It seems that a post of mine was misunderstood. I will now clarify it.

R' Michael Kopinsky wrote:
> I think that the fact that the Torah permits slavery
> indicate that it is not INHERENTLY problematic. Just
> like polygamy, there are times when slavery is OK.
> Both are unacceptable under certain circumstances,
> which is why polygamy is assur, and slavery may as well
> be. ... Murder, on the other hand, (if it is actually
> murder, and not permitted killing) is absolutely
> immoral, and no societal norms can EVER be machshir
> murder.

To me, rape is an inherently immoral act, so I played "devil's 
advocate" and used it to demonstrate a logical flaw in RMK's post. I 
wrote:
> According to this logic, rape is not inherently immoral,
> because if it was, then we would not find a case (yefas
> toar) where it is mutar.

In other words, according to RMK's logic (which says that if 
something is occasionally allowed by the Torah, it cannot be an 
inherently immoral act) rape is *not* inherently immoral. But since I 
presume that rape *is* inherently immoral, my conclusion is that 
RMK's logic is flawed.

However, I would like to propose a variation of RMK's logic which 
seems satisfactory to me:

When the Torah permits something in all cases, this indicates that it 
is not inherently immoral. RMK's examples of polygamy and slavery are 
in this category. When the Torah forbids something in the vast 
majority of cases, this indicates that it *is* inherently immoral, 
even though there might be some exceptions where that act is allowed. 
This category includes killing people (despite the exceptions for 
executions and self-defense) and rape (despite the exception for 
yefas toar).

Akiva Miller