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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-GB link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal>RAF writes:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> > In Avodah Digest, Vol 32, Issue 35, Liron Kopinsky asks why Aliyyot can't be given to women when aliyyot are given to the Blind.<br><br> > Dov and I discuss the case of "Suma" in great length in our Tradition article on Women's Aliyyot (See: ?Women, Kri?>at haTorah and Aliyyot? Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, Tradition, 46:4 (Winter, 2013), 67-238 - available at <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>> <a href="http://www.rcarabbis.org/pdf/frimer_article.pdf" target="_blank">http://www.rcarabbis.org/pdf/frimer_article.pdf</a>). See especially Sections VIA and B and note 172.<br> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>...<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>> R. Caro (Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec 139, nos. 2 and 3, and sec. 141, no 2) rules according to Rosh and others that even >in the presence of a ba’al korei, the oleh is obligated to read along quietly with the reader, lest the oleh?s berakhot be considered in<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>> vain (le-vatala). As a result, Rabbi Caro furthermore rules, that a blind or illiterate person is precluded from receiving an aliyya.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoPlainText><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>></span>R. Moses Isserlish (Rema; Darkei Moshe, Tur, O.H., sec. 135, no.4 and sec. 141, no 1) concurs that normative halakha requires the oleh to read along with the reader - and hence a suma, who >can't read from the Torah, should not be able to get an Aliyya. However, Rema (in his gloss to Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 139, no 3) cites the leniency of R. Jacob Molin (Maharil) and others >who permit a blind or illiterate individual to receive an aliyya, even though neither can read along with the ba?al korei from the Torah parchment. According to Maharil, the Ba'al Korei can >read for the blind oleh via the mechanism of Shome'a ke-oneh because both the ba'al korei and the oleh are inherently obligated. Hence there can be a transfer of the act of reading from the >Ba'al korei to the oleh who makes the berakha. (We discuss this mechanism of Shomei'a ke-oneh at great length in Section II of the article.) <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoPlainText>> In contrast to Suma, Women are not obligated in Keri'at haTorah (this is the view of all known Rishonim and the overwhelming opinion of Aharonim - thoroughly documented in the article, >Section III and note 85). Hence shome'ah ke-oneh cannot work and the Berakha would be le-vatala. As a result, there is no such dispute or ruling regarding women receiving aliyyot in the >posekim.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>The problem with this analysis, as RAF and RDF freely acknowledge, is that the same discussions vis a vis a woman apply also to a katan, who is also not obligated in kriyas hatorah, or at most obligated mishum chinuch which is a lesser obligation, and may even be an obligation on the father, not the katan himself. Shomea k’oneh therefore cannot work for a katan receiving an aliya either.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>And yet it is a commonplace across the Sephardi world (and has been for the last two thousand years) to call up katanim to the Torah, in accordance with the mishna Megilla (24a) the rishonim and the Shulchan Aruch. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>It does vary as to the extent. Some at least appear to follow the Ari Zal that one can only call up a katan for shvi'i (this has to do with kabalistic analyses linking each of the aliyos on shabbas to one of the sfiros - see the Birchei Yosef 292:5) or at least do not call up katanim for the first three aliyos (also there). Some only call up for a maftir/haftorah (the Moroccans) and the S&P call up for haftorah only. But other groups call up katanim more generally throughout the seven aliyos on shabbas and the various aliyos on yom tov/yom kippur, and even on Mondays and Thursdays, - see Yachave Da'at (chelek 2 siman 15) where ROY justifies the Monday and Thursday practice (although he does prefer a specific tzorech in this case, given the split amongst the poskim as to whether one can call up a katan only on shabbas and yom tov or even on weekdays). <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>To give you a real life example: a few weeks ago the new (Ashkenazi) English Chief Rabbi (Rabbi Mirvis) who has been doing the rounds of the shuls in the Golders Green/Hendon area, decided for a given shabbas that he would visit the Sephardi shul that my husband went to as a child. So my husband decided to go (even though it is a fair walk from our house). And a boy in our nephew’s class (our nephew is eight(!) and one of the oldest in the class) layned beautifully for the Chief Rabbi (not the Chief Rabbi’s aliya, but some of the others). In this instance the katan just layned and did not himself get an aliyah (although that was probably because while he had been down for months to prepare the layning, but once it turned out the Chief Rabbi was coming, there were too many important adults to spare an aliyah for a child). But in general all combinations occur. Katan laying for gadol, katan layning the portion that he is called up for, katan called up when gadol layns.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>That is, between the two halachos, that of permitting the calling up of a blind man, and that of calling up a katan, the katan is the normative, more generally halachically accepted, practice, even though the minhag in Ashkenaz is not to do it (but even the Rema acknowledges its normative nature, holding only that one should not call up kattan forall seven aliyos (Shulchan Aruch Orech Chaim siman 282 si’if 3)). On the other hand the calling up of a blind man is much more halachically difficult to justify, even though the Rema does indeed acknowledge the minhag from the Meharil to so call, despite the opposition of the vast majority of the rishonim.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>So what in effect RAF and RDF are arguing for is that the logic applied to justify the difficult, hard to legitimise case (that of the blind), should then applied back onto the normative, everybody agrees the halacha permits case (the katan), and used to illegitimate it; and with it the practices of half the Jewish people for thousands of years. And that I don’t believe is a tenable position.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>So, how do we deal with the difficult case of the minhag vis a vis the blind man? Now the most common way to justify this is, as RAF/RDF say, is by reference to shomea k’oneh. That is, in the case of a blind man, where that man cannot look into the Torah scroll himself and read (albeit quietly) despite standing there at the bimah, and where he is forbidden to read ba’al peh, because of the principle that Torah shebichtav is forbidden to be read ba’al peh, the usual justification for the minhag is to fall back on the idea that in fact the blind man is relying on the reading by the ba’al koreh under shomea k’oneh. But at most that means that in this particular scenario a special relationship is formed between the oleh and the baal koreh, meaning we need to have equivalent obligation, so in the case where a blind man is called up, the person layning would then need to be a gadol and not a katan. But to then suggest that this should undermine the normative case permitted for at least the last two thousand years and rule out a katan being called to the Torah, would seem to be a case of the tail wagging the dog.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>And note that despite the existence of a few rishonim holding for shomea k’oneh and the posited reliance in order to justify the minhag, the fundamental underlying problem as identified in the rishonim remains, that a blind man who is called up to the Torah is doing no more than any other member of the congregation in listening to the reading of the ba’al koreh, just merely from a position a little closer to the ba’al koreh. If a man from the congregation needs to go to the bathroom between aliyos, and thereby misses the brachos on a portion of the Torah, he does not need to say those brachos quietly before he listens to the reading of the ba’al koreh, because of the general principle that his brachos in the morning patur his Torah learning all day (Shuchan Aruch Orech Chaim siman 47 si’if 10). And while various rishonim are prepared qualify this by saying that if there is a sufficient hefsek (such as a fixed sleep) he can/should repeat the brachos, there is nothing of this nature that would normally be deemed to create such a break between the birchos haTorah in birchos hashachar and the layning after shachris (the consensus being that going to the bathroom is not a sufficient hefsek). But if there was a general shomea k’oneh relationship that set up a bracha on the part of the listener, a late running newcomer to shul or a bathroom returner who missed the brachos from the oleh would need to say the brachos too!<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>This is why the majority rishonic position is that one cannot call a blind man to the Torah, because while the ordinary oleh is doing something special when he is called up, namely looking in the Torah scroll and reading along quietly (something that is not done by the rest of the congregation and which justifies the special bracha) the blind man is doing nothing special over and above the rest of the congregation, and if for the rest of the congregation eg coming back from the bathroom or coming in late to say the brachos over the Torah would be bracha l’vatala (and no shomea k’oneh is set up between that man and the ba’al koreh), so too would it be for the blind man. So at best what can say is that a special relationship is permitted to be formed between the blind man and the ba’al koreh, a relationship that need not be set up for any other oleh, of shomea k’oneh, which allows in the difficult case the saying of the brachos, but that in the normal case, the normative situation applies and there is no shomea k’oneh as per the majority rishonim.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>I might perhaps suggest however (independent of the above) that the understanding of why we have here a bracha l’vatala, or more technically a bracha sheano tzricha, (because it would in fact be a valid bracha if the blind man had not said his birchas hatorah in the morning and these brachos were not duplicative) might give an alternative explanation of how one can justify calling up a blind man. Because once the chachamim instituted that every oleh makes brachos, in doing so they operated to change what the birchas hatorah in the morning cover. Originally a man saying the birchas hatorah in the morning patured all his learning that day (or at least up until there was a valid hefsek). But once the chachamim made their takana, that every oleh makes birchos hatorah, what that effectively meant was that the birchos hatorah in the morning can be deemed to patur all his learning that day *<b>except for the learning he does if/when he is offered an aliyah and is called up to the Torah</b>*, since this will be covered by the separate brachos that the chachamim instituted he will make as an oleh.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>And once you say that this is the standard position for every able sighted man, then this could be true also for somebody blind. In a place where the minhag was not to call up a blind man, then that learning when called up to the Torah never takes place. However in a place where the minhag is to call up a blind man, he too would understand his birchas hatorah in the morning not to cover any Torah learning that he does when offered an aliyah and called up to the Torah. (Note by the way that in this day and age, the whole question is for the most part not applicable to the illiterate, as the illiterate today are overwhelming illiterate in Hebrew because they are not frum, and hence are likely not to have made any birchas hatorah in the morning at all, particularly in Sephardi circles where birchas hatorah are said prior to coming to shul, and so there is likely no bracha l’vatala).<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>However this explanation of why calling up a blind man does not result in a bracha sheaino tzricha is still likely still be a problem for the Shulchan Aruch (and Rav Ovadiah who follows him), because they hold that a bracha sheino tzricha is an issur d’orisa. So it is one thing in relation to the situation where the chachamim actually made their takana of each oleh making a bracha, which was in the days when everybody read for themselves (and which by definition therefore excluded a blind man who could not read and therefore could not be called up). All acknowledge that the power to determine the circumstances for brachos was given over to the chachamim . Hence they could mandate a bracha in a circumstance where otherwise it would be a bracha sheano tzricha. But to extend this to a blind man and allow him to make a bracha sheano tzricha when we could prevent any question of this by never calling up a blind man and thus avoid any concern that one might come to violate an issur d’orisa is not territory in which they would likely be willing to go. But for those following the Ashkenazi tradition, which follows the position of Tosphos and others that a bracha sheino tzricha is only an issur d’rabbanan and who therefore allow a bracha to be said even on a minhag (like half Hallel); allowing a blind man also, like a fully able man, to bifurcate his morning brachos, and have them not cover any Torah learnt during any potential aliya does not seem such a difficult position to take. But such an understanding would mean that no bracha l’vatala is occurring when a blind man is called up without any need to resort to shomea k’oneh. And this would also comfortably allow for some of the Brisker extensions based on the Meharil that RAF/RDF cite without needing to reject the overwhelming majority of rishonim and without postulating a fundamental rejection of normative halacha as practiced across the Sephardi world for hundreds of generations.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>But whether this suggestion is valid or no, the fact is that katanim are not obligated in krias hatorah, and shomeah k’oneh cannot work vis a vis them, and yet nobody suggests that the brachos they make week in and week out across the Sephardi world are brachos l’vatala or that their calling up is invalid on this basis, and certainly not based on the halachic stretch that is the calling up of the blind.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> <br>>Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer<br><br><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Regards<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Chana<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div></body></html>