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<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">RMB:</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> </span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> Pashut peshat in Chazal is that machloqes is understood in these</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> terms as well.</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> </span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> "Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim, vehalakhah keBH."</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt>You take it as '' pashut peshat''</tt><tt> that ''divrei
E-lokim chaim''</tt><tt> </tt><tt>means ''true [despite being
contradictory],'' but</tt><tt> the </tt><tt>rishonim I will
cite below hold that what you consider ''pashut peshat'' is not
correct peshat.<br>
</tt></p>
<p><tt>MAHARAL</tt></p>
<p><tt>You invoke the Maharal, but the Maharal (be'er HaGolah, be'er
rishon) explains that halacha is like Hashem's creations. He
gives the example of a tree. It is composed of all four
elements, but there is an overriding one that determines that it
is a tree. In halacha, too, he says, although there are
properties [in things or situations] that point to divergent
conclusions, ''only one of them is the main, overpowering one,
and that is the determining factor, and that is the halacha.''
(''V'chein, af sheyeish l'davar echad bechinos
mischalafos--kulam nitnu min Hashem, /rak ki echad mei-hem
yoseir ikkar, v'hu hamachria, v'hu halacha/.'')</tt></p>
<p><tt>That Maharal is explaining ''kulam mi-ro'eh echad nitnu.''
''Eilu v'Eilu,'' he maintains, implies that the determining
components are actually present in equal strength. He says that
this is ''sometimes'' the case, and such was the case regarding
the disputes of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel concerning which
the Bas Kol declared that there was no machria. Even if you
consider this to be supportive of your view (I don't), the
Maharal applies this to a limited amount of cases, and does not
make it into the general rule as you do.</tt></p>
<p><tt>CHAZA</tt><tt>L</tt></p>
<p><tt>You haven't addressed my point that every Gemora's kushya, or
at least every tiyuvta-tiyuvta, is assuming the Law of
Non-Contradiction. If Aristotle was wise enough to recognize the
truth of this logic, that is to his credit. But it is a logic
that everyone from Adam to Moshe Rabbeynu and on has been
expected to use to determine truth. Chazal taught the Sinaitic
rule that if two pesukim are in contradiction, a third one comes
to qualify them, to add conditions to one or both of them so
that they no longer contradict.</tt></p>
<p><tt>RASHI</tt></p>
<p><tt>Despite what one may think ''pashut peshat'' of ''kulan Kel
echad amran'' is, Rashi (Chagigah 3b) explains it to mean ''you
don't have any of the disputants bringing a proof from any god's
torah, only from the Torah of our G-d.''Parness echad amran'':
You don't have anyone bringing a proof from the words of a
prophet who came to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu.'' That's the
characterization Rashi gives to the many divergent opinions
among the chachamim. Not th</tt><tt>at they are ''all true.''</tt></p>
<p><tt>When Rashi (Kesubos 57a) explains eilu v'eilu by saying
/sometimes/ this consideration is appropriate and /sometimes/
that one is, because the considerations change over according to
/slight changes in circumstances/, he is working with the logic
that ''2 or more contradictory statements cannot both be true in
the same sense at the same time not (A and not-A).'' And that is
why he says that if there two Amoraim are arguing over what
their mentor held, one of them is saying ''sheker,''and we
/cannot/ apply ''eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim'' to such a
situation.</tt></p>
<p><tt>When TOSEFOS on the same daf says that if there two Amoraim
are arguing over what their mentor held, one of them ''erred,''
it is because </tt><tt>he is working with the logic that ''2 or
more contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same
sense at the same time not (A and not-A).''</tt></p>
<p><tt>When RITVA on the same daf quotes Rashi as the correct
peshat, it is because he too is working with the Law of
Non-Contradiction .(Yes, the same Ritva who elsewhere quotes the
kabbalistic teaching about Moshe being told 49 considerations
pointing to opposite conclusions, but who concludes that ''that
is correct by way of drash, but in the derech ha-emes there is
ta'am v'sod ba-davar.'' And pardon me, but I cannot accept that
any one of us can decipher what he means, either in the
beginning or the end.)</tt></p>
<p><tt> </tt></p>
<p><tt>RAMBAN on Devarim 17:11 says that one should not be afraid to
follow Beis Din Gadol even if one thinks they erred, and that
one must accept the interpretation of pesukim by the Great
Sanhedrin of Yerushalayim whether they received it from Moshe
from Hashem, and whether they say it is so according to the
mashmaos or intent of the mikreh. He is working with the
assumption that the mikreh has a specific intent that is subject
to error.</tt></p>
<p><tt>TOS RABBEYNU PERETZ (Eruvin 13b)begins by taking eilu v'eilu
as you do, but cannot accept it because it is illogical. "If
something is assur it cannnot be muttar, and if something is
muttar it cannot be assur." He too is working with the Law of
Non-Contradiction. He therefore concludes that Eilu V'eilu
merely means that one must follow the chachmei hado</tt><tt>r. I
take it that he means that both shittos of a machlokess are
worthy of consideration.</tt> </p>
<p><tt>SEFER HACHINUCH states that by commanding us to follow the
majority opinion, the Torah teaches us the fact that the
majority opinion will always conform to the truth more than the
minority.</tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2 (a similar passage in Tractate Sofrim</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> 16:5): R' Yanai said: Had the Torah been given decided, we wouldn't </span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> have a leg to stand on. Where? "And Hashem spoke to Moshe." He said </span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> before Him: Master of the World, tell me what is the halakhah. He </span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> responded "Decide according to the majority...." So that the Torah be</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> interpretable 49 ways tamei and 49 ways tahor.</span></tt></p>
<p><tt>I don't have peshat in why we would be at a disadvantage if
we were explicitly given a pesak for each and every situation
that may arise. Probably the thought is that it would be beyond
out ability to carry all those details and instead we were given
klallim through each situation could be halachically solved.
This does not contradict the fact that there is a correct
conclusion to reach for.<br>
</tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> </span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> And then there's the problem of explaining the Tanur shel Akhnai</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> story if we're seeking the One True Pesaq. We got the siyata</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> diShmaya; if it was telling us the One True Pesaq, how could we</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> possibly choose rabbim over siyata diShmaya?</span></tt></p>
<p><tt>The object is to uncover the original intent, but Hashem in
His wisdom imposed upon us the requirement that our endeavor to
do so must be restricted to what we can arrive at through our
own minds' use of the interpretive tools he gave us, and not
through any new revelations. Heavenly revelations are no longer
valid for determining halacha.Why then was there a bas kol by
tanur shel Achnai? Among the explanations given are two by Rav
Nissim Gaon ( (Brachos 19b). (1) When the Bas Kol declared the
halacha follows R. Eliezer b'kall makom, it meant usually, but
not necessarily here, or someting similar. (2) It was a test for
the Chachamim to withstand the temptation to transgress the
principle of lo bashamayim hee, similar to when Hashem grants a
false prophet the ability to perform a miracle (or the
appearance of one).</tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> ...</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> </span></tt></p>
<p><tt>To support your take that --</tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">></span></tt><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">Divrei Elokim Chaim is described as going beyond the Law</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> of Contradiction. Majority opinion isn't advocated as a way of</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> maximizing the chance of getting the One Right Answer, but the given</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> methodology for picking /a/ right answer. </span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;"></span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;"></span></tt><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">--y</span></tt><tt>ou
invoke the RAN, and cite RMH's translation, which ends </tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">Yet [God] also gave him a</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision</span></tt></p>
<p><tt><span style="white-space: pre;">> had already been delegated to them...</span></tt></p>
<p><tt>I feel frustrated because in my last post I already pointed
out that this is a mistranslation, and the correct translation
contradicts the thesis.</tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt>The last sentence reads, in Hebrew,</tt></p>
<p>
</p>
<p><tt>
/aval massar lo klall yivadda bo ha-emmess/.</tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt>Translating ''klall yivadda bo ha-emmess'' as ''a rule
whose truth is manifest'' is wrong, changes the meaning,. The
correct translation is </tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt> But [God] gave him a rule /through which one knows the
truth/, 'Favor the majority opinion'...</tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt>And the context removes all doubt that the Ran explicitly
denies that he is referring only to ''Emes leHoraah.vs Emes
leAmito. To wit (and this is again something I already cited
last time but repeat again.</tt></p>
<p><tt>In Drash 5 and 11 the Ran poses a quandary:</tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt>Since the words of those who declare something tamei and
those who </tt></p>
<p><tt>declare it tahor are intrinsically contradictory, it is
impossible for </tt></p>
<p><tt>both sides of the dispute to be conforming to the Truth. How
then could </tt></p>
<p><tt>we say that they were both told to Moses by G-d? Does G-d
have any </tt></p>
<p><tt>doubts as to what the Truth is?!</tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt>And he then suggests the approach that the sages only
established ''Emes leHoraah.vs Emes leAmito." But he then goes
on to reject it for the overwhelming majority of cases:</tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt>Now, this approach will satisfy those who hold that there
are no reasons </tt></p>
<p><tt>behind the mitzvos at all and that they all simply follow the
</tt></p>
<p><tt>[arbitrary] Will of G-d .... But we do not choose this
approach. /We </tt></p>
<p><tt>believe that everything the Torah warns us against is indeed
</tt></p>
<p><tt>[intrinsically] harmful to us, and creates a negative
imprint on our </tt></p>
<p><tt>souls, even though we may not know the mechanics behind that
process. </tt></p>
<p><tt>Therefore, if the consensus of the Sages is that something
[that is </tt></p>
<p><tt>tamei is] tahor, so what?!/ Won't it still harm us and
produce its </tt></p>
<p><tt>natural effect, whatever it is? ?...</tt><tt> It would
therefore seem that we </tt></p>
<p><tt>preferably /should/ follow the revelation of a prophet or Bas
Kol, which </tt></p>
<p><tt>would tell us the true nature of the thing.</tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt>The Torah took means to prevent a misfortune that can
always arise, and </tt></p>
<p><tt>that is the divergence of opinions and the creation of
machlokess, </tt></p>
<p><tt>almost creating a situation of two Torahs. The Torah's remedy
for this </tt></p>
<p><tt>ever-present danger was to hand over to each generation's
Sages the </tt></p>
<p><tt>right to resolve halachic questions. /For in the majority of
cases this </tt></p>
<p><tt>will result in both a remedy [of the problem of machlokess]
and the </tt></p>
<p><tt>correct decision/.... And even though there is the extremely
remote and </tt></p>
<p><tt>practically absurd possibility that they may make a mistake,
the Torah did</tt></p>
<p><tt>not concern itself with that remote danger. The risk is worth
taking for </tt></p>
<p><tt>the benefit accrued.</tt></p>
<p><tt><br>
</tt><tt>So the Ran's take is that as a rule ''Divrei Elokim
Chaim'' does /not/ go beyond the Law of Contradiction. He /does/
advocate majority opinion as a way of maximizing the chance of
getting the One Right Answer, and does /not/ merely advocate it
as the given methodology for picking /a/ right answer. <br>
</tt></p>
<p><tt>Down to the Yam shel Shlomo, who wrote (Introduction to Bava
Kamma) ''Never did two opposite predicates for one subject
escape the lips of Moshe'' (''shelo yatza hadavar mipi Moshe
l-olom lihyos shnei hafachim b-nosei echad''), and the
acharonim, the various explanations of ''eilu eilu'' avoid
conflict with the Law of Non-Contradiction.</tt></p>
<p><tt> So as far as the consensus of rishonim is concerned, I'm
making my case from Rashi, Tosefos, Tos. Rabbeynu Peretz,
Ramban, Ritva, the Ran and Sefer HaChinuch. That's 8 rishonim.
Do you have 9 that say otherwise?</tt></p>
<p><tt>Zvi Lampel<br>
</tt></p>
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