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<tt>RMB </tt><tt><tt>(Avodah Digest, Vol 34, Issue 157) </tt>maintains
that the Ran broke with the Rambam and Geonim by asserting that
Hashem and Moshe literally transmitted, as truth, both sides of
future disputes, despite their being contradictory and
incompatible. The future sages' job was to choose between these
two truths (based on their proclivities towards geverua, chessed,
etc.). There is no one-and-only-truth. Any references to the sages
determining the one truth is referring to a hyphenated-emes, the
emes-l'hor'a'ah, not the emesses l'amitah. They are referring
solely a correctly identified previous pesak, but the opposite
ruling is still an ''emes.''<br>
<br>
I argued that this is a misreading of the Ran, because he
explicitly rejected the concept that it is merely by the decree of
the sages that objects are tahor or tamie, and actions are mutar
or assur. Just as poison is poisonous even if the consensus of
doctors otherwise, he says, so too a tamei object or a forbidden
action will produce negative effects on the soul, regardless of
the consensus of the sages. <br>
<br>
Here is another quote from the Drashos HaRan (Drash 5, second
version) that should make it clear that he does not argue with the
Rambam and Geonim, and like them does not endorse a ''multiple
emeses'' concept.<br>
<br>
</tt>
<blockquote><tt>''We are commanded to follow the chachmei hadoros
whether they agree to the emes OR ITS OPPOSITE... (BM 86) has an
Aggada about the halacha when there is a safek whether the
baheres or the white hair appeared first on one's skin. Rabbah
bar Nachmani recited, he heard in the Mesivta d-Rakia [the
tsadikim learning together in Heaven after having passed away]
that HKB''H says [the person is] tahor, but the entire mesivta
deRakia says tamei. ...When he passed away he said, ''tahor,
tahor, and a bas kol went out and said Ashreycha...that your
body is tahor and your neshama went out b-taharah. </tt><br>
<br>
<tt>''In truth, they entertained no doubt about what they grasped
from Hashem Yisborach, that He was metaher b-emes *V'LO ZULASO*
...For although they knew that AL DERECH HA-EMES the [halacha in
the] safek case is [that the person is] tahor, they said 'tamei'
because the Torah's decision is handed over to them [for what
they can conclude] during their lives, and their seichel
compelled them to say tamei. It was proper that it should be
[considered] tamei EVEN THOUGH IT IS THE OPPOSITE OF THE TRUTH
... and the fact they were me-tam-im was only due to a
shortcoming of their seichel."</tt><br>
</blockquote>
<tt><br>
The Ran says that only the din of tahor is the ''emes'', V'LO
ZULASO, explicitly rejecting that tamei is ''another emes'' in
Hashem's eyes. The context is what is the true state of the
object in Hashem's eyes, not merely the true pesak chosen by
predecessors. All the hyphenation in the world will not change
this fact.<br>
<br>
So when he said (quoting RMB's translation and capitalizations),<br>
<br>
</tt>
<blockquote><tt>''It is a known thing that the whole TSBK and TSBP
were given over to Moshe... And Moshe learned them all miPi
haGevurah, WITHOUT DETERMINATION OF EACH MACHLOQES
individually...''</tt><br>
</blockquote>
<tt><br>
which I think we're both taking as referring to future issues,
yes, the Ran is saying Moshe was not explicitly told the pesak.
''However,'' as the Ran continues, <br>
<br>
</tt>
<blockquote><tt>''However, he was given the rule by which the truth
is known, which is: acharei rabbim lehatos.'' He was told given
the methodologies which when applied would determine THE TRUTH.
And not a hyphenated truth. Because there is a one-and-only emes
V'LO ZULASO which in rare instances the chochmei hadoros may
reach the OPPOSITE of.</tt><br>
</blockquote>
<tt><br>
In his more recent post, RMB raises an interesting point, that
Hashem's response to Moshe's request for clarity does not direct
him to apply the methodology to arrive at the halacha. Hashem
instead tells him that the future sages will decide. RMB
characterizes this as ''a rule that depends on a future event, not
the revelation at Sinai.'' But all this means is that Moshe is
aware that the future situations are innumerable, and the relevant
factors that determine the halacha in each case have different
strengths in each one of those situations. Moshe is overwhelmed.
He cannot hope to anticipate every situation, much less apply the
methodology to every one. So Hashem tells him that the sages of
each generation will deal with the issues they confront. They will
apply the methodology that Moshe transmits, and come to the same
result he would.<br>
<br>
This is similar to what R. Avahu tells us in Sh'mos Rabbah (41:6):
And did Moses actually learn the entire Torah?! It (Iyov 11:9)
says that '[the Torah] is vaster than the Earth ... and wider than
the Sea.' And in forty days Moses learned it all?! No. It was the
overall principles that G-d taught Moshe.'' <br>
<br>
Indeed, the Maharzu on this passage identifies the 'overall
principles' with the Thirteen Principles and he identifies the
unrevealed details with the many laws resulting from their
application. He writes, ''These 'overall principles' [which were
given to Moshe] are identical with the darcay ha'drash. For each
of the rules of Torah interpretation produces an infinite number
of teachings [which were not (explicitly) revealed to Moshe].<br>
<br>
And, incidentally, positing that the Ran and other rishonim
rejected the previous view of the Geonim and Rambam that pesak is
a matter of retrieval is itself paradoxical. For they would be
saying that the real explanation of machlokos in talmudical times
was forgotten by these earlier authorities, and Ran, etc.,
reviewing the Gemoros and Midrashim retrieved the true
explanation.<br>
<br>
Additionally, if one speaks of ''rov rishonim,'' one must factor
in the opinion of (how many?) Geonim in addition to the Rambam.<br>
<br>
RASHI<br>
>ZL:<br>
> : Chagiga 3b:<br>
> <br>
> : "Ba'alei asufos" (Qoheles 12:11) ... "Kulam nitnu<br>
> : miRo'eh echad." One G-d gave them, one source/leader<br>
> : said them, miPi Adon kol hama'asim barukh Hu. As it says
(Shemos<br>
> : 20:1), "Vaydaber E-lokim es kol hadevarim ha'eileh".<br>
> <br>
> : ...RASHI: You don't have any of the disputants bringing
a proof <br>
> : from any god's torah, only from the Torah of our G-d." and
he<br>
> : explains: "Parness echad amran" to mean: You don't have
anyone<br>
> :bringing a proof from the words of a prophet who came to
argue<br>
> : against Moshe Rabbeynu."<br>
> <br>
>RMB: DH "kulan Keil Echad amran": You do not have a disputant
bringing a<br>
> proof from the bible of another god, only from Toras
E-lokeinu<br>
<br>
ZL: My point is, had Rashi held that ''kulam nitnu miRoeh echad''
meant that Hashem literally assigned and transmitted contradicting
halachic statuses to all things and actions, he would have said,
"kulan Keil Echad amran": 'Hashem gave both sides.' Period. <br>
<br>
Or he would have left the Gemora without comment, and we would
have the situation you claimed we have, that the rishonim did not
reinterpret it. Obviously, something is bothering Rashi.
Obviously, I claim, it's the literal take.<br>
<br>
>RMB: DH "Parnes Echad amran": You one have [no] one
bring[ing] a proof from the<br>
> words of a navi to dispute against Moshe Rabbeinu.<br>
> <br>
> Rashi could well be saying (but admittedly not mukhrakh) that
both<br>
> will indeed find valid ra'ayos in Toras Moshe -- not merely
try to<br>
> find.<br>
<br>
ZL: Also docheik. Rashi did not leave the words ''Parness echad
amran'' at face value, nor simply say, '' "Parnes Echad amran':
Moshe gave us both sides of the machlokess.'' Instead, Rashi is
explaining that what the Gemora means by saying ''Parnes Echad
amran'' is that both sides of the machlokess are basing themselves
on Moshe Rabbeynu's words, and not someone else's. Obviously a
move away from the literal take.<br>
<br>
============<br>
<br>
>ZL: DH "asei oznekha ke'afrekhtes": "Since their hearts are
[directed] to heaven [i.e. since they are both making sincere
attempts /to understand the matter/]...<br>
> <br>
> RMB: Woah! Your conculsion is in your bracketed "i.e.", not
in the Rashi!<br>
> <br>
<br>
ZL:''Lev l'Shamayim'' means sincere intention. If it doesn't refer
to their intention to understand the matter, what is it referring
to?<br>
<br>
> RMB: Rashi could be assuming that rabbanim who are liban
leShamayim are <br>
> going to find Emes. <br>
<br>
I have no problem with Rashi holding that after discussion the
consensus the rabbanim reach with identify the emes (as the Ran
does). But here he says nothing about the results of their
intentions. In explaining why one should learn all the
contradicting shittos, Rashi introduces the factor of liban
laShamayiim. Why? If all the contradicting shittos are equally
correct, that alone should be the entire reason to learn them all.
There would be no reason to introduce the factor of liban
laShamayim. Your suggestion that by saying liban laShamayim, he
really meant to imply that they are reaching ''an'' emes, is
docheik. The ikkar is chaser min hasafer. He is saying that one
should listen to all the shittos, since they are all valid
attempts to understand the matter. This is obviously an
intentional move away from a literal understanding that Hashem
told Moshe opposite pesakim.<br>
<br>
Incidentally, when the Midrashim say that Hashem revealed to Moshe
the factors pro and con that should be taken into consideration
''l'kall davar v'davar,'' I originally thought ''l'kall davar
v'davar'' translated ''for each and every future situation.'' But
the slight girsa difference in Midrash Tehillim (Buber 12:7)
clarifies that it means ''for each and every dibur (statement) of
Hashem.'' Thus means that when Hashem said, for instance, that a
sheretz is tamei, rather than listing the virtually infinite
number of cases this would apply to (i.e. giving the Torah in
chatichos form), he provided Moshe with 39 factors pro and con for
what makes something tamie like a sheretz. <br>
<br>
>RMB: (Rashi:) Since all of them have their hearTs toward
Shamayim, make your ear <br>
> listen, and learn and know all of them. When you know how to
decide <br>
> which to make kosher, extablish the halakhah like him.<br>
> <br>
> "Afrekhes" is the grain-reciever on top of a millstone.<br>
<br>
ZL: Like a funnel. The question was: There are so may different
opinions! Which one should I learn? (By the way, it's asking about
learning, not poskening.) Answer: Make an effort to widen your
ears (and mind) like a funnel. Learn all of them. But then, see
which makes most sense (as it continues below), and learn it that
way.<br>
<br>
>RMB: Notice he does not talk about deciding which is true or
right, or<br>
> even which IS kosher, but "lehavkhin ei zeh YIkasher''<br>
> <br>
ZL: Actually, ''lehavkhin ei zeh yichshar.'' The incorrect nikud
was my error. It's from a posuk in Kohelless 12:6. ''In the
morning plant your seed, and in the evening do not let your hand
rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which
[attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, and if both of them as
one, they are good.'' <br>
<br>
In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean
''yatzliach''--succeed.<br>
<br>
> RMB:<br>
> -- to decide which YOU MAKE kosher" and that is who you are
qoveia'<br>
> the halakhah to be like. <br>
<br>
ZL: Whether it's ''yichshar'' or ''YIkasher,'' there's no second
person pronoun there.<br>
<br>
Regardless, the thought is LEHAVCHIN which of the two
contradictory bids will pass scrutiny. It does not mean, to choose
(livchor) between the two based on one's proclivities towards
gevurah or chessed, v'chulu, but <i>lehavchin</i>, to distinguish
(as in <i>l'havchin</i> bein yom uvain layla; zocheh <i>l'havchin</i>
bein dinie mammonos l'dinei nefashos [Brachos 63b]); to test ''<i>bochein</i>
levavos''); to determine which conclusion will emerge as standing
scrutiny (b'zos <i>tibacheninu</i>...<i>v'yibacheinu</i>
divreichem ha-emes itchem''); to determine another's desire (''Al
daas aviv--b-katan sheh-yeida <i>lehavchin </i>she-haKibui <i>zeh
</i>noach l'aviv v'oseh bishvilo'' ). <br>
<br>
The Kohelles mashal speaks of an objective observation of which
seed or plant will succeed in thriving in this particular soil, at
this particular time and this particular climate, etc. In the
nimshal, the final halacha mirrors the one reality, determined by
the objective observation of which of the two options, in the
particular circumstances at hand, responds positively to the test
for truth, conducted by application of the methods of drash,
precedent, etc.<br>
<br>
> ZL:<br>
> : Identical to the Ritva ...<br>
<br>
> RMB:<br>
> Yes. And again, you decided what liban laShamayim means.<br>
<br>
ZL: That <i>liban laShamayim</i> means sincere intention is
standard and, I believe, exclusive usage. <br>
<br>
> <br>
>RMB: And ignored that the bechinah is which to make kosher,
not which is<br>
> true.<br>
> <br>
> <br>
ZL: The verb here (<i>yichshar</i>) isn't even in hiphil or piel,
so there's no ''making'' kosher here. Again, the operational word
is <i>lehavchin</i>, to distinguish which of the two
understandings ''<i>yichshar</i>,'' will prove viable. And that
understanding, of course, will lead to the posek's pesak. <br>
<br>
==================== <br>
> RMB:<br>
> For that matter, the other quote you bring from them also
indicates <br>
> the reverse of your intent. See the Ritvah you quote, right
before <br>
> "ela eilu va'eilu" (some lines before the part you
highlighted in <br>
>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/mesorahPsakSources2.pdf#page=2"><http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/mesorahPsakSources2.pdf#page=2></a>
<br>
> page 2):<br>
> <br>
> He says what he sees according to his da'as, and he says what
he sees<br>
> according to his da'as. Not one of them is lying, Rather,
"eilu<br>
> va'eilu". HOWEVER, when we say that students are arguing in
their<br>
> rebbe's words.... is appears that one of them is lying or
forgot his<br>
> tradition...<br>
> <br>
> Lying or forgetting is ony an option because they are arguing
about <br>
> what the rebbe said.<br>
<br>
ZL: (Just a note that whereas Rashi says ''meshakker'', Tosefos
says ''ta-ah b-shemu-aso.'' Sheker, too, does not necessarily
mean ''lying,'' just saying something that is not true. I don't
think Rashi would argue with this.)<br>
<br>
> RMB: A normal machloqes, where they disagree about the din is
eilu va'eilu Divrei E-lokim Chaim, in contrast to (aval) > this
case where "meshaqer o shakhack".<br>
<br>
ZL: What about where they are disagreeing over what a rebbi meant,
or what the Tannaim or Mishnah meant, or what Moshe Rabbeynu
meant? If those are not ''normal machlokos,'' you've just
eliminated just about every relevant machlokos we know of from the
category of eilu v'eilu.<br>
<br>
> RMB:<br>
> What you say is a rule, Rashi and the Ritva are explicitly
saying is <br>
> the exception.<br>
<br>
</tt>
<blockquote><tt>ZL: Ritva: ''It is better for us to say that two
Amoraim are having their own argument about their own opinions,
than to say that Amoraim are arguing over one Amora. Meaning,
it is more likely to say that R. Yochonon and R. Yehoshua ben
Levy are arguing their own points—that each one says what the
halacha should be in his own opinion, so that neither one of
them would be saying something that [by necessity] is false,
but "these and those are the words of the Living G-d." But
when we say that the disciples of one mentor are arguing over
what his words were, one saying this, and one saying that, it
seems that one of them is lying or forgot the information he
learned, something one should refrain as much as possible from
saying. And as Rashi z"l explains.</tt><br>
</blockquote>
<tt><br>
</tt>
<blockquote><tt>And although here, nevertheless, R. Yochonon and R.
Yehoshua ben Levy are [still] arguing over what Tannaim were
arguing over, this too is [merely] arguing over their own
opinions, for they did not learn [the correct understanding of
the Tannaim's dispute] from the Tannaim and did not receive a
transmitted report originating from them. Instead, each of
these Amoraim is saying what seems to him to be correct to say
the Tannaim are arguing over. ''</tt><br>
</blockquote>
<tt><br>
When they are making opposite claims of what is reasonable and
resultant from the rules of the 13 middos, eilue v'eilu does
apply.<br>
<br>
That's the rule.<br>
<br>
When they are making opposite claims of what their immediate
teacher's words (or even intent) were, eilue v'eilu doesn't apply.<br>
<br>
That's the ''exception.''<br>
<br>
I did not say otherwise. We're just disagreeing over what Ritva is
saying eilu v'elilu means in such cases means.<br>
<br>
But according to you, why is Ritva saying one <i>cannot </i>say
eilu v'eilu when they are disagreeing over their rebbi's words?
According to you, even if one of them is wrong about whether the
rebbi said assur or mutar, he is still saying divrei Elokim,
because, according to you, Hashem said both.<br>
<br>
As I explain it, Ritva is explaining that eilu v'eilu divrei
Elokim Chaim means that each side is offering a sincere and
competent attempt to gauge the Emes (l'amito) whether correct or
not. Disagreement about a rebbi's very words (a rare occurence)
indicates, or at least creates the impression of, incompetence
(forgetting or lying), so eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim does not
apply. But when their opposite claims of what someone in the more
distant past said or meant, their competence is not called into
question. It is natural for information to get lost over time.
Therefore, it still qualifies as divrei Elokim.<br>
<br>
=====================<br>
<br>
> RMB:<br>
> I again wish you had gone le'at le'at, as I tried to redirect
the <br>
> conversation. <br>
<br>
ZL: I am going step-by-step, and first tackling your claim that
rov rishonim hold that Hashem and Moshe literally handed down
opposite halachos for situations, and hold that the identical
situation has opposite halachos (if not l'maaseh, then klappei
shmaya). I do not want to go to the next step (although I have
what to say about it) before this is settled. (Reminds me of,
l-havdil, the Ramban's Vikuach, where he does not want to discuss
whether the Talmud teaches that Moshiach that his opponent alleges
claim, is G-d, before settling whether the Talmud holds Moshiach
came.) <br>
<br>
=================<br>
>ZL: ... : Thus, Rashi (Sota 47a-b) writes that the first of
the Zuggos<br>
> brought to : an end "Torah b'amitah, v'ein dofi v'shikcha<br>
> umachlokess." The : reference to forgetfulness-free, dofi<br>
> (two-panim)-free, and : machlokess-free as the characteristic
of<br>
> "Torah b'amitah," (and not just : halacha b'amitah),
indicates that<br>
> there was a true, single din for each : situation that was
the emes<br>
> of Torah, as opposed to when machlokos began.<br>
<br>
>RMB: <br>
> 47a DH "ha'eshkolos": It is explained in the gemara that all
of them,<br>
> until their era, there was no machloqes among the chakhmei
Yisrael.<br>
> They all said things as they were given to Moshe from Sinai.
And they<br>
> were the first who disagreed about the semichah of qorbanos
on YT, as<br>
> is says in Chagiga (16a). This was the first machloqes in
Israel in<br>
> words of Torah<br>
> <br>
> Nothing about Torah ba'amitah being machloqes free.<br>
<br>
ZL: It's the last Rashi on 47b.<br>
<br>
RMB:<br>
> You are assuming that Rashi means "there was no machloqes
...<br>
> [because] they all said things as they were given..."<br>
<br>
ZL: No. There was no machlokess. [Rather,] they all said [the same
things; namely] things as they were given to Moshe at Sinai. Torah
b'amitah, v'ein dofi.<br>
<br>
> RMB: Which is not accumulative either, and goes back to
forgetting /<br>
> imperfect retrieval.<br>
<br>
ZL: Yes. As I laid it out, I see all rishonim acknowledging that
machlokoess is due to loss of a key principle given at Sinai that
would determine the weight of the various relevant factors, to
reveal the true status of the thing or action in question.<br>
<br>
> RMB: The missing connective could just as well be "despite".<br>
<br>
ZL: "there was no machloqes among the chakhmei Yisrael <i>despite
</i>the fact that they all said things as they were given to Moshe
from Sinai''?? This does not make sense. And Rashi would have to
say ''af al pi'' if he meant ''despite.'<br>
<br>
>RMB: For that matter, there are cases of Rashi acknowledging
different<br>
> Batei Din haGadol before the zugos having conflicting
pesaqim, that<br>
> only weren't machloqesin because the two sides were different
pesaqim<br>
> lemaaseh for different eras.<br>
<br>
ZL: Agreed. Also, conflicting pesakim between Moshe and Aharon,
Dovid haMelech and Shaul, Esther and Mordechai, Esther and the
Sanhedrin. When we say there was no machlokess previously, we mean
that after all discussion, a conclusion was reached. The semicha
machlokess, was however, the first to remain unsolved through
generations (Tosefos Chagigah 16a DH Yosey ben Yoezer etc., Gra
note 1 on Temura 16a, Maharatz Chayos, Mishpat haHoraa. 9). The
machlokess was not settled in the generation that raised it (the
generaiton of Yosey ben Yoe-ezer). Thus, when he died, we had the
first phenomenon of unsettled machlokess and Torah with dofi.<br>
<br>
> RMB:<br>
> Eg, the shisin in the mizbeiach in bayis sheini. Zevachin
61b, DH<br>
> "shisin hosifu". According to Shelomo, the mitzbeiach in
bayis sheini<br>
> wasn't atum ba'adamah,<br>
<br>
ZL: Quibble: It was a fact (not just the opinion of Shlomo) that
the mizbeyach in Bayis Sheini wasn't atum ba'adamah. The
difference between Shlomo and the Sanhedrin of Bayis Rishon and
Ezra's Sanhedrin of Bayis Sheyni was whether the Torah's
prescription of ''mizbach adamah'' required that it be atum
ba'adamah, made of solid earth, or only that it be attached to the
ground.<br>
<br>
> RMB: and according to Ezra, no one in bayis rishon did nisuch
as the<br>
> shisin were alongside the mizbeiach, not eithin it.<br>
<br>
ZL: They both did libations, and in both cases the liquid flowed
into the permanently located drain holes in the ground, a
requirement all agreed to. The only difference is that in Bayis
Sheyni, Ezra's Beis Din allowed digging channels through the alter
leading to the drain holes. This allowed an expansion of the alter
even though it would cover the drain holes. (Again, Shlomo took
''mizbach adamah [Shmos 2:24] to mean an alter of solid dirt,
while Ezra took it only be a requirement that the alter was
attached to the ground.) Ezra's new interpretation of the posuk
left Shlomo's nissuch just fine. On the other hand, you could say
that according to Shlomo, Ezra built an illegitimate mizbeach,
which is indeed a daunting thought, but such is the nature of
machlokess. (Although one may in this case claim that Shlomo would
have agreed that the Torah allowed for a secondary meaning of
mizbach adama if and when the times required a larger alter.)<br>
<br>
====================<br>
ZL<br>
> : [ Rashi (Sota 47a-b) writes that until the era of Zugos,
there was no machloqes among the chakhmei Yisrael.<br>
> They all said things as they were given to Moshe from Sinai.
And they<br>
> were the first who disagreed...This was the first machloqes
in Israel in<br>
> words of Torah] the first of the Zuggos<br>
> brought to an end to "Torah b'amitah, v'ein dofi v'shikcha<br>
> umachlokess." <br>
> <br>
How could this fit the notion that Moshe literally handed down<br>
> opposite halachos? Will you say that through the generations
up<br>
> until the Zugos, even though they knew the Torah b'amito,
they<br>
> preserved the shitta that was not Torah b'amito to be
available for<br>
> later generations to choose?<br>
> <br>
>RMB: Yes.<br>
<br>
> Or, that he was literally handed down a system by which both
are<br>
> derivable -- by HQBH's Intent, of course -- because He wanted
to<br>
> "Say" both!<br>
<br>
ZL: Now you're getting closer to my claim, if you would just
eliminate your last 6 words. And with the qualification that
nevertheless, ultimately the derivability of one halachic option
is stronger than its opposite.<br>
> <br>
> Which is what I believe the Qorban ha'Eidah <br>
RMB:
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/mesorahPsakSources2.pdf+page=4"><http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/mesorahPsakSources2.pdf+page=4></a>
<br>
> page 4 is saying. Beis Shamai derives Torah because they are
working <br>
> the system, mevi'im ra'ayah min haTorah<br>
<br>
ZL: Beis Hillel was also working the system. ''Both of them were
bringing proofs from the Torah.'' I hope you don't think BH
disregarded the system yet because they were nice, the halacha
goes their way.<br>
<br>
RMB: <br>
> "veChadei QBH becharifus pilpulam". Their deductions are more<br>
> joy-making, as Beis Shammai were the more charifin. But BH,
through<br>
> their anavah, were zokhin to reach the emes [lehora'ah]. Not
emes<br>
> le'amito,<br>
<br>
ZL: I disagree with your proposal [and insertion in brackets]
that ''emes,'' stam, and all the less, ''THE emes,'' stam, is used
to indicate ''emes lehora'ah'' vs ''emes'' period. If you can find
a rishon, never mind rov rishonim, explicitly making such a
distinction, let me know. This is simply not the way the language
is used.<br>
<br>
RMB: as HQBH wouldn't be thrilled with a bright person's ability<br>
> to all the better to fool himself.<br>
<br>
ZL: The Korban HaEidah himself indicates that charifus is
reasoning so involved, complicated and tedious that others cannot
follow it or even stay awake. The pesak of the charif may still be
factually wrong (or right) about the un-hyphenated emes.
Nevertheless, Hashem is thrilled with people who take Torah
seriously and engage in intensive and sharp debate with proofs
about its meaning, even if they reach the wrong conclusions, ''for
through this is seen the esteem of the glory of His Torah.''<br>
<br>
I'm sure that the nachas of seeing one's sons engaged and animated
and arguing over learning Torah is not dependent upon whether one
agrees with their conclusions.<br>
<br>
Yet somehow, as a rule, the anivasdik attitude of Beis Hillel,
demonstrated by their treatment of their opponents, helped them
arrive at the unhyphenated emes. And in cases where they were
finally modeh to Beis Shammai, even though they were wrong at
first, they eventually conformed to the truth. And not to forget,
at times BS also showed humility and were modeh to BH.<br>
<br>
RMB : Nor would their wrong answer help<br>
> you decide another case.<br>
<br>
ZL: Nothing was said about their wrong answer helping. ''It is
also impossible that there will not come out of their pilpul
something needed for teaching elsewhere.'' The sevaros and facts,
corrections and tweakings developed in the argumentation, even
when ultimately not relevant in the case in dispute, can be
applicable or helpful in other cases. Similar to Rashi in Kesubos:
Different sevoros apply, subject to slight changes in
circumstances. <br>
<br>
> RMB:<br>
> And last, you don't quote to the end, and the final words
"...<br>
> mimenah nora'os ALIBA DEHILKHITA".<br>
<br>
These final words fit my claim just fine because I'm saying the
point of poskening alibah dehilchisa is to distinguish the
un-hyphenated emes. The halacha is always like BH, for they were
zocheh to be mekavven to the emes because they were humble. And it
is written: ''This is the Torah...from it will be seen wonders
according to the halacha.'' <br>
<br>
But note that the Korban HaEida is commenting on the eili v'eilu
quality of the machlokos between BS and BH. So you now seem to be
saying that ''mimenah nora'os ALIBA DEHILKHITA'' indicates that
eilu v'eilu refers to corectly matching a previously established
halacha. This contradicts what you said previously, that eilu
v'eilu refers not to emes l-hora-a, but to contradictory emeses
la-amita.<br>
<br>
<br>
=======================<br>
<br>
> RMB: More, when I have the time.<br>
<br>
ZL: I am amazed you find the time for what you do. Bli nedder,
I'll respond to your new post eventually.<br>
<br>
Zvi Lampel</tt><br>
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