[Avodah] evolving ethics?

[Micha Berger]

On Tue, Nov 29, 2022 at 10:58:18PM -0500, Joel Rich via Avodah wrote:
> At what point in Jewish history did the concept of halacha as an objective
> ethical standard (max and min) vs a floor become a topic of discussion
> (consciously or subconsciously)?

I am reminded of what I learned about the Sho'el uMeishiv's position
on copyright law in 2001. This was from a Lunch-n-Learn given at YU's
office in Manhattan by R Zev Reichman, then of REITS' Kollel Elyon.
Since I don't recall the SuM itself, I'm going to post my notes from his
survey of the topic. (The post is dated 2015, since I had then learned
R Asher Weiss's position from R Jonathan Ziring and added it.)

See my dilemma: If ethics do evolve, how do we distinguish between
ascending standards and assimilation?

   2- Our Torah Must be Moral

   The Sho'el uMeishiv (1:44) says that if secular society saw the moral
   obligation to protect an author's creation and publisher's investment,
   and this is in accord with our natural morality, it is impossible
   that the Torah would less moral. He therefore assigns ownership of
   ideas to their creator.

   This goes beyond dina demalkhusa dina; it is not an obligation to
   obey secular law, but to obey the moral goals that drove its creation.
   Since, in halakhah, ownership is eternal (barring proactively making
   a qinyan), he pasqened that copyrights are lehalakhah also eternal.

   I just want to note the SuM's assumption, and the importance he
   assigns moral rights identified by the surrounding culture.

   RZR wondered if the SuM would also recognize the French philosophy of
   copyright: that the artist could sell reproduction and profit rights,
   but eternally retains rights to controlling how the idea is changed.
   (So even if you sell a painting, the owner is allowed to copy it,
   but not modify it.) After all, this is also a secularly identified
   moral right. Would it be a halakhah only in France?

   I personally have a more complicated problem... How do we know when
   our instinctive moral compass is verifying some need identified by
   civil legislators, and when it is being influenced by external culture
   and thus a consequence of that law. It could be that halakhah must
   accept a true moral value, but it could also be that halakhah must
   help us correct a moral error.

   How do we know which is which?

So, the SuM deals with the question of either evolving morality or evolving
expectations from others creating new moral demands.

Which I guess also underlies Cheirem deR Gershom on polygamy. Was polygyny
suddenly too immoral to allow? Or were 11th cent women getting into marriage
in a world which shifted the morality?

We get a parallel issue in halakhah. Where it looks like the din changed,
but really some aspect of the situation is new and the old pesaq doesn't
really apply to the same case. One would not say that precedent is violated
and the halakhah itself changed; the metzi'us did.


Now, on to the example, slavery:
>                                  Example -- is slavery presumed to be an
> existential institution supported by halacha or an institution which must
> be dealt with halachically but not encouraged?

Third possibility: slavery is an acceptible option when the alternative was
not having enough food to go around. And therefore had no offsetting value
afterward.

This would be a change in mezi'us. Whereas slavery is tolerated when
it was the only way to get a sufficient food and clothing supply with
the given resources, it wouldn't necessarily be as tools and machines
improved efficiency.

And speaking of offsetting values, I mentioned the Chinukh offering a
one...

On Wed, Nov 30, 2022 at 04:08:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote:
> You have it backwards.   The premise Reb Joel proposed was that slavery
> might be something that halacha doesn't really like; it deals with it only
> because it has to, but it is not to be encouraged.

And I provided the Chinukh, which says that while slavery is a negative,
releasing someone who already was an eved has the offsetting bigger
negative of creating a likely sinful Jew.

> My reply is that if that were the case, the halacha would not forbid freeing
> a slave...

Unless the prohibition isn't about slavery being good, but that there
is another factor that itself would be worse. You're taking something
that was deemed the lesser evil and calling it outright moral.


And last, halakhah isn't morality. There is Hilkhos Dei'os, which
obligates one to be moral, but most of morality is subsumed under ve'asisa
hatov vehayashar. With no specific black-letter din what that consists
of in your particular situation.

Halakhah provides data points one can use to deduce values. But
experimental data isn't the actual moral principle. No more than timing
given objects falling is Newton's Law of Gravitation.

Sticking to that mashal, the Chinukh seems to be saying the parallel to:
"Feathers are subject to wind drag." Whereas Zev supposes something
more akin to, "Gravity pulls different objects different amounts." The
nimshal to the feather's wind drag is the undesirability of creating a
sinning Jew, and clouds the results too much to determine anything about
gravit... I mean slavery.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. 
http://www.aishdas.org/asp   "I want to do it." - is weak. 
Author: Widen Your Tent      "I am doing it." - that is the right way.
- https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF                 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk