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<font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Re: Truth and the
Rambam<br>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">ZL:
The idea that in transmitting the mesorah, the legal
status of objects,</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">:
actions or thoughts should conform to a single original
Intent predates</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">:
Aristotle and goes back to Moshe Rabbeynu and beyond. The
entire</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">:
enterprise in the Gemora that pits one Mishnah or speaker
against another</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">:
and concludes either that the later speaker is in error or
that one of</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">:
the statements must be modified so that they conform,
assumes that there</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">:
is a single original idea that must be complied with.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">RMB:
What about the notion that eilu va'eilu reflects that
fact that HQBH's</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Original
Intent (kavayakhol) is diffracted into a spectrum
of opinions</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">by
the time it reaches the human mind?</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
style=""> </span></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">ZL:<br>
The rishonim and acharonim treat <span style=""></span>“eilu
v’eilu” as logically untenable,
indeed incomprehensible, if it is taken to mean at face value
that contradicting
halachos of identical scenarios are both true. Those who offer
an explanation (such
as the Rashi you quoted, more on that later) all modify the face
value of “eilu
v’eilu” so that the two sides are not actually talking about the
same scenario
(Rashi), and/or they explain that the truthfulness attributed to
each side does not
refer to the predominate halachic character of the matter,
whereas the final
halacha does.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">(Two
blind men who, by feeling different parts of an
elephant, each come to a different conclusion about what the
totality of the
elephant is, are both wrong. If each admits that the part he is
feeling is a
different one, and therefore has different characteristics than
that felt and
described by his fellow blind man, then each realizes that they
are not
arguing, and will not think that the characteristics he
perceives form a kushya
against what the other<span style=""> </span>is describing.) </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">This
is why Chazal refer to forgotten halachos being
restored to their [original] status. If something had really
been both totally
or predominantly tamei and tahor in the identical scenario,
depending upon
which diffracted view of the original intent one maintains, what
was there to
restore? </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">So
whatever is meant by the notion that HQBH's Original
Intent (kavayakhol) is diffracted into a spectrum of opinions by
the time it
reaches the human mind, one cannot deny the fact—held not only
by the Rambam
but by every rishon in the world, and indeed every Torah
source—that Judaism is
defined by the transmission of what Moshe Rabbeynu received from
Sinai, the
laws of which he presented to the people there “as a shulchan
aruch.” He did
not transmit to us 600,000 conflicting rulings or conflicting
sevaros on each
case.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">As
the Yahm Shel Shlomo (Int. to BK) emphasizes, “she-lo
yatsa ha-davar mi-pi Moshe le-olom lih’yos shnei hafachim
b’nosei echad.”</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">And
as the Drashos HaRan #3 says, “Since the words of those
who declare something tamei and those who declare it tahor are
intrinsically
contradictory (hefchiyim b’atsmam), it is impossible for both of
them to be
conforming to the truth (ee-efshar sheh-sh’nayhem yas-kimu
l’emmess); how can
we say that all [the opinions] were said to Moshe mipi
HaG’vurah? Is there any uncertainty
in Heaven?”</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Even
the Ritva on Eruvin 13b, who famously quotes the
kabbalistic piece about “eilu v’eilu” comments, “V’nachon hu
l’fi ha-drash,
u-b’derech ha-emmess yeish taam sod b’davar,” which indicates
that this concept
is not to be taken at face value.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Rabbeynu
Peretz on Eruvin 13b prefaces the Midrash (as he
refers to it) by asking how one can say “eilu v’eilu divrei
Elokim Chaim,
since, “if it is asur, it isn’t mutar; and if it is mutar, is
isn’t asur. And
he follows up on the Midrash by saying, “Nevertheless, there is
a kushya [on the
face value of this Midrash] from things that already were, such
as the
Mizbayach—for one authority brings proof for it being 60 amos,
and one brings
proof for it being 20 amos….V’yesih lomar … “eilu v’eilu divrei
Elokim Chaim”
means that from the pesukim there is basis to darshan like each
opinion, but
certainly there was only one way [it could have been].</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Rashi
actually avoids the problem by focusing on the
language of the statement, that Moshe Rabbeynu’s receiving of 49
reasons one
way to posken and 49 reasons to posken otherwise, and his
helplessness over
what to accept as the halacha, all took place only before he
received the
Torah. The implication is that upon receiving the Torah he was
informed of the
correct sevoros; and the need for future Chachamim to decide
between sevoros
would be due to their eventual forgetting the original halacha
and appropriate
sevara to use.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">One
cannot deny the fact that the principle methodology by
which the poskim and Talmud determine the halacha is through
citing precedent
and assuming that there is an original intent to reach for.
Otherwise, it would
be pointless for any amora to pit a contradiction to another
from an earlier
and higher authority. His opponent could always answer,
“Hah!…that’s the way you,
or Aharon HaKohen heard it at Sinai, but I’m saying how I, or
Nachshon ben
Amindava heard it at Sinai!”</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">So
if it is true that the souls of the arguing tannaim and
amoraim witnessing the<span style=""> </span>Sinai revelation
literally
received different messages as to, say, the kashrus or
permissibility of
something (and that the source of halacha was their individual
receptions of
the revelation, rather than Moshe Rabbeynu’s transmission of the
revelation he
alone received) first we must say that the dispute can only be
concerning
things that were not stated explicitly. You must admit that this
can only be true
of corollaries of the distinct halachos that Hashem told Moshe
Rabbeynu. Surely
you do not doubt that all the minds at Sinai did get it clear
that animals with
split hoofs that chew their cud are kosher and the others are
not. You must
admit that all minds at Sinai got it clear that melacha on
Shabbos is assur,
and no one received a diffracted idea that it is mutar.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Secondly,
the same kabbalistic sources also state it becomes
the task of the Chachamim to determine what the halacha is. As I
already noted,
we see the methodology for doing this is eidus: tracing
authoritative
statements as far back as possible and checking their
consistency and accuracy.
What is this methodology aiming for, if not one authentic
halacha? It would be
a fatuous and futile exercise if the halachic status of each
given case
originally had 600,000 diffracted opinions perceived by the
tannaim’s and amoraim’s
souls at Sinai. </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
style=""> </span></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">The
rishonim and acharonim teach the nigleh and logical
approach that logical contradictions are unacceptable, and that
our source for
the Torah’s explanations is Moshe Rabbeynu’s clear teaching of
specific
halachos. They—the rishonim and acharonim—should be our guide in
approach
towards understanding the <a name="OLE_LINK1">esoteric </a>and
paradoxical<span style=""> </span>kabbalistic sources, and
therefore we should
adjust the face value of these perplexing sources the nigleh
sources, rather
than the other way around. So, we need to understand and
interpret the
kabbalistic sources that state that machlokess is a result of
the souls of the
tannaim and amoraim being at Sinai, each having received its own
understanding
of the revelations’ laws.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">RMB:
See Rashi (Kesuvos 57a, s.v. "ha QM"L"),
Ritva (Eiruvin 13b "eilu</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">va'eilu")
and every other rishon I know of (aside from
the Rambam)</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">on
plurality in machloqes.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">…</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
style=""> </span>ki peligi terei
amora'ei bedin or be'issur veheteir,</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
style=""> </span>kol chad amar
hakhi mistaveir taama,</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
style=""> </span>ein kan
sheqer.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
style=""> </span>Kol chad amar
sevara didei...</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
style=""> </span>Ve'ika lemeimar
"eilu ve'ulu DEC"H"</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
style=""> </span>zimnin deshayakh
hai ta'ama vezimnin deshayakh hai taama.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Rashi's
opinion works because he holds that halakhah is a
legal process,</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">not
a single truth to be mined out of the sources.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">ZL:
I disagree, one reason being the immediately preceding
part of that Rashi you left out:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">D’ki
peligei terei aliba d’chad—mar amar hachi amar ploni,
u’mar amar hachi amar ploni—chad mi’niy-hu MESHAKER.—When two
amoraim are
arguing over [what another] one [said]—one saying this is what
he said, and
another saying this is what he said—one of the two is saying
something false.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Then
Rashi continues with the piece you cite:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">But
when two amaoriam are arguing over the din or in the
prohibited and permitted, each one saying “Hakchi mistaveir
taama (This
understanding is more probable)—there is no falsehood (ein kam
sheqer)---each
one is stating his own sevara: one offers the reason for which
he holds
something to be permitted, and one offers the reason for which
he holds it is
prohibited; one compares cases like this, and one makes compares
it another
way. And [therefore] one can say “Eilu V’eilu divrei Elokim
chaim.” Sometimes
this understanding is more appropriate and sometimes this
understanding is more
appropriate, because the [correct] understanding changes in
response to subtle
changes in the things [i.e., the situations—ZL].</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Why
must one of two people attributing opposite opinions to
someone be saying sheker, but neither of two people holding
opposite opinions
about what he feels is logical is saying sheker? Because the in
the second case
neither is attempting to identify something that had actually
occurred
previously or that was already established—they are reporting
their own
opinions. One must still be sheker relative to what was actually
said, but
neither is sheker in terms of what is being reported: the sevara
that makes
sense to the speaker. And, in that second case, the true
appropriate sevara to
apply is determined by subtle differences in the case at hand.
And while the
subtle properties of the scenario at hand really calls for one
sevara to be the
determining one—and therefore only one opinion of the halacha is
really
accurate—at other times similar scenarios subtly different will
make the other
sevara, producing the opposite halacha—the appropriate one.
This, Rashi holds ,
is the meaning of “eilue v’eilu.” Each sevara is correct in a
certain scenario.
But both sevoros cannot be correct in the same scenario.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">So
there is no doubt that if there are opposite reports or
conclusions about what someone already declared the halacha to
be—and Moshe
Rabbeynu accurately transmitting Hashem’s Torah laws was such a
person—then one
of those conclusions must be false. The aim of the tannaim and
amoraim was to
determine what that original intended halacha and sevara
producing it was.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">If
according to Rashi the aim is merely to follow some “legal
process” without regard to original intent of what the correct
sevara is, why does
the validity of a sevara depend upon its appropriateness at some
times? What
indeed makes it appropriate, if there is no original intent to
match up to? Let
each opinion be valid solely on the basis that it was expressed
by a tanna or
amora whose mind perceived the diffracted version of the halacha
at Sinai he
expressed!</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">The
legal process IS the attempt to determine the original
intent.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">And
this is why an amora who was still alive could inform his
talmidim that some understood him correctly and others got it
wrong—and that
the erring talmid was not merely in touch with some other
equally true
diffracted version of Hashem’s original intent.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">RMB:
RMB: See Rashi (Kesuvos 57a, s.v. "ha
QM"L"), Ritva (Eiruvin 13b "eilu</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">va'eilu")
and every other rishon I know of (aside from
the Rambam)</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">on
plurality in machloqes.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">ZL:
Well, not the Tosefos and Rashi discussed, nor the Ran,
Ritva or Rabbeynu Peretz. What rishon do you have in mind? And
not the Maharal,
Yam Shel Shlomo, Reb Yisrael Salanter or Ohr Gedaliahu (see
Dynamics of
Dispute). They all modify the face value of “eilu v’eilu” so
that the two sides
are not actually talking about the same scenario, and/or they
explain that the
truthfulness attributed to each side does not refer to the
predominate halachic
character of the matter, whereas the final halacha does.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">RMB:
Which I'm saying is unlike the Rambam.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">ZL:
The Rambam says the same thing as Rashi, that a halacha/sevara
assigned to a given scenario either matches the original intent
or does not;
but if that halacha/sevara is not extant, it can be debated over
with each side
having a reasonable chance of matching the original.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">“Machlokess
occurs with those halachos they brought out
through derech ha-sevara…and this will happen when analysis
differs. And for
this reason they said: If it is a [decided received] halacha we
will accept it;
but if it is derived through analysis, we have logical basis to
disagree”
(Hakdama L’Payrush HaMishnayos).</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">Zvi
Lampel</font></p>
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