<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><blockquote type="cite"><div><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#000000"><br></font><br><br><blockquote type="cite">But, and I think this is where RAF above is misunderstanding RMS, RMS above<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">is talking about being an advocate (lawyer) in the court system (and the<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">secular court system at that). ?Being a lawyer is a very very different kind<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">of situation to being either a litigant or a witness.<br></blockquote><br>Based on RMS' reaction to my post, I don't think I misunderstood him.<br>He mentioned that women surely aren't barred from court, and I pointed<br>out that there is/are (a) maamar(ei) 'Hazal that say(s) the opposite.<br>I did not attempt to analyze whether or not we are presently bound by<br>those maamarim, or whether they depend on societal norms or whatever;<br>that exercise I left to him and other participants to the "Tzeni'us<br>and gender roles" thread, which I enjoy reading without getting<br>actively involved ;-).<br></div></blockquote><div>While I am honored to be darshened, my point was somewhat in the middle. RCl is right that I was pointing out that the current MO/YU community accepts as a matter of course public roles for women in the nonreligious sphere - intending lawyers in secular court, which is a common career path. However, this is in spite of the fact that there exists clear textual precedents, as well as history of social norms, that would argue against such roles( kol kevudah bas melekh penimah was finally brought in, but there ar others) - these are not thought to apply. The text RAF is another one that suggests a problem - which is not held to be binding. However, WRT the specific text</div><blockquote type="cite"><div><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#006312"><br></font>Beautiful hypothesis. However, lacking strong proof, you should keep<br>in mind that you may or may not be right. Data point: the maamar<br>'Hazal I quoted from Rashi states melamed she-ein la-isha *reshut*<br>ledabber bifnei ha-ish.<br><br>According to your beautiful theory, the maamar should have taught:<br>"she-ein ha-isha *tzerikha*" or "*'hayyavet,*" "le-dabber bifnei<br>ha-ish."<br></div></blockquote></div>while it may express reservations, I do not think carries the weight that RAF suggests - that it is a blanket prohibition (she ein laisha reshut) to speak before a court - understanding haish as the court - the issue is a far more limited one. After all, in general (to distinguish from the particular case being discussed, there is no such issur - a woman litigant is allowed to speak before a court, and a woman is allowed to testify in areas where we accept her testimony (eg, roughlyin areas where it is one of ne'emanut, rather than a formal ma'ase edut), and I have not heard of any posek who would use this rashi to disqualify such speech, so it is difficult to read this as such a blanket issur. )Furthermore, the language - bifnei haish - is strange, if ish is referring to the bet din. <div><br></div><div>I think that the answer lies in the case, and it is a far more specific issur (albeit one that suggests family dynamics..) The particular case being discussed was motzi shem ra - and the issue is that before the court appear the father and mother (not the primary victim), and then only the father speaks - and the question is why either not the girl, or why doesn't the mother speak - and therefore the tora temima's pshat makes perfect sense - the rationale here is the kavod of the father - and the wife is not allowed to speak before haish - the ba'al. </div><div><br></div><div>Meir Shinnar</div></body></html>