<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div><br>On Thu, Jul 23, 2009 at 08:29am EDT, R Dr Meir Shinnar wrote:<br>: 1. The discussion started with a discussion of RHS's psak (not mussar <br>: schmooz) that a public role inherently required a violation of <br>: tzeniut, and required a mattir in the form that someone had to to do <br>: it - and only someone obligated could violate his tzeniut. We are now <br>: told that we shouldn't focus on halacha - this is hyperlegalism - this <br>: is a matter of mussar. I take it that you are not willing to defend <br>: the halachic nature of this psak any more.<br>RMB<br>Well, I think to better articulate what I'm saying, let's break it into<br>two levels.<br><br>I see the mussar effect of the activity as the metzi'us about which RHS<br>is pasqening. Not that there are dinei tzeni'us, but that the existence<br>of a fundamental mussar concept of tzeni'us causes halachic outcome.<br><br>Thus one shouldn't be trying to analyze tzeni'us on a halachic level. As I<br>wrote, being a shocheit does make one more capable of dealing with blood,<br>whether the shechitah is a qiyum asei or not. That was the point I was<br>centering on. Hutrah vs dechuyah isn't the right discussion, because<br>we're still discussing psychology on "what do we expect will happen<br>to our personalities" terms.<br><br>After the mussar is resolved, then on can ask what that reality demands<br>in terms of a halachic response. The halakhah involved is either the<br>Ramban's qedoshim tihyu "bemah shemutar lakh" or the Rambam's lehidamos<br>bidrakhav (quoting the list of mitzvos asei preceding Hil' Dei'os).<font class="Apple-style-span" color="#000000"><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#144FAE"><br></font></font></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The issue with this formulation is as follows</div><div>1) I am not sure what you mean with your statement about not analyzing tzeniut on a halachic level. The issue wasn't trying to apply some novel halachic hakira - or even standard halachic terminology (hutra or dechuya was suggested by others)- but to subject the concept to a rigorous analysis - both conceptually, as well as in terms of our understanding of what communal and Jewish norms have been - both been on a practical level, as well as on an ideal level. This analysis concluded that the notion of tzeniut suggested by RHB and defended by you, while having precursors in, say, Christian and Stoic ideology, has no basis in Judaism - which has rejected the denigration of public service at its core. </div><div><br></div><div>2) the issue of the ramban's kedoshim tihyu or lehidamot bidrachav - there are issues where the application of that standard is quite clear (naval bireshut hatorah). THere are others where it is quite difficult and subjective - I would argue that a woman engaged in public teaching of torah, chaplaincy, etc - is engaged in lehidamot bidrachav, and is actaully part of kedoshim tihyu bemah shemutar lach ( as she doesn't go into alternate, higher paying jobs using her skills (see RM Broyde's article in the Jewish Week, republished on Hirhurim, where he talks about he used to counsel intelligent women who were intstead in serious learning to go into secular law...) The issue that needs to be answered is why this violates those parameters - and this is not clear at all...</div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>: 2. WRT mussar - there are different values. Yes, there is a large <br>: mussar literature on the danger of being seduced by honor and power - <br>: and the need to train oneself against them. What there isn't in <br>: mainstream Jewish literature is the implication that public service is <br>: something to be avoided unless there is a particular requirement...<br><br>Except RHS holds that being asked to be chazan etc... is a precedent<br>for that very thing. That accepting being chazan is only something you<br>should do when the minyan would otherwise be stuck.<br><br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The problem is that this halahca of a chazan is something we don't follow in general - and even you don't follow it. This is on two levels.</div><div>1) In terms of kibbudim, most shuls are not makpid on this issue of a hazan (and it was suggested, with good evidence, that the issue is not one of tzeniut, but derech eretz). We don't also follow it in most other issues - as has been pointed out, at a wedding, we would not be stuck if we only had two other people under the huppa as edim, mesader kisddushin etc- but we call other rabbanim as well, even though we wouldn't be stuck without them.....If this is a real halacha of tzeniut, we need to be consistent - as it would apply far more broadly.</div><div><br></div><div>2) In terms of public policy, we do want to encourage people to do things for the community - not just when the community is stuck. No organization would survive or be founded if the response of everyone was call me if you really need me, and would be other wise stuck. Nothing new would ever be done. Eg, you admitted that you support R Jungreis, because of the good that she does. When she started out, how did we (or she) know that she would have a good effect? She wasn't fulfilling a role that the community recognized as needing, nor did it recognize her as the one that it needed. If today someone wants to go and emulate her, how does she know that she would be successful and that the community would otherwise be stuck? That is why the traditional response has been to encourage involvement in the public sphere - including areas where we didn't know whether there was a real need. It is a model that is not viable for the Jewish or other community - and has never been followed - and never should be followed.</div><blockquote type="cite"><div>: Your approach, which places individual self fulfillment ahead of the <br>: needs of the community, is problematic - and without precedent...<br><br>But it doesn't! It says that personal need bows to the needs of the<br>community. What it doesn't allow is violating personal need without<br>proving that the community gains from the violation.<br><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#000000"><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#144FAE"><br></font></font></div></blockquote><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>When the minyhan needs a chazan, go, be a chazan.<br><br></div></blockquote><div>the issue is determining what the community needs.. You are viewing maharat etc as a means of personal fulfilment of the individual - and I (and RCL had a similar response) view it as a response to the needs of the community - which was initiated by the Mara D'atra of that community in response to those needs.</div><div>But in general, as above, this is a view that is against traditional jewish thought. If I have a new idea to start a hesed organization, do we say we don't know whether we need it, so don't start it?? We encourage people to become publicly involved.</div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>I think this entire self vs community dichotomy is off target. It's<br>about self refinement as a halachic end. In the case of tzeni'us, that's<br>vs the community, but that's only one instance of a more general idea.<br>But since the community "wins" even in my model, it isn't placing the<br>individual first.<br><br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It is precisely that you place self refinement as the fundamental goal and sole measure that is problematic, rather than communal needs. Furthermore, the community does not win in your model, because the initiative to identify new needs and solutions is stifled. </div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>: 3. You emphasize that the issue is the accomodation of the individual <br>: women's desire for religiosity, and focus on the maharat as violating <br>: kadesh et atzmech bema shemutar lakh - viewing it as a form of self <br>: expression and realization. This reflects (IMHO) a complete <br>: misunderstanding of the issue - and reflects, again a bias for the <br>: individual self perfection over the community. The issue is quite <br>: different - and is intrinsically a communal issue - and one of tzorche <br>: tzibbur (properly understood). The issue is that we are now dealing <br>: with a community (which reflects all of its members) which has <br>: undergone major structural changes - and the issue is of addressing <br>: the spiritual/religious/halachic needs of that community - where many <br>: of the women today routinely live, outside the shul, a very public <br>: life....<br><br>And again, the question is whether that should be a given.<br><br>Do we accomodate this structural change or resist it? Isn't that the<br>entire question? You're assuming the change, and then asking "Now what?"<br><br>I wouldn't.<br><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#000000"><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#144FAE">W</font></font></div></blockquote>WADR, you misunderstand the issue. The structural change has occured. Yes the question is to accomodate or resist it. However, resisting it has to be systemic - one has to oppose the change in social roles for women. If you want to be consistent, you have to oppose the role of women in the workplace, be against women lawyers, etc. that suggests a consistent vision. (It has its own problems, but at at least it is consistent). I have not seen that approach in the MO community, and very little in the American haredi community. The question therefore is, if the structural change has occured, and we are accomodating it (perhaps even encouraging it, but the norm is at least to accomodate it), what is the proper religious and halachic response? One can argue about the details of any proposed solution, but to resist religious and halachic accomodation while being comfortable with social accomodation is, ultimately, to argue that halahca and religion are and should be irrelevant. You can't accomodate the social and economic sphere, and just resist on the religious sphere.</div><div><br></div><div>RMB and I have disagreed on many issues - but his opposition has normally been cogent. For the first time, I confess that I am truly puzzled by his dedication to this model of tzeniut - which seems (IMHO) to be so profoundly immoral and without basis. I understand opposition to some of the innovations, but do not understand his support of this issue.</div><div><br></div><div>Meir Shinnar</div><div><div><br></div></div></body></html>