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On Areivim, RMB posted:<BR>
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<<However, your "in genera" is a paraphrase of Kant's definition of<BR>ethics, the categorical imperative. Most decisions are hypothetical<BR>imperatives; IOW, if I want to cease being hungry, I should eat. (I<BR>wonder why that example came to mind?) A moral decision is one not<BR>based on a goal, that hypothetical. Without something to put behind an<BR>"if", you end up with a requirement that is not conditional on anything<BR>but the situation. The categorical imperative. The usual translation of<BR>his exact words reads:<BR>Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time<BR>will that it should become a universal law.<BR>-- Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr James E<BR>Wellington>><BR>
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I have wondered from some time whether the categorical imperative finds expression in halakha. Perhaps I am misunderstanding Kant's concept altogether, but I frame it my mind as follows: Supposing that there is a halakhic imperative not to destroy grass, is there a halakhic imperative not to walk on the grass because, if everyone did it, the grass would be destroyed, even though my individual act of walking on the grass will contribute only negligibly to its destruction? This has exercised my mind far more since making aliyah 4 months ago. In Israel, a vast array of my individual decisions are affected by the categorical imperative, because if they were copied by the majority of my fellow Israelis, their impact could be huge. <BR>
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For instance, in chu'l, my decision to buy food with one hechsher and not that with another is largely a personal decision. In making that decision, I might weigh up the halakhic leniencies/stringencies which the particular kashrus organisation applies, the cost, the impact on my family, etc. In Israel, the same question involves me asking questions of communal impact. To illustrate, a number of weeks ago, a rabbi from the kashrus department of the Tzohar group of Rabbis advocated that all of us, including dati Jews, only eat food with a Rabbanut hechsher, and not eat food with a mehadrin hechsher from a private supervising body (eg the various badatzim) unless it also bears a rabbanut mehadrin hechsher. His argument is that, if datiim/charedim only purchase food with the badatz hechsherim, Israeli restaurateurs and food manufacturers who are unwilling to meet the higher standards required by the badatzim will simply go treif, leading to secular Israelis eating chazir treif rather than at least minimally kosher food when they go to a restaurant or supermarket. In other words, what appears to be a chumra on my part (buying the badatz product) when viewed from an individual standpoint, may in fact be a kulla, or indeed a michshol, from a communal or categorical standpoint. The argument is not simply that we need a minimal rabbanut hechsher to maintain a basic standard for the hamon am, it is that the medakdekim adopt the same standard in order to save it for the majority.<BR>
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Another case in point is the heter mechira/yevul nochri dispute. If I alone purchase yevul nochri rather than rely on heter mechira, I have not really contributed to foreign ownership of the Land of Israel, not connived in the issur of lo sechonem, and, on the contrary, have avoided a number of real halachic problems. However, if a whole community adopts the same course, lo sechonem and contributing to terrorism become real issues. (Of course, we can argue about the metzius, but that is the argument.) A narrow halachic approach, if I can call it that, would focus on the classic halachic issues. A broader halachic approach would admit the broader, communal consequences in the decision-making process. <BR>
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However, halacha certainly does endorse the notion that some modes of conduct are for the elite (the baalei nefesh, medakdekim, or however else it is sometimes phrased in halachic literature). Clearly, the intention was never that such conduct be copied by the masses (lo kol harotzeh litol es hashem...). Wouldn't the categorical imperative, as I have (mis)understood it, dismiss this approach, insisting that if the conduct cannot be generalised, it should be not be followed?<BR>
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Kol tuv<BR>
Dov Kaiser<BR>
Rehovot, Israel<BR><BR><br /><hr />Beyond Hotmail - see what else you can do with Windows Live. <a href='http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/134665375/direct/01/' target='_new'>Find out more.</a></body>
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