Are the two notions of Eilu v'Eilu and a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim essentially identical, two ways of expressing the same idea? Or, do they refer to two different ideas? If different, how do the two overlap? Is one a more general category, encompassing the other one? Or, is it like a Venn diagram where they overlap but both maintain areas beyond the overlap?

I had assumed that they were identical, that any positions considered part of a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim would be also be considered as positions falling with the realm of Eilu v'Eilu, and that likewise, if two (or more) positions could be appropriately defined as Eilu v'Eilu, then the dispute they concerned would also be a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim. Yet, perhaps I was
mistaken in this assumption?

I suppose my broader concern is the boundaries of Orthodoxy, and what happens when one sizable group considers the positions of another sizable group to be beyond the pale. How do we define such disputes in terms of Eilu v'Eilu and Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim?

Let me provide two cases that might help explicate this:

1. The institutionalization of girls' Gemara. By this I mean the formal teaching of Gemara to girls in a day school setting, as is done in Brookline's Maimonides School and elsewhere. As I understand it, many rabbinic authorities would hold that although individual girls or women could
on their own initiative request to study Gemara, that it should not be taught, even on an optional basis, in a formalized classroom setting. And not only that it should not be done so, but that it is wrong or even forbidden to do so, that there is not even a valid halakhic debate here, that the position in favor of the practice is really beyond the pale, and that we do not have a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim or a case of Eilu v'Eilu here.

2. The issue of whether or not Daas Torah extends beyond halakhic matters. Do we (are we obligated to) turn to the Gedolei HaDor for correct views on such non-halakhic matters as politics and science? Again, my impression is that although many Orthodox Jews reject such an expansive notion of Daas Torah, many others consider this rejection itself as beyond the pale, and that we likewise do not have a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim or a case of Eilu v'Eilu.

I suppose the two examples could be elements of a single, larger one, as a core part of the argument against something like institutionalized girls' Gemara is that--regardless of the halakhic merits or issues--it has not been embraced by the Gedolei HaDor. One might consider the debate over banning Rabbi Slifkin's books as another example. Was that a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim and/or a case of Eilu v'Eilu? What happens when there is disagreement within Orthodox circles about how to characterize such a dispute? And, finally, as I have read or at least inferred recently in writings by Rabbi Nathan Lopes-Cardozo and Rabbi Benjamin Hecht, what value are these concepts if one includes only positions with which one agrees or at most refers only to differences of nusach or chumrah observance? Are not these concepts only meaningful when they encompass vehemently argued opposing positions, where one believes strongly that the opposing view is incorrect, but retains a certain respect nonetheless? And if so, where do we draw the line (because obviously there are limits, and we would not want to say anything goes, to include for example a debate over whether or not a person can drive on Shabbos)? In a way, then, I am asking what the boundaries of an Orthodox pluralism would be, and how and who defines those boundaries? And my worry is that, increasingly, the boundaries are being narrowed so severely, that the Orthodox community itself is moving further and further away from any hope of Jewish unity...

Alan Krinsky
