
physical perception of or physical interaction with an angel must
be understood as a vision of things in the spiritual world, and
not the material world, and (b) the term ''angel'' sometimes
refers to a natural force. And a support for the latter point can
be found for those who subscribe to the Ramban’s premise.<br>
<br>
The Rambam kept the contradictory premises 40 chapters apart,
making it hard to spot. I have not seen any commentary note this,
and it took me several decades...<br>
<br>
Zvi Lampel<br>
<br>
-------------------------<br>
<br>
* Friedlander’s inaccurate translation:<br>
<br>
Seventh cause: It is sometimes necessary to introduce such
metaphysical matter as may partly be disclosed, but must partly be
concealed: while, therefore, on one occasion the object which the
author has in view may demand that the metaphysical problem be
treated as solved in one way, it may be convenient on another
occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite way.<br>
<br>
Pines’ translation is more accurate:<br>
<br>
The seventh cause. In speaking about very obscure matters it is
necessary to conceal some parts and to disclose others. Sometimes
in the case of certain dicta this necessity requires that the
discussion proceed on the basis of a certain premise, whereas in
another place necessity requires that the discussion proceed on
the basis of another premise contradicting the first one. In such
cases the vulgar must in no way be aware of the contradiction; the
author accordingly uses some device to conceal it by all means.
The author must endeavor, by concealing the fact as much as
possible, to prevent the uneducated reader from perceiving the
contradiction<br>
<br>
*... in the Midrash and the Aggada...* [y]ou may also notice ...
contradictions due to the *seventh *cause. *Any inconsistency
discovered in the present work will be found to arise in
consequence of the fifth cause or the seventh. *Notice this,
consider its truth, and remember it well, lest you misunderstand
some of the chapters in this book.<br>
<br>
My translation:<br>
<br>
The seventh cause [of a contradiction to be found in a work]: The
recognition that with very deep subjects, it is necessary to hide
some of their elements and to reveal some of them. And sometimes
necessity demands developing a given idea in one place following
and accepting a certain premise, while elsewhere, to develop
another idea, necessity demands accepting and following a premise
contradictory to the first one. And it is necessary that the
unsophisticated do not in any way sense the place where these two
contradict, and that the author finds any schemes he can to
totally conceal this.<br>
<br>
...in the Midrash and the Aggada [y]ou will also find ...
contradictions due to the seventh cause. Any inconsistency
discovered in the present work will be found to arise in
consequence of the fifth cause or the seventh. Notice this,
consider its truth, and remember it well, lest you misunderstand
some of the chapters in this book.<br>
<br>
* “Ordinarily” is a key qualification, because the Ramban--contra
the Rambam--holds that whenever an angel is also described as an
“ish,” a “man” that someone saw and/or physically interacted with,
it means that G-d “clothed” the angel with a physical semblance of
a person. Such was the case, Ramban holds, contra Rambam, with the
three angels who visited Avraham and saved Lot, and the angel who
fought with Yaakov.<br>
<br>
<br>
</font>
</body>
</html>