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RAM:<br>
<br>
<<I think we all might agree that the things God does are good
by definition. If so, then He is definitionally unable to do evil,
just as He is difinitionally unable to make the rock or the
rectangle. I think RDR is saying that God is not only definitionally
unable to <b class="moz-txt-star"><span class="moz-txt-tag">*</span>do<span
class="moz-txt-tag">*</span></b> evil, but even to <b
class="moz-txt-star"><span class="moz-txt-tag">*</span>look<span
class="moz-txt-tag">*</span></b> at evil. And I might agree,
except that I don't really know what "God looking at evil" <b
class="moz-txt-star"><span class="moz-txt-tag">*</span>means<span
class="moz-txt-tag">*</span></b>.>><br>
<br>
<snip><br>
<br>
<<How can that be? Can one really think that God is unaware of
the evil in this world? I don't even know where to begin to argue
against that.>><br>
<br>
I entered this discussion in the middle. You and RMB (and possibly
some others) were discussing how God construes time. I offered the
suggestion that God doesn't construe time as a single category, but
that He construes different spans of time (e.g., Tishrei, Nisan) as
different archetypes (e.g., geulah al derech hateva, geulah al
derech neis).<br>
<br>
I pointed you to Wolfson's article about intradeical and extradeical
Platonic ideas, and, of course, neglected to mention that I'm using
"archetype" as a synonym for "Platonic ideas".<br>
<br>
At this point we are impinging on the muddy boundary between Jewish
thought and classical philosophy, so please bear with me as I spend
a few minutes with Plato.<br>
<br>
One of the conceptual problems people have raised about Plato is
that, throughout the dialogues, there are many examples of Platonic
ideas, but none of them are negative. He discusses "Justice", for
example, but not "Injustice". Why not?<br>
<br>
Socrates, according to Plato, was of the opinion that people do
wrong only through ignorance (cf. MN II:11). Platonic ideas
represent the ideal version of something real, which (modern
philosophers might think this paragraph is meaningless) cannot be
the product of a mistake. So "Injustice" can't be a Platonic idea
because it's not the ideal version of anything.<br>
<br>
There is a parallel discussion among Jewish thinkers about why evil
exists (I strongly recommend that you learn through the Ramban's
commentary on Iyov), and it contains many disagreements (MN III:12).<br>
<br>
But one of those opinions is that evil is a mirage induced by the
lack of a sufficiently broad perspective. The classic example is
that when you punish your kids, they think that's bad, but it serves
a good goal in the long run. So one answer to your question is that
God is aware of what happens, but He construes it using archetypes
other than "Evil", because<br>
in the long run it has a good end, and the depredations of
Nebuchadnezzar, which the prophet was discussing, were in the long
run productive.<br>
<br>
David Riceman<br>
<br>
<br>
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