[Avodah] Telling LH to AI

[Micha Berger]

Is one allowed to tell LH to AI? Does the issur require that the bad
impression of someone actually gets spread, or is any exercising of this
bad middah assur?

See https://riets.substack.com/p/can-you-speak-lashon-hara-to-chat
(below) by R Daniel Z Feldman of YU's Kollel Elyon

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

Can You Speak Lashon Hara to Chat-GPT?
May 05, 2025
Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman
RIETS Bella and Harry Wexner Kollel Elyon Substack

This is our second straight week of speaking lashon hara, with the Torah
reading of Taria-Metzora last week, where it is a subtext, and Kedoshim
this week, where the prohibition itself appears: "do not walk, or travel,
as a talebearer (or peddler)" (Lev. 16:19). In that context, my daughter
posed a practical question: can I speak lashon hara to Chat-GPT?

On the surface, the question seems like a simple one: as impressive as AI
is, it is not another person; one is not actually sharing the derogatory
information with someone else. However, there are a number of factors
to consider.

One is that lashon hara is not only an offense of harm against another,
but it is considered a corruption of character as well. The Talmud
identifies the speaker himself as one of three who are "killed" by lashon
hara, along with the subject and the recipient (Arakhin 15b). All sin is
a source of harm to the sinner himself, in that through such actions the
perpetrator incurs guilt and punishment. However, the sense is that this
arena is unique in its impact on the actor, imposing an effect distinct
from that of sin in general.

>From a philosophical perspective, many Jewish thinkers have focused on
the unique role of speech as a defining element of humanity. Speech,
at least in its fully realized form, distinguishes Man from the animal,
and as an expression of thought, this is a distinction with a profound
difference. This notion is reflected in the Aramaic translation of Onkeles
to the verse "and Man became a living soul (Gen. 2:7)", where the last
words are rendered ruach mimalela, or "a talking spirit". The Chafetz
Chaim, in his introduction, cites this phrasing in explaining why he
subtitled the main section of his work Mekor Chaim, or "Source of Life".

Further, it has been noted, speech is an essentially nonphysical act with
an immense impact on the physical world, and thus wields an awesome power
(See Netivot Olam, netiv halashon, ch. 2, and Shemirat HaLashon, sha'ar
hazekhirah, ch. 1); in the words of the verse, "death and life are in the
hands of the tongue (Prov. 18:21.)". Accordingly, the attribute of speech
demands extreme care and sensitivity in its usage, and the abuse of this
precious resource imposes an exceptional degradation on the speaker (See
R. Moshe Schapiro, in BeYad HaLashon pp. 373-379; R. Mordechai Karlebach,
Chavatzelet HaSharon, Num. pp. 436-438;R. Eliyahu Bakshi Doron, Sichot
Binyan Av, II, Parashat Metzora.).

Further, on a level that is more psychological/moral, it is asserted
that offenses of speech both reflect and deepen particularly unsavory
elements of the human personality. Significantly, the speaker of lashon
hara may, by doing so, display a bias toward negativity, a dangerous
attitude which feeds upon itself and ultimately affects all that is in
its purview. Maimonides writes as much in his legal code (Mishneh Torah,
Hil. Tuma'at Tzara'at 16:10), where he notes a direct path from hearsay
to heresy, noting that those who at first are merely cynical in their
orientation will eventually come to disparage and deny God Himself. This
aspect must not be understated; the tendency toward a negative assessment,
when circumstances allow for other perspectives, is profoundly corrosive
and, left unchecked, can undermine the possibility of a fair treatment and
appreciation for any value of life (For a discussion of the relationship
between a general attitude of negativity and lashon hara, see R. Avigdor
Nevenzahl, Sichot LiSefer Shemot, pp. 328-331).

It seems clear that lashon hara represents at least two categories of
evil: an act of damage, an offense against the subjects of the speech;
and a base character trait, an aspect of the personality dangerous to
the soul (The psychological makeup of the personality inclined toward
gossip is discussed in Rumor and Gossip: The Social Psychology of
Hearsay pp. 81-83). Maimonides is often associated with an action-based
understanding of the Torah's commandments, regarding the technical
formulation of the commandments, if not their purpose. In other words,
even if the ultimate goal is an emotional or intellectual state, a
mitzvah would command an action as the means. Nonetheless, he does speak
of character traits in his legal code, in which he notes that a Torah
scholar "judges his fellow favorably, speaks in praise of his friend and
never to his disparagement" (Hil. Deiot 5:7. See the discussion in Emek
HaLashon, pp. 6-7).

Many authorities, including the Chafetz Chaim (Hilkhot Lashon Hara,
klal 3, in Be'er Mayim Chaim #7), have discerned this dual theme in
the writings of Maimonides as well. In the chapter of his legal code
addressing the principles of lashon hara, Maimonides seems to define the
prohibition twice (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Deiot 7:2-4). First, he rules
that one who disparages his fellow is in violation of this precept. In
the following paragraph (Ibid., 7:5), he reintroduces the concept, now
defining it as the relating of items that, if heard by other people,
cause "damage to his fellow, in his body or in his property, or even to
anguish and or to scare him". The implication here is that lashon hara
comes in two forms: the general disparaging of others, which appears to
be a character defect; and the actual harm inflicted upon others through
derogatory speech.

Some later scholars have suggested that the multiplicity of sources in
the Torah might correlate to varying elements of the prohibition and its
effects. For example, the "peddler" verse may be addressing the general
derogation of others, while other injunctions may address actual damage
inflicted upon the subject (See R. Avraham Shmuel Papenheim, Pinat Yakrat
to Bava Batra, # 133 and R. Elyakim Shlesinger in Ner LeEchad, Parshat
Kedoshim, pp. 476-478. Compare, however, R Meir Yechiel Weinshtok, Beit
Shlomo to Arakhin, 14. A different theory regarding the various verses
is advanced by R. Natan Gestetner, Natan Piryo, Makkot, pp. 216-217).

This may also be read into the format of the Torah's core prohibition in
this area. The impression created by a statement such as "do not travel
as a peddler", rather than a more straightforward formulation such as
"do not disparage... ", is that it is not an act that is being condemned,
but rather a personality type; as if the instruction is not what not to
do, but what not to be.

A further observation can be made from the fact that the Torah
characterizes the act of gossip as "walking as a peddler". The Chafetz
Chaim (Hil Lashon Hara Klal 1, BMC 4 and klal 2 12 in fn, citing the
Shlah) offers the suggestion that the intent is to include not only the
gossip itself but the prior acts leading up to it in the transgression. If
so, the message would seem to again be that lashon hara is damaging not
only because of the effect on the subject, but that the entire process
and mentality is corrosive to the speaker.

Ohr HaChaim (Lev. 19:16) suggests that the "walking" is a reference to the
dissemination of the gossip by the listeners, to refute the perception
that it may be safe to spread the gossip in a certain context where the
subject would not seem to be affected. (Chelkat Binyamin, p. 53, notes
that the Torat Kohaniminterprets the word differently; see also Emek
HaLashon, pp. 7-10. For further exposition on this topic and alternative
perspectives, see VaYita Eishel to Arakhin, 97).

All of this indicates that the very formation of the disparaging
statements in one's mind, apart from their communication to another human
being, inflicts its own cost. This can also be seen from another aspect
of the lashon hara prohibition.

Not only is there a prohibition against spreading lashon hara, but
"accepting" it (kabbalah) is also forbidden. According to the Talmud
(Pesachim 118a; see also Mishneh Torah, Hil. Sanhedrin 21:7), this
prohibition is located earlier in the Torah (Ex. 23:1), in a verse
that is complicated to translate but appears to prohibit the "bearing"
(lo tisa) of a report (shema) that is "shav", which is either translated
as false or unnecessary. In that same Talmudic passage, it is suggested
that this verse addresses the speaker of lashon hara as well, as the
report is "borne" by both the receiver and the transmitter.

It is noteworthy that Maimonides, despite his detailed treatment
of the laws of lashon hara in his Mishneh Torah, does not mention
any limitations on the prohibition of receiving lashon hara. He also
does not explicitly state that prohibition in the first place (in this
section; he does record it elsewhere), in fact only mentioning it almost
incidentally in the context of noting that the recipient is one of those
"killed" bylashon hara, and then asserting, as mentioned above, that the
recipient is worse (literally, "more") than the speaker. In addressing
this, it may be that Maimonides understands the mindset of lashon hara,
the unjustified disdain of others, as the actual offense, and the speaking
of the content as merely the vehicle for conveying that sinful attitude
to others. If so, it would be understandable that receiving lashon hara
does not merit a specific direct mention, as it is the context for the
entire prohibition, including the speaking. Further, there would be
no need to mention any exceptions or justifications, as those would
simply be excluded from the mindset of unjustified condemnation that
typifieslashon hara (a similar but significantly different approach can
be found in Emek HaLashon, 25 and 26. For a wholly different approach,
see R. Hillel Zaks, in BeYad HaLashon, pp. 329-332).

The focus on personality corrosion independent of harm gives rise to a
number of other issues. For example, lashon hara would be prohibited even
if one could envision a situation in which the speaker could credibly
maintain the subject will not be harmed (Hil. Lashon Hara klal 3, #
6. See also Tehor Sefatayim, pp. 140-141, who understands the issue to be
a dispute between Maimonides and Rabbenu Yonah. Note Resp. Az Nidberu,
XIV, 59, who assumes that this prohibition would not include incidental
discussion of information already known to the listener. Other than that
category, however, he maintains in a later responsum (loc. cit. 65) that
there is no lashon hara that can actually be characterized reliably as
harmless. See also Emek HaLashon, 15, regarding this and related issues,
and also Resp. VeDarashta VeChakarta, III, C.M. 20, and Resp. Minchat
Peri, IV, 65. See also, at length, R. Shlomo Arieli's introduction to
his expanded edition of Chiddushei R. Akiva Eiger to Pesachim).

Conversely, if a speaker speaks with malice, but the item is afterwards
determined to be important and justified, that result would not mitigate
the original offense, and the speaker would still have to undergo an
internal process of repentance (Chafetz Chaim Hil. Lashon Hara 4:11. See
R. Mordechai Karlebach, Chavatzelet HaSharon, Num. p. 338-339 and Chut
Shani, Shmirat HaLashon 1:6).

Interestingly, while the issue of speaking lashon hara to "things" may
be a newer question, the issue of speaking about things was discussed
earlier, as may emerge from the condemnation of the spies and their
slander of the land of Israel (see Mishpetei HaShalom, p.232, #23,
with fn 28. For an analysis of the prohibition of disparaging the land
of Israel, and its relevance as a source for a general prohibition of
speaking badly about inanimate objects, see R. David Yitzchak Mann,
Be'er Miriam to Hilkhot Melakhim, II, pp. 91-92.). Indeed, the Chafetz
Chaim and others do record a prohibition of slander against objects (Sefer
Yereim, 191, (41), quoted by Chafetz Chaim, Hil. Lashon Hara, 5:7 See also
R. Avraham Yisrael Moshe Solomon, Netivot HaKodesh to Arakhin, who notes
further questions on this passage. See also Zera Chaim, pp. 356-358, and
R. Mordechai Karlebach, Chavatzelet HaSharon, Num. pp. 436-438). From
one perspective, this may stem from the association certain objects
have with specific human beings, particularly if the object in question
is merchandise used in business. However, this concern may also emerge
from the corrosive effects of negativity and cynicism, even without a
human target (See Responsa Az Nidberu, XIV, 66:13; R. Shalom Yuchik,
VaYita Eishel to Arakhin, #93; and Emek HaLashon, addendum to #18).

Further, there is an additional prohibition, also found in this week's
Torah reading, against netirah, or 'bearing a grudge'. According to
some understandings, one who acts to preserve animosity within his
own heart runs afoul of this provision, leading some to suggest that
merely keeping a journal in which such feelings are recorded could be
problematic. Similarly, a conversation of this nature with AI would seem
to raise similar issues.

Most significantly, it is not guaranteed that the information imparted
to the AI will not cause any harm to the subject. This data does become
absorbed by the system, and can be reflected back later in unhelpful
ways to the original speaker, and possibly even to others, with untold
consequences.

Due to all of the above, it cannot be simply maintained that speaking
lashon hara to AI is a non-issue. That being said, lashon hara even
to people is subject at times to justification, known as toelet, or
'purpose', and such rationales would be relevant here as well, and in
some cases would indicate that AI is a preferable choice as a recipient.

'Purpose' may include not only the thwarting of a predator, but also
necessary benefit to the speaker. In this vein, it is likely that to
relate negative information in the process of confiding in a therapist,
or other helpful individuals, is justified. This point is noted by the
Chafetz Chaim (Hil. Lashon Hara, 10:14 in fn,, and see also 6:4. See
Birkat Yitzchak pp. 310-311. See also R. Yisrael Yaakov Fisher, Respona
Even Yisrael, IX,164:5, and R. Chaim Kanievsky, Derekh Sichah, p. 429; and
see also the comment of R. Moshe Chaim Shachna in Kovetz Simchat Yechiel
to Kiddushin 33a) and actually draws upon two distinct forms of benefit.

Without a doubt, the crucial realm of mental health is a self-evident
priority that itself can justify many otherwise discouraged
behaviors. More specifically, the benefit of talk therapy is identified
in the Talmud (Yoma 75a). Interpreting a scriptural verse (Prov. 12:25),
the Talmud advises "one who finds worry in his heart should discuss
the matter with others". According to the primary Talmudic commentator
Rashi, the benefit is that the listener may have some solution to the
problem. Within that interpretation, the purpose of such conversation
is functional in the practical sense.

However, it is also likely that the intent is that the very act of talking
is productive as an emotional support. Accordingly, such unburdening of
the mind should be permitted even if the listener is not likely to offer
concrete advice. It seems that this justification is grounded not only in
the productive benefit but also in that there is no intent to disparage
the individual being discussed, but rather to provide therapeutic relief
to the speaker (See R. Zevulun Shuv, Sha'arei Zevulun, YD, 76).

The listener would not necessarily have to be a professional therapist
if indeed the simple act of talking is deemed beneficial. Theoretically,
such license could be extended to "venting", if that is productive;
it should be noted, however, that there is some debate among experts
in psychology as to the actual benefit of venting anger (see Enright,
Robert, Forgiveness is a Choice, pp. 54-55, and see You Are Not So
Smart, ch. 32, and the studies cited therein). Some studies indicate
that "venting" either keeps initial anger running longer or causes
an emotional dependency on the venting that otherwise would not be
there. R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky (Emet L'Ya'akov to Orach Chaim, 156,
n182) distinguishes between one who is sharing his distress that an
offender is going unpunished, which is permitted, and one who is using
the publicizing of a misdeed as an expression of anger itself, which
he maintains is prohibited. He compares such speech to the destructive
behavior of one who smashes vessels in anger, implying that the speech
is unproductive (or counterproductive) and thus not subject to a license
of "purpose". (Compare Chelkat Binyamin, Hilkhot Lashon Hara 10:39 and
Netiv Chaim, Hilkhot Lashon Hara 1:12, with Zera Chaim p. 308).

Centuries earlier, the medieval pietist R. Yehudah HaChasid (Sefer
Chasidim. # 64) formulated this potential benefit, emphasizing also the
perspective of the listener. He described a situation in which an angry
individual is on the verbal warpath, determined to share his fury with
the world. In such a case, while listening to lashon hara is normally
discouraged, it may make sense for one to decide that he will choose
to provide an audience for this individual, under the assumption that
by doing so, he can reduce the speaker's need to tell anyone else,
while also playing a role in calming the speaker and trying to shift
his perspective more positively.

The goal of reducing the number of listeners is an important one. A
"venting license" should not be taken as a free pass to widely disparage
the source of one's anger. Emotional unburdening should be accomplished
with a very limited number of people (preferably, one person) and should
not involve the widespread dissemination of negativity (See Responsa
LeChafetz BaChaim, I, 2, and II, 1).

The therapeutic value of listening is significantly recognized in the
halakhic literature; R. Avraham Yaakov Pam, the revered rosh yeshiva
of Yeshiva Torah Voda'ath, emphasized in his lectures to his students
the often-overlooked possibilities to engage in acts of kindness even
without leaving their study hall. Among his examples, he noted, citing the
Talmudic comment cited above, that the very act of listening to another,
even when there is no practical advice to offer, is a fundamental act
of kindness (Atarah LaMelekh, pp. 22-23.).

A contemporary authority, R. Yitzchak Zilberstein (in the journal Kol
HaTorah LXI, pp. 180-182) was asked a question by a woman whose mother was
depressed, and needed to talk to discuss her problems with her daughter,
including her grievances against various people. The daughter was under
the impression that she may listen, but that she must not believe the
reports, and was concerned that such an approach would not allow her
to be much help to her mother. R. Zilberstein told her that indeed she
should listen to her mother and she should believe as well, while at the
same time mitigate the effect through extending generosity of judgment
to the subjects as far as their general character.

In considering these particular benefits, Chat-GPT may have some
advantages as the 'recipient' of the lashon hara. A helpful comparison
may come from another frequent issue in the laws of lashon hara, the
question of omitting names.

It is popularly assumed that it is permissible to relay derogatory
information as long as no names are used. However, some halakhic
authorities wondered if this was indeed the case, and some, in fact,
concluded such conversation was forbidden (see, for example, R. Akiva
Eiger-Sofer, Responsa Hitorerut Teshuvah, Vol. I-II, 270. See R. Shabtai
Sofer, Sha'arei Deah, to Mishneh Torah, Hil. Deiot, ch. 7, who understands
such to be the position of Maimonides), while others did allow if it is
clear there will be no harm caused (see R. Chaim Kanievsky, in She'ailat
Rav I, ch 7 # 9). (It should be emphasized that the discussion here is
relevant only to a situation where the identity is actually successfully
concealed; if it is at all possible the identity would be perceived,
all would agree that lashon hara is violated.)

Those who are stringent in this situation are apparently assuming that
the concealing of the identities to protect the guilty does not eliminate
the prohibited nature of the conversation. Indeed, just as a gossip
column might relay salacious information without specifying the subject,
merely stating that 'a well-known politician' has been implicated in
some scandal, there is prurient interest in such stories even without
knowing the identities of the protagonists. This interest can nurture
the negative character traits associated with lashon hara, and thus
pose a problem even when damage is not being inflicted upon the subject
(see also R. Aharon Roth, in the journal Marpei Lashon, II, pp. 16-19).

R. Shmuel Hominer, the author of a summary adaptation of the Chafetz
Chaim's writings, asserted (Ikarei Dinim, klal 3, in fn) that relating
lashon hara without the name of the subject may not be an act of
"talebearing", but is nonetheless a violation of character, and by
reinforcing the perception of the subject in the mind of the speaker
commits an act of "acceptance" of lashon hara. He maintained that such
gossip is addressed by the scriptural verses, "let none of you plot
evil against his brother in your heart" and "And let none of you plot
evil in your hearts against his neighbor" (Zach. 7:10 and 8:17. see also
Resp. Minchat Peri, IV, 65. R. Yisrael Pesach Feinhandler, in the journal
Bikkurim, II, pp. 802-804, asserts that if the identity is concealed,
there is no violation of the specific prohibition of lashon hara, but
there are many other prohibitions that may be transgressed, which he
proceeds to enumerate.)

However, such conversation may be permitted according to all views if
the intent is not to gossip but rather to convey an educational message
or cautionary exhortation. In that case, as there is neither harm to the
subjects nor a salacious motive, both elements oflashon hara appear to
be mitigated. R. Hominer acknowledges this as well, but warns that it is
necessary to ascertain that all listeners are aware of the motivation,
so as to prevent any misunderstanding that would result in the perception
of endorsing gossip.

The "Chat-GPT question" seems similar. There are certainly many factors
that caution against a casual attitude of permissibility in this
case. However, when there are justifiable goals to be accomplished,
it may be argued that technology has provided a new avenue by which to
minimize the problems and maximize the benefits. If so, this is one more
development for which we can be grateful.